Lieutenant Colonel Charles Bevan

From Dictionnaire Biographique des Generaux et Amiraux Francaus de la Revolution et de l’Empire

(1792-1814)

Antoine-Francois Comte Brenier de Montmorand

1767-1832

Brenier began his military service as a cadet in the service of Spain in 1781. In June 1786 he was admitted to the compagnie des gendarmes ordinaires du roi. He was a captain in October 1791 and served as an aide-de-camp to General Crillon and in May 1792 was appointed as an aide-de-camp to General d’Albignac.

In June 1793 he was chef de bataillon commandant of the 6th Battalion des Cotes maritimes de l’Ouest in the Armee des Pyrenees-Orientales. He was named a provisional chef de brigade in October 1793 by the Representatives of the People on Mission. He was assigned to the 14th Ligne in September 1795 and to the 63d Ligne in January 1797.

Brenier served in Italy from 1796-1798, Holland in 1798 and in Italy in 1799. In April 1799 he was wounded in an attack on Verona and was again wounded later that month at the passage of the Adige. He was nominated as a provisional general of brigade by General Moreau in June 1799. He was confirmed in that grade in October 1799 by the Executive Directory.

In November he was appointed commandant of Coni, replacing Musnier. He served under Turreau in Divison Liebault in March 1800 and in April was appointed commandant at Tarantaise. In May 1800 he was assigned to Division Chabran and served at the capture of Fort Bard in June. He was assigned to the Army of Gallo-Batavie in November 1800 and then to the 20th Military Division in September 1801. In September 1803 he was assigned to 11th Military Division and in 1806. He served in General Delaborde’s division in the Corps of Observation of the Gironde in August 1807 and served at the Battle of Rolica in Portugal in August 1808, and was later wounded at Vimiero.

In September 1809 he was assigned to the Corps de Reserve of the Armee do Nord and was the commandant of the 2d Brigade of the rear guard of the Army of Spain in February 1810. He continued to serve in the same division under General Seras commanding the 1st Brigade and then the 3d Brigade when the division was assigned to the Army of Portugal in June 1810. In August he was assigned to the garrison of Almeida as governor and in May 1811 he blew up the fortifications of Almeida and led the escape of the garrison. He was promoted to general of division in May 1811 and was given command of the 6th Division of the Army of Portugal the following October.

Brenier was made a Baron of the Empire in February 1812 and was appointed commandant of the 25th Military Division at Wesel and in February 1813 commanded the 3d Division of the Corps of Observation of the Rhine and later the 2d Division of Marshal Ney’s 3d Corps of the Grande Armee. He served at Weissenfels in May and was seriously wounded at Lutzen. In October 1813 he was commandant of the 16th Military Division at Lille and in December he was made a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor.

He served in the army during the first restoration as well as after Napoleon’s return from Elba. He was allowed to remain in the army after the second abdication and held both command and staff assignments until he retired in Grenoble in April 1823.

From Oman's History, Volume IV, pages 352-353 (footnote):

'Wellington says (to Lord Liverpool, May 15): 'Sir W Erskine was dining with Sir Brent Spencer at headquarters, and received his orders about 4 o'clock. He says that he sent them off forthwith to the 4th regiment, which was stationed between Aldea de Obispo and Barba del Puerco...The 4th regiment, it is said, did not receive their orders before midnight, and, though they had only 2 1/2 miles to march, missed the road, and did not arrive at Barba del Puerco till after the French.' (Dispatches, vii. 566.) Tomkinson's contemporary comment on this is (pp. 102-103 of his diary): 'The order reached Sir W Erskine's quarters about 2 pm: he put it in his pocket, and did not dispatch the letter to Colonel Bevan before midnight, and to cover himself, when required to explain by Lord Wellington, said that the 4th unfortunately missed its way, which was not the case.' Many years later (1836) in his Conversations with Lord Stanhope (which see, p 89) Wellington said that he believed Bevan had his orders 'about four or five in the afternooon, but the people about him said 'Oh! you need not march till daybreak,' and so by his fault the French got to Barba del Puerco.' Napier (History, iii. p 156) says plainly that 'Erskine sent no order to the 4th regiment.' Colonel Bevan always maintained that he got nothing from Erskine till nearly midnight.

Further, the footnote on page 356 states:

'For statements showing that every one believed Erskine to be the responsible person see Stepney, p 105: 'instead of promulgating the orders the general, it is said, put them in his pocket and forgot them.' George Simmons (p 174): 'Bevan was too late owing to Sir W Erskine, by accident, not sending him an order in time.' Charles Napier (Diary, p 173), It is said that Sir Wm Erskine is to blame, and next to him General Campbell.'

Oman writes on page 356: 'Public opinion in the army held that [Bevan] had been sacrificed to the hierarchical theory that a general must be believed before a lieutenant colonel.'

Thanks Tom - always love a bit of Ward. I think he's very fair about the whole thing not being Bevan's fault. The fact remains though, Wellington did not name Bevan, far less (if we continue the discussion from the other thread), pursue a vendetta against Bevan. Muir also offers these in his online commentary: https://www.lifeofwellington.co.uk/commentary/chapter-25-fuentes-de-onoro-april-june-1811/?highlight=Bevan

Lt Col Bevan and the 4th’s role in Brennier’s escape:

In his account of the affair to Lord Liverpool Wellington wrote that ‘The 4th regt., which was ordered to occupy Barba de Puerco, unfortunately missed the road, and did not arrive there until after the enemy had reached the place.’ (Wellington to Liverpool, 15 May 1811, WD V p 18-20. Parts of this letter, including the passage referring to the 4th regt were published in The Times of 29 May 1811). This was putting the best interpretation on the 4th’s late arrival, for the view at headquarters, as expressed by Alexander Gordon, was rather more critical: ‘The battalion which had been ordered from Aldea Obispo to Barba del Puerco, by some neglect, and inconceivable delay of sending the order and carrying it into execution, did not arrive at its destination till seven in the morning of the 11th.’ (Alexander Gordon to Aberdeen, Villar Formoso, 15 May 1811 At Wellington’s Right Hand p 203-6). Neither Wellington nor Gordon said whether the delay was attributable to Erskine, the commander of the division, Dunlop, the commander of the brigade, or Bevan, the commander of the battalion.

In the army, the story circulated that when the order arrived Erskine had been at dinner and pocketed it unread, only forwarding it hours later when it was too late. (Tomkinson Diary p 101-3; Simmons British Rifleman p 174: both entries in these ‘diaries’ were clearly written later, probably after the war, when the original slim pocket books were copied out and expanded into the form we have received them). However Charles Cocks says, in a letter written at the time, that ‘An English general delayed executing the order he received to occupy the bridge at Barba del Puerco and the garrison of Almeida slipped out’, which certainly points to Erskine. See also Hercules Pakenham to Lord Longford, 20 June 1811, Pakenham Letters p 104 who also blames Erskine but who tells a totally different story from Tomkinson and Simmons. Yet if Erskine was really so much at fault it is strange that Wellington did not blame him for the affair even in his most private letters home to William Wellesley-Pole. He was not normally slow to expatiate on the faults of subordinates.

Even if Erskine was to blame, it does not fully explain why the 4th took so long to reach Barba de Puerco when both the French and Douglas’s Portuguese had so much further to march. Bevan’s own account of the events of the night is far from clear: he does not say when he received his orders, but he does admit that he knew that the French column had passed near him and that he decided not to pursue it in case this permitted other French troops to use the bridge he was guarding. This was a simple error of judgement: the bridge he was guarding was over the Dos Casas stream, which was fordable at many places, while the bridge at Barba de Puerco was the only way the French had of crossing the Agueda. Bevan’s account is quoted in Hunter Wellington’s Scapegoat p 153; see also p 143-44 and Ward ‘Brenier’s Escape from Almeida’ p 29-30. (Brennier’s name can be spelt with one or two n’s; Ward uses one; I use two). Neither Hunter nor Ward can clearly identify the bridge which Bevan says he was guarding, but it is certain that it was not over the Agueda. Bevan may not have understood this – maps were scarce at time – but he took it upon himself to exercise discretion in not obeying an order, despite the limited information available to him. The responsibility was willfully incurred, and far from being an innocent victim or scapegoat, he was fortunate that the finger of blame was not pointed more directly at him in the immediate aftermath of the garrison’s escape.

Ward writes that there was ‘one battalion in “the deep field” at Barba de Puerco’ (p 29) which gives an idea of its role. He spells this out more clearly later on:

I confess, however, that the movements of the 4th do not seem to me the principal feature in the escape of the garrison. It cannot have been intended that the 4th, amounting, say, to 400 men, should meet head on, and intercept unaided, 1,400 desperate Frenchman. The army fought at worse odds, it is true, but this was a preconceived movement in which Wellington did not commonly hazard his troops to that extent. The 4th should, more properly, be regarded as a large outlying picquet posted to give the alarm and make as much a nuisance of itself as possible until the rest came up. It was part, but only part, of the arrangements taken to prevent an escape. (Ward ‘Brenier’s Escape from Almeida, 1811’ p 33).

It certainly seems clear that too much emphasis has been placed on the 4th; however there is little room to doubt that if the 4th had been in place at Barba de Puerco they would have delayed Brennier for long enough for other allied troops to come up. Still, the arrangements for the blockade were plainly inadequate in other respects.

Ward also doubts Bevan’s account of his movements:

His explanation cannot be altogether believed. If the French garrison broke through the picquet line between midnight and one o’clock, it could not have reached “the river” (whether “the river” be the Tourões or the Dos Casas) until two or three at the earliest. By which time, if Bevan had obeyed his orders strictly, he should have reached Barba de Puerco. Poor man! No one can have suffered more from a momentary weakness shown at an hour when the body’s resistance is at its lowest ebb. He deserves every sympathy. (Ward ‘Brenier’s Escape from Almeida, 1811’ p 33).

It is worth noting that Bevan did not say that he believed that his orders were not meant to be obeyed until morning, but rather, tacitly admitted that they should have been acted on at once, hence his explanation for not doing so.

Wellington did not single Bevan out for particular criticism:

This is arguable, for Wellington did lay the blame for the escape on the 4th, though without naming Bevan or imputing much fault to him. He told Liverpool: ‘The enemy are indebted for the small part of the garrison they have saved principally to the unfortunate mistake of the road to Barba de Puerco by the 4th regt.’ (Wellington to Liverpool, 15 May 1811, WD V p 18-20). And, ‘Thus your Lordship will see that, if the 4th regt. had received the orders, issued at 1, before it was dark at 8 o’clock at night; or if they had not missed their road, the garrison must have laid down their arms; and the same would have occurred if Lieut Col Douglas had remained at Barba de Puerco; and possibly the same would have occurred had the pursuit been judiciously managed.’ (Wellington to Liverpool, 15 May 1811, WD V p 20-22.) Still, this hardly compares with the public criticism directed at Cochrane, or even the criticism of Long implicit in Wellington’s comments on Campo Mayor.