Was Wellington the greatest tactician and strategist?

@john fortune Yes, the KGL cavalry was generally regarded very highly (the KGL infantry by contrast wasn't). I honestly don't know why they got carried away at Garcia Hernandez - I can only speculate but I suspect there may have been a desire to 'prove' themselves, after their comrades acquired all the glory the previous day.

The excellent article also clearly demonstrates the nonsense written by Marmont on the action.

@Zack White I wasn't aware that the KGL infantry were not well thought of.

Rory Muir's biography is a good place to start any reading on the Duke's life, though its not specifically about his operational style. I'm currently reviewing G.E. Jaycock's Wellington's Command which makes some decent counterpoints to some of the hagiography that is sometimes seen that Wellington was a commander without fault.

@Zack White

A bit telling in my view that nothing compared to Nabulieone or Frederick the Great is available on Wellington in this context - I cannot see anything sensational about his strategy in Spain, nor in tactics, both seemingly quite conventional and making the best out of what he had. His major strength, in my view was being down to earth and very realistic - compared to other commanders - about what he could achieve with his army.

But - yes, it may be due to my lack of knowledge of what made him in some peoples' view a top strategist and tactician. In case he would have been, then there should be a flood of books, at least in equal terms compared to Nabulieone - or even Archduke Charles.

Possibly he is suffering from the sun-ray beam of Nabulieone who seemingly overshadows other successful commanders and draws military historians like moths to a flame towards his art of war and by that others don't obtain the same attention as they would deserve.

I would love to read a book about any other great commanders of the Napoleonic time in such superb fashion like those of Beraud to learn more about their style of war.

@Zack White

So I listened to this talk, took all my self discipline to listen to the end, yes entertaining and myth making of Elting style, I fear I did not learn a lot of substance about Wellington's art of war - some comments I found interesting

Shane Devries
1 month ago
wagram was not even fought til ONE year after Welesley entered Portugal in 1808  My god this man

my hero Stephen Smith

Stephen Smith
4 years ago
If the great general was so great why did it take him five years to  finally defeat the French in Portugal and Spain. He needed the Portuguese and Spanish armies, not to mention the insurgents to do it. To defeat Napoleon at Waterloo he needed the Prussians to help him out of a tough spot. Most of his army at Waterloo was German and Dutch

also

Graham king
9 months ago
I have listened to you for about five minutes, and have lost count of mistakes. Lord Longford was her brother NOT her father ! Also he was younger Than the Duke as he will become Please if you are going to talk , get your facts rightYou are taking money under false pretences Sorry to say this as I like your and your sons work

From John Elting's Swords Around a Throne, 507:

'Wellington was unique, in the true sense of that abused work. England had no general equal to him then, and very few before or since. But the army he used so effectively was the work of Frederick Augustus, the famous Duke of York, who was a calamity as a general but an organizer and reformer of rare talent. He had taken a gaggle of separate regiments, each mulishly insistent on going to the devil in its own fashion, and made a national army of them. Also, he was honored as 'The Soldier's Friend.' One of his best assistants was Sir John Moore, a rare and imaginative trainer of men, who might have made a great name but was given one impossible mission too many and died in action at Corunna in 1808.'

'Wellington had been through the defeats in Flanders; he had learned logistics during campaigns in India. A superb battle captain, efficient administrator, courageous, patient, sensible, gifted with unusual foresight, he kept his army under the tightest personal control, allowing even his best subordinates little initiative. In everything he was a high-nosed Anglo-Irish aristocrat, hard, aloof, quick and apt with a cutting remark for juniors who displeased him, often ungrateful and vindictive, always courteous to those in authority over him. His men respected him for his skill-he was the long-nosed bugger who beat the French-but he was not a soldier's friend.'

'He could be completely ruthless, as in his devastation of Portugal in 1810 while he retreated before Massena into his entrenched position around Lisbon(the 'Lines of Torres Vedras'). Napoleon was quite impressed, remarking that such measures would cripple Massena's army without a battle. (Three years later, when urged to do the same thing in Saxony, Napoleon refused; Saxony was an ally, and such treatment would be dishonorable.)'

'Wellington's triumphs in Spain were all the dearer to his countrymen because earlier British campaigns-Flanders in 1793-1795; Holland in 1799; Spain and Italy in 1800; Naples and Hanover in 1805; Buenos Aires, the Dardanelles, and Egypt in 1806-1807; Spain and Sweden in 1808; and Holland again in 1809;-were a series of disasters, hasty scuttles, and pratfalls. The only real successes had been in the 1801 Anglo-Turkish overwhelming of the isolated French in Egypt and the extrication of the almost equally isolated Junot from Portugal in 1808. And even in those two cases, the French had secured terms that allowed them to go home with some swagger. Add that until 1813 Wellington's position in Spain was frequently precarious, with as many retreats as advances, and that Suchet beat off all British attempts against eastern Spain, and there is evidence enough why so many Frenchmen still had hope of victory in 1814 and 1815.'

There are no perfect generals. Generalship, like all human endeavours, is imperfect; subject to the usual human frailties. ‘Greatest’ is a comparative not an absolute term, and certainly does not mean infallible. What Wellington did routinely display was that quality of divining what was happening on the other side of the hill. Which makes those rare occasions when he was ‘humbugged’ such as 1815 all the more remarkable.

@Kevin F. Kiley In terms of the second paragraph you quote from Elting, may I suggest you visit the "Napoleonicist" website and listen to Zack White's excellent podcast on "Scum of the Earth" which puts pretty much all of the stereotypes quoted to the sword.

Interesting point re. Hill. Are you thinking of Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of the British Army 1830–54 (1984)

@Zack White A far greater problem than Wellington's conservatism or Hill's deference was Parliament's refusal to fund the army properly, which in turn reflected pressure from liberals and radicals for small government and lower taxation. There was always going to be a problem with stagnation after the long war, but budgetary pressures made it far, far worse.

Rory, you are not confusing it with the latest Defence Review are you? “plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.” 😀