Were Metternich's Peace Ouvertures in 1813 Genuine?

@Mo Cheikh As is so often the case, context is everything. There is an unfortunate tendency to look at Metternich in isolation and so for the Napoleon supporters, he is denounced for not somehow helping N to stave off the results of his own decisions.

You have to start with Austria, which had known since the Spanish Succession War a century before, that it could not fight a war on its own, especially against its traditional enemy. The 18th century saw the rise of Prussia to challenge the Habsburg position in Germany and the appearance of Russia in the European theatre with all the potential instability that could cause in the eastern lands. If you are sat in the middle, having to look at least two ways like the god Janus, it becomes a balancing act, not an opportunity for expansionism with some of border at least fully secure.

Emperor Leopold actually welcomed the French Revolution at first, believing that it would produce a constitutional monarchy that he was planning on and also renew French strength. The alliance of 1756 had created a new dynamic in Europe, albeit a difficult partnership where old rivalries were buried to control Prussian expansionism. Franz II would listen to an adviser, who brought him a plan, but inevitably others at court would have different views. So, you start with Thugut, who contrary to the mythology, really just wanted a strongman in France with whom Austria could deal. He was prepared to do a deal in 1799, but Napoleon kept up the pretence of negotiation while preparing for the 1800 campaign. Thugut has made the fateful decision to draw Russia into Central Europe, mainly for manpower reasons, a decision, which still resonates today.

The Cobenzl-Colloredo duo running policy from 1801 to 1805 was pretty ineffective as Austrian policy lacked a clear sense of direction. The losses in Italy and the inevitable end of the Holy Roman Empire left Austria essentially on her own facing an expansionist France and that had led to the Third Coalition. Prussia remained an issue, having stepped out of the war effort in 1795 to pursue expansion in Germany and Poland. This is why there was no coalition between the two between 1795 and 1813.

Stadion becomes Foreign Minister in 1806 and a big split opens up - he and the dreamier types looked to German nationalism (a force not really needed in the empire) to tackle French expansionism, but with a broken economy and a Russia at least nominally allied to France at Tilsit. Others, notably Archduke Charles, thought France was really only an issue while Napoleon was in power and that Russian expansion was the real problem in the longer term, something in which history has vindicated Charles.

The 1809 war swept away the German nationalists and the influence of Charles, so Austria was then looking for a new role in Europe as Metternich became Chancellor. Austria had been withdrawing from Germany since the end of the Seven Years War, so she was looking to enhance her position in northern Italy for its wealth and trade (contrary to more nationalist myth, Milan was generally supportive of Austrian rule). Poland had been an awkward issue as Austria had been reluctant to get involved in the partitions, but the alternative was Prussia or Russia right up against the Carpathian passes. Illyria was worth having as an adjunct to Italy, but there was no real appetite for Balkan expansion. Given her own weaknesses, Austria however needed friends in the world.

That was Metternich’s dilemma and his solution was the Concert of Europe, which worked well until the hothead nationalists got going. Initially, he recognised that even in southern Germany, Austria’s influence would be limited. So, he largely went along with Charles’s view and hence the marriage to Maria Ludovika. 1812 changed everything and 1813 was a difficult time, full of opportunities and pitfalls. Initially, Austria stayed out of fighting, but it gradually became obvious to Metternich as Siemann says, that Napoleon would not acknowledge the weakness of his own position. Metternich is then in a difficult position, given that he didn’t want Prussia and Russia to defeat Napoleon, but didn’t want yet more war, especially after Austria went bust in 1811. Look at it through Metternich’s eyes and ask yourself what you would have done, once you had come to the conclusion that Napoleon was not going to agree a settlement.

@david.a.hollins Thank you for your response which shows great knowledge. I believe that a statesman's job is to further the interests of his country. So I think that Metternich did what he thought was good for Austria. I won't demonize any of Napoleon's adversaries, they were just doing what they thought was good for their country. But as is well known morality is not the most important consideration in formulating foreign policy, so that furthering one's interests often leads to pain and misery for others. Where I disagree with some of the historians who are hostile to Napoleon is when they show empathy for all of his adversaries yet deny it to him. They present GB, Austria, Prussia, and Russia as following legitimate foreign policy objectives, objectives in the pursuit of which they are willing to go repeatedly to war. However when Napoleon tries to further what he thinks are the interests of France (when following Bourbon foreign policy for example) he is dismissed as a warmonger and a blood thirsty Tyrant. Do you think the British were ever going to accept French control over the Netherlands? French hegemony in Europe? French challenge to their mastery of the seas? Were the Austrians going to accept French presence in Northern Italy? In the former territories of the Holy Roman Empire?

The only way Napoleon might have had peace was by giving up the Netherlands, Northern Italy, the right bank of the Rhine ie giving up territories he inherited from the Directoire. Since that was not going to happen war was inevitable and would not stop until one of the sides was decisively beaten.

Going back to Metternich he was duplicitous in the pursuit of his aims as Martyn Rady explains in his book on the Habsburgs :

"Metternich was never less than duplicitous. Notoriously, in communicating with his ambassadors abroad, Metternich would send three letters. The first would announce a policy position; the second would indicate to whom it should be disclosed, and the third would give the real policy. Metternich continually referred to his principles, his interest in maintaining the rule of legitimate monarchs, and his goal of a lasting peace and balance of power in Europe. Like so much else, none of these were his true aims. Metternich’s interest was to maintain the influence of his master and of the newly proclaimed Austrian Empire (...) His stress on legitimacy was a cover for maintaining the status quo, which he had stacked to Austria’s advantage. When it came to the legitimate rights of Spain to its rebellious Latin American colonies, of the Poles to their historic kingdom, or of the city of Cracow to independence (...) Metternich was uninterested."

As A. WESS MITCHELL explains in his book on the Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire, playing for time has long been a foreign policy tool used by Austria:

" Metternich’s goal [post 1809 defeat], like that of Stadion, was to achieve a period of recueillement in which to play for time and gather strength. To do so he now embraced the first of the two strategic options that Vienna had been debating since Pressburg and Tilsit: cohabitation with the enemy. This was not the first time Austria had to accommodate a stronger foe to survive. Habsburg monarchs had long used temporary peace arrangements to improve the monarchy’s circumstances before returning to deal with an enemy from a position of strength."

@Mo Cheikh As it is 40 years ago this week that I started at UCL, I suppose I should start with Rady. He will actually be in SEES, now into UCL, but it stands for the School of East European and Slavic Studies. You can see from his biog that he is really an adherent of theceastern European view. While any book on Austria in English is worthwhile, the work you quote from is popular history and so, I would be reluctant to quote from it, not least as I haven’t been able to locate the source of the claim about the three letters.

I don’t see what Metternich could have done about Spain’s colonies as Austria lacked any capability in the area. Cracow was the only part of the Third Partition that Austria recovered, but it was for its strategic importance and to stop it falling into Prussian or Russian hands. It is not true that Metternich took no interest in Polish wishes as in 1830, he did offer to help Polish rebels and risk war with Russia, if Archduke Charles was made king. This goes back to Austria not wanting to get directly involved in Poland and preferring a buffer state, but the collapse of the kingdom in the 1790s made this no easy task.

There de interesting parallels between the 1813 negotiations and the current Brexit version. One side is thinking long term, but has many conflicting internal pressures, but with the benefit of a wily civil servant. On the other is a rather unstable state relying on nationalism and led by a regime of sycophants supporting a leader, who thinks too much in terms of his own short-term interests and legacy to history. It finishes up in a lot of rancour and posturing with judgement being rather coloured by nationalism on one side.

It was probably inevitable that Napoleon‘s regime did work in the short-term as it was unstable simply because it was a new regime with no established continuity. However, Napoleon did rely too much on his own interests and short-term needs. In 1796, he was doing his level best to obstruct Clarke, who was supposed to be opening peace negotiations in November. Napoleon needed a decisive victory ((Rivoli) and the fall of Mantua to establish his position - see the start of Zamoyski. He claimed to be seeking a negotiated peace in 1800, when actually preparing for war to establish his rule in France, but he did have the sense not to do much beyond confirming Campo Formio at the Peace of Luneville. However, by making his regime dependent on military prowess, he set off forces that he ultimately could not control.

France had not had much involvement in Germany, so moving into the vacuum created by Austria’s withdrawal inevitably maintained friction with Austria and created newcfriction with Prussia. However Napoleon’s problem was financing his army, especially given that British sea power had cut off both his colonial revenues and Spain’s ability to pay the subsidy, so he started looking for new sources of revenue, including the annexation of Piedmont in 1802. His failure to withdraw from Holland and Switzerland led to the collapse of the Peace of Amiens and his only response was to flog Louisiana to pay for another big army. Even then the Bank of France was on the edge of bankruptcy in November 1805. So, with this short-term thinking, he becomes embroiled in Spain and invades Russia. Those in Austria, who felt that France was a manageable problem or even a potential ally in 1801 knew thit could not go on. So, they went along with Roosevelt’s slogan of talking softly, but wielding a big stick.

That is why Austria did not get involved in the spring 1813 fighting, where Napoleon did much to stabilise his own position. However, Metternich was dealing with a gambler now, who believed that just one more spin of the wheel would bring success and restore his position. This can be seen in in his attempts to win and try to accept Metternich’s proposals only when the strategic situation had moved against him. Napoleon’s other key failing. which afflicts Brexiteers, is a failure to consider the other side’s position and objectives. This is a key skill in negotiation as it enables you to identify where movement is possible to reach a settlement. He like Johnson could only see negotiation in terms of victory/defeat and how it served his own position. It is tough to reach a settlement with someone, who thinks like that. Austria would have agreed to France retaining the “natural frontiers” to keep a useful ally in power and at full strength, but it was not enough for Napoleon’s ambitions.

Speaking of Brexiteers, that clown Andrew Roberts has reviewed Siemann’s book. Only an ill-informed Brexiteer could come up with his conclusion. https://newcriterion.com/issues/2019/11/metternichs-strength-in-law