Wellington’s Army Strengths by Year in the Peninsula and in Belgium. In 1809 and 1810 Wellington’s army was small by comparative standards, but steadily increased with the addition of the British-trained Portuguese Army and with attached Spanish units. In 1813 and 1814 Wellington’s army was large, as it was in Belgium in 1815.
The British Army was small, but that was a conscious decision on the part of the British government and the British army in Spain and in Belgium had to be augmented by allied troops to be able to fight the French on anything like an even basis or suffer the fate of Moore’s command in 1808. The French corps and army strengths for 1800 and 1805-1815 are given as a comparison. The average French corps strength in the main theaters are generally consistent from 1805-1815.
The information was taken from Nick Lipscomb’s Peninsular Atlas and the Esposito/Elting Atlas.
British Army strength from 1809-1815:
1809: 27,231.
1810: 34,059 at Torres Vedras.
1811: 54,000 in Estramadura and around Beira under Stewart.
1812: 50,964.
1813: 106,500; at Vittoria 94,000.
1814: 50,000 plus 30,750 Spanish.
1815: 94,600.
Average French Corps Strength by Year:
1800: Less than 20,000 each. Army strength at Marengo: Approximately 28,000.
1805: Less than 30,000 each. Army strength at Austerlitz: 73,200.
1806: Approximately 23,000. Army strength at Jena: Approximately 96,000; Davout’s strength at Auerstadt: 26,000.
1807: Eylau campaign: Approximately 19,000. Army strength at Eylau: 59,600. Friedland campaign: Approximately 21,000. Army strength at Friedland: 80,000.
1808: Approximately 18,500. Army strength for the campaign: 127,300.
1809: Approximately 38,400. Army strength at the outset of the campaign 165,000. Davout’s III Corps initially numbered 67,500. At Wagram in July Davout’s strength was 37,900.
1812: Approximately 31,000. Army strength at the outset of the campaign: 430,400. Borodino: Approximately 21,000. Army strength: 130,000. Davout’s I Corps initially numbered 69,500.
1813: Approximately 20,000 at the outset of the campaign. Army strength at the outset of the campaign: 171,000. Dresden: Approximately 20,000. Army strength on the second day: 120,000.
1814: Approximately less than 20,000. Army strength at the beginning of the campaign: 117,000.
1815: Approximately 20,000. Army strength at the beginning of the campaign: 128,000.
Not convinced by those Peninsular strengths; at least some of them must include Portuguese as well, but by no means all of them do - the figure for 1814 clearly doesn't whereas I suspect the Vitoria strength includes Portuguese and Spanish. Don't forget that my transcriptions of the theatre returns are all hosted on the NS - a summary of British Peninsular strengths over the entire war can be found at the top link here, for example: https://www.napoleon-series.org/military-info/organization/Britain/Strength/Bamford/c_BritishArmyStrengthStudyPeninsular.html
Funnily enough I was literally about to post a link to your transcripts Andrew because I spotted some numbers that didn't sit quite right. They're a great resource. I strongly recommend them to anyone who wants to understand the numbers of British troops deployed in the Peninsular during this period. Does anyone know of an equivalent for other forces?
not convinced at all about any of those numbers - what's the references for Nabulieone's forces, including his Allies ?
Also to say that the Armée de Reserve had corps is far off the mark, they were no corps at all, but divisions given a certain commander - so nothing else, as Dave Hollins would call wing commanders, an old hat in all other armies of that period.
And then
Average French Corps Strength by Year: 1800: Less than 20,000 each. Army strength at Marengo: Approximately 28,000.So a wing is almost bigger than the actual army?
Napoleon did not employ 'wings in 1800 and did organize the Army of the Reserve in corps d'armee. Desaix, Lannes, Victor, and other general officers were corps commanders in that army. See the army's organization in Gaspar de Cugnac's Campagne de l'Armee de Reserve en 1800. The orders of battle clearly designate corps-level organizations in the Army of the Reserve for the descent into northern Italy after crossing the Alps. And the army was reorganized on the march in order to give Desaix his own corps command.
Campagne de l'armée de réserve en 1800 ...: Marengo (googleusercontent.com)
Further, in Napoleon's Correspondence it is clearly outlined that Moreau's Army of the Rhine was organized on a corps level. Napoleon directed Moreau to organize the army into four corps d'armee and to organize his cavalry into divisions.
See 'Plan de campagne pour l'armee du Rhin' 22 March 1800 in Correspondence VI, number 4694, page 201.
It is high time those myths get destroyed, Moreau already created corps d'armée in 1796 - and Jourdan even earlier, Nabulieone's subcommands in the armée de réserve cannot be regarded as corps d'armée but only as wings, and those were in operation in all armies long times ago.
For more :
John Weinzierl : The Second Italian Campaign (though quite fawning about Nabulieone)
Jordan Hayworth : The French Way of War
both in
Napoleon and the Operational Art of War, edited by Michael Leggiere
and
Précis Historique de Campagnes de l'Armée de Rhin et Moselle, pendant l'an IV et l'an V