1796. July… August… September… Three months in which Napoleon Bonaparte’s north Italian army runs rings around the Austrians… On the Rhine the French commanders simply can’t get their act together… And in Paris the Directory looks on, uncertainly, as their young general’s star continues to rise. This is episode 19 of the Napoleonic Quarterly – covering three months in which Bonaparte proves that the best form of defence, strategic or otherwise, is attack.
[12:45] - Rick Schneid on Bonaparte's escape from the trap set by the Austrian general Wurmser
[28:53] - Jordan Hayworth on Moreau and Jourdan's clashes with Archduke Charles on the Rhine
[52:31] - Biancamaria Fontana on the worries, insecurities and general wobbliness of the Directory government in Paris
Plus Charles Esdaile and Alexander Mikaberidze offer their analysis of the political situation throughout, including in north Italy, south Germany and Spain.
Another very informative and highly enjoyable podcast from Napoleonic Quarterly.
Still it strikes me how poorly the campaign in Germany is understood and how the big lament is still seemingly en vogue how and why those two experienced generals, Jourdan and Moreau with two powerfull armies fail, despite it is even explained in the podcast. Number one is, those two generals were obeying the orders from their government. Secondly - in case it is true and Carnot planned an evelopment of the Austrians instead of an unit onslaught - it is pretty obvious why they failed. Just look at the maps, Jourdan is on the Main valley, but where is Moreau and how could he even dream to conect? It is not just simply marching back up the Rhine and follow the tracks of Jourdan up the Main, or just march up to the Danube, then invade Bavaria and march direction of Ingoldstadt, from there to Nürnberg and then maybe possible find Jourdan to make a connection of those two armies. And the next would be, in case those two armies unite, who would command it and fromulate the strategical goals? Moreover one would have to consider, how could those two commanders establish their lines of communications between each other, how could they send their ADCs and what route should they chose? Erzherzog Karl in fact, acts like Bonaparte in Italy, he operates from interior lines, and checks successfully first Moreau and then rolls back Jourdan culminating in the battle of Würzburg. While - rightly Boney's success in Italy is fawned all over, the skill how Karl conducted the defense in Germany is IGNORED. Not without reason Karl got the title Saviour of Germany.
I liked very much how they portrait the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations, and yes a lot of those small catholic states stayed loyal to the Empire, Reichstreu, and they were usually successfully ruled by their often church leaders as the Fürstbischöfe - as in my home time Bamberg in 1789 a very modern and big hospital was built and not only castles.
The difference of Jourdan / Moreau and Bonaparte is that Bonaparte in the end cut loose from the directions of the Directoire and acted much much more politically than any other Republican General before him (with the excepition of maybe Dumouriez).
Just finished reading Jordan H. Hayworth : Revolutionary France's War of Conquest in the Rhineland.
Here the author paints a rather grim picture about the state of the French Revolutionary armies in that area. One is wondering how at all those two armies of Jourdan and Moreau could wage any offensive war and why those armies of the Republic were in such a sorry state.
While the author is good when doing original research he falls again into the Napoleonic propaganda trap - like that Barras appointed Boney to counter the "royalist" uprising of 1795 fame. Shocking to read such myths by professional historians and being published in the Cambridge Military Historiies - spreading the legend even more, needless to say of ArcolA fame as well.
Here a map - showing where Moreau did operate, and what was in between him and Jourdan, there wasn't any convenient valley to follow.
By the way, it is pretty evident that in 1800 Moreau did gain quite a profit from operating in his campaign on the Danube.