Was D’Erlon’s attack in line formation?

Eric,

I am following your other thread on columns with interest but need more time to digest all the information which you and others have kindly provided; but my quick scan through only seems to emphasise (to me at least!) the lack of clarity in the descriptions as each column ‘name’ can mean different things (I will read through it again more carefully!). I understand that it supports this discussion.

So, back to d’Erlon!

In your opinion, is the correct description of d’Erlon’s columns at Waterloo, ‘Colonne par Bataillon’ as described in the 1st Corps War Diary? You are right that colonne de division par bataillon does not seem to appear in any contemporary accounts that I have found, but I have read it a number of times in secondary accounts and I notice that Pierre de Wit uses it in one of the links to his excellent website that you put in your post. It may not be the official designation, but it does help to fully understand what ‘we’ are talking about; Colonne par Bataillon does not clarify whether the battalions of the division should be in line or column, yet the difference is significant.

Hello Andrew,

thanks for your feedback. well, see in P. de Wit the footnote n° 27 > the "formation" is described as "colonne par bataillon" by severals. So the question is : what is exactly a colonne par bataillon-colonne par bataillons ? and does it match with D' Erlon's Divisions formations ? (so the other thread about columns for a larger point on view).

27. Lieutenant Martin (45th regiment of the line, division Marcognet) mentions the formation en colonne par bataillons et en masse.

In his memoirs, Martin refers to the formation par bataillons déployés, se suivant à 4 pas de distance. 

Corporal Canler (28th regiment of the line) states that his brigade was formed en colonne serrée par bataillon.  Captain Duthilt refers to the formation as en colonne d’attaque par bataillon.

Durutte states all divisions were formed en colonnes par bataillon. Adjudant Gastinieau (13th regiment of light infantry, division Donzelot) says his division was formed “tous les bataillons déployés, rangés à 5 pas les uns des autres.”

Chef de bataillon Rullière states that each division of the corps formed one column: the 1st battalion was deployed and the seven others were placed serrés en masse sur le premier seulement à 5 pas de distance d’un guide à l’autre.  General Schmitz speaks of his division (the 2nd) being en colonnes par bataillon. The exception is general Noguès claiming his brigade (division Marcognet) was formed in bataillons échelonnés. He also denies he had skirmishers in front.

Thanks for the additional links

The war diary of the 1st Corps can be found in Journal de campagne du Ier Corps, from the 12th to the 18th June 1815 (in Operations of the Armee du Nord: 1815, by Stephen Beckett, Volume I, pages I-447-452), which I have in front of me.

The exact wording is,

‘… il [Napoleon] ordonna au Cte d’Erlon de faire ses dispositions pour attaquer l’Ennemi par la gauche, de former à cet effet chacune de ses divisions en Colonne par Bataillon et de les faire marcher en Echelon, en dirigeant Celui de droite de manière a attaquer la gauche de L’Ennemi vers Smohain, en ayant soin de masque aussi longtems qu’il serait possible le mouvement…’

Please share your own thoughts or knowledge on this interesting subject.

 de former à cet effet chacune de ses divisions en Colonne par Bataillon 

It is difficult to understand such an order at all, I agree that Drouets interpretation is the most likely one, each battalion in line behind each other, on the other hand - Boney's order is not saying anything more about it other that each of his divisions should be formed in a battalion column. It doesn't specify for example that close column formation or masse.

In case I compare that with the orders to Soult how to attack the Pratzen and how Soult modified it and even then how the division / brigade commanders even changed that again, I see a big difference in what way the French Army did develop, 1815 - it has loss all the flexibility of 1805, I cannot understand the enthusiasm that this was one of the best armies Boney did command, for me - it was the worst.

Barry, I suspect, as with all things Waterloo, the subject of this thread still has legs. Probably to be addressed in a glut of books in 2025, 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, 2050, 2055, 2060 and set to be a controversy again in 2065. Any of you youngsters accessing this on the archive, I’ll let you be the judge!

Barry, I’m very happy to have helped; I am always keen to share what knowledge I have and the information I have discovered. If you have questions on any other aspects of the Napoleonic Wars, please feel free to ask them on the Forum; if you still have anything in particular on this subject, please contact me through Zack.

Quite an interesting thread, and I have learnt quite a few for me new aspects as well.

That’s the man; thank you.

During the battle of Waterloo, Rullière commanded the 2nd Battalion of the 95th de ligne. This regiment was part of the 2nd Brigade (Brüe) of the 4th Infantry Division (Durutte), part of I Army Corps (d’Erlon).

Rullière was born in 1787. He accumulated forty three years of service and made twenty two campaigns. Vélite in the Guard in 1807, lieutenant in 1811, captain in 1812, chef de bataillon in 1813 and in 1815. His personal file carries the following specifics: ‘This superior officer saved at Waterloo, at seven thirty in the evening, the eagle of the 95th Regiment at the moment when Brue’s brigade of Durutte’s division was thrown into the middle of the English army by Marshal Ney who had put himself at the head of this brigade when the whole army was beginning its retreat.’ [S.H.A.T. Dossier Rullière, G.D. 2nd Série 1135.] He went on to become a général de division and then a politician, though the latter only for a short time. The coup d’État of the 2nd December 1851 put an end to his career. He died in 1863.

Thanks Andrew. I’ve always thought that Mandy Rice-Davies would have made a great Waterloo scholar. Remember her court testimony in the Profumo affair, when presented with contrary evidence? “Well, he would say that, wouldn’t he?” Quite. However, as you rightly point out, we have to add more than just understandable hubris or convenient memory of the participants. Hard on it’s heels, and beyond the usual problems of bias and heuristics, comes the jingoism, xenophobia, sycophancy and hagiography of the various acolytes masquerading as historians. When you add a scholarly thin-skinned vanity and the opportunity of making a quick buck off of what must be one of the most written about Sunday afternoons in history, you have a heady brew indeed. That’s what has kept my interest in this battle ever since I saw the film and acquired the Ugo Pericoli book over four decades ago. Well over a thousand titles later (including all of yours!) and I have to admit that in some respects my understanding has gone backwards. My only real criticism of Gareth Glover’s “Myth and Reality” is where are the other two volumes? I’m getting to see why Wellington’s aversion to histories might be wise! The time is coming though where the rise of artificial intelligence might be coming to our aid. The police have been refining systems like HOLMES for years. We are fast approaching a time where we can throw all of that testimony into a neural network. It could then find all of the points of correlation, sift all of connections and hang the whole thing on a time and space skeleton. With the accounts then suitably weighted, and adding in the physical evidence of archeological projects like Waterloo Uncovered and I suspect we would get a very different narrative emerging than the one we are used to. To Andrew, and all others making primary sources available in more languages, thank you and more power to your elbows. Barry, many of us are much further down the road, that is true. We are not necessarily any closer to our destination, even so. I envy you the journey, enjoy the twists and turns! Yours ever, David

David; I somehow feel that if we really knew what happened at Waterloo, it would rather tarnish the romance and intrigue of the battle!!

In case artificial intelligence gets this good, I hope I am dead then there is no need for the human brain.

In general one has to be beware of the blurb, taking on assessments of authors without reflection, author A brings it up, B copies it and then it becomes general wisdom. This happened quite a lot in books about the Napoleonic period, but when looking close, a lot of those statements collapse into dust.

I cannot share your conclusions at all, about Jemappes. As our research concluded that those bataillon de Jemappes or colonne de Mons, or whatever, was just a makeshift column of rallied French soldiers - and those column did not gain the brake through, but was one of many.

I don't know if Drouet d'Erlon fought at Jemappes - he was then a caporal of the Chasseurs de Reims then.

He mustn't be confused with Francois Richer Drouet and who lost a leg and died at the 6th of November 1792.

nothing more to say on Hamilton-Williams: Hofschröer, Peter.Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 73, no. 294, 1995, pp. 138–141.JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44229992. Accessed 6 July 2020.

And then read this: http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=134915.

"H-W crawled back under his stone, although he persists in using the name and the ####### had the temerity to write to the Daily Mail site about the Armed Forces Memorial recently opened in the UK (where my father is among the 14,000 listed). Unfortunately, some publisher has republished this nonsense and so it remains in circulation., However, it is best used to prop up the wonky table or keep the door open.

The man is a proven liar and even superficial checks will show that he was making claims up and inventing sources." from: xxxxx from the Miniatures Place (22 Feb 2008).

Yet you will find that a lot of authors again and again will used this work of H-W

Barry,

(I hope you do not feel the following is patronising; it’s not meant to be) You will now have realised that every history must be based on the published reports/correspondence etc., and individual eye-witness accounts of the campaign or battle you are studying. You will have seen from this thread that much of this information is contradictory, falsified, mistaken etc., etc., so that every history is the author’s own interpretation of the sources (complete or incomplete) and his own particular bias (conscious or unconscious). It therefore follows that everyone will have their own favourite account of the battle which many others will hate/dislike because their own interpretation is different! I guess we can also state therefore, that no account of Waterloo is entirely accurate. There are many good accounts and many bad ones; the bad ones are either bad because the reader does not agree with the author’s interpretation, or because the author has based his accounts on poor secondary or even tertiary accounts with no original research of their own.

To get a real feel for the various interpretations of the battle, it is necessary to read many and make up your own mind. As I studied the battle I soon learned not to believe everything I read! It is important to understand on what sources/accounts etc., each author has based his interpretation and to learn what is available so that you can identify what they have chosen to ignore or not consulted. Many of the earlier English language accounts were very Anglo-centric because they only used English sources and were often very dismissive of the contribution of their allies. That does not mean they are without value, but this means you must fully understand this is the case. Luckily, in more recent years, authors have begun to publish the accounts of the other nations involved in the battle and this has generated a more even-handed and more thorough understanding of the battle.

I will therefore make my own initial recommendations, hoping, and knowing (!) others will have different opinions and hopefully also make useful recommendations. There is, of course. , a wealth of information available in other languages, but I have restricd myself to English (sorry Hans-Karl!!).ted

On line, I do not think you will do better that Pierre de Wit’s outstanding https://waterloo-campaign.nl/ This is a great start; and free!!!

For a modern, even-handed account of the battle (2005), I would recommend Alessandro Barbero’s The Battle, A History of the Battle of Waterloo.

For something older and lighter, but an easier read, try David Howath’s A Near Run Thing.

Mark Adkin’s The Waterloo Companion has some failings but is an excellent primer, well-illustrated with lots of useful context. Heavy and more a coffee table book, easy to dip in to and out of and highly recommended.

For eye-witness accounts you will not do better (I think!) than:

British:

Siborne’s The Waterloo Letters and the follow-up Letters from the Battle of Waterloo, edited by Gareth Glover which contains all the letters not published in Siborne’s volume.

The volumes of Gareth Glover’s invaluable Waterloo Archive series; volumes I, III, IV and VI (with maybe more to come).

Dutch-Belgian:

John Franklin’s Netherlands Correspondence.

I believe Gareth Glover is going to publish a Netherland’s volume in his Waterloo Archive series soon.

For the Dutch-Belgian perspective of the campaign see Erwin Muilwijk’s excellent three volume series.

Prussian:

Peter Hofschroer’s volumes (Just remember what I said about some authors having their own agenda!).

Hanoverian/Nassau/Brunswick:

John Franklin’s Hanoverian Correspondence.

Gareth Glover’s Waterloo Archive series volumes II and V (and more to come I think!). Letters from the Battle of Wateroo (see above).

French:

My four volume French Perspective series are full of French accounts/reports/correspondence, but is a history of the campaign and therefore very much my interpretation with which not everyone will agree. For a different French interpretation you might try Paul Dawson’s books.

I have just published a volume with just the accounts of French eye-witnesses to the battle (The French at Waterloo, Eye-Witness Accounts; rather unjustly judged by people who had not read it on this forum in January(!)) with the second volume due out in the next couple of months. You can therefore make your own interpretations of their accounts, though I do point out why they may contain inaccuracies or personal agendas.

That was much longer than I planned, but I hope it is useful. I am sure others will make equally useful contributions.

Hi Andrew, I am fairly thick skinned and probably set myself up a bit. I have saved the above list, thanks.

One thing that I have been puzzling over though. The Dutch/Belgians I believe we’re fighting in line at Waterloo. Was this their usual formation or was it imposed by Wellington? If so how did they cope with the change, would they not have suffered the same communication problems that you and Hans-Karl mentioned the French would have in the d’Erlon attack.

I found the diagrams, let's see if I can insert them all here

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finally

Whilst I agree that the village of MSJ and the road junction it lay on was an important strategic point, none of the French army would have been able to see it, which makes it a strange objective to set initially. Also the grand battery could neither see it, nor reach it; it was far out of range. So I still have my own concerns.

I agree that they could not see it on the field, but surely on the map. The French should have known this area as well as the Allies, Wellington, Belgians, or even better there they fought extensively already there in the French Revolution.

Soult was there already in 1794, as well as Ney who was part of Klébers staff, also Pajol, etc.

Here is what Muilwijk has to say: in Standing Firm at Waterloo, he writes of Bijlandt’s position,

‘… It is now well possible [sic] the array for battle was changed for the brigade, either by or in cooperation with Major-General van Bijlandt and Lieutenant-General Perponcher. On their immediate right some companies of the 95th Rifles were positioned behind the Ohain road, followed next by the six guns of Captain Rogers’ battery. To their left the seven guns of Captain Bijleveld’s horse battery were now to be positioned… The embankments of the road here were partially covered with pollard willows and hedges. Wherever necessary the latter were cut down to provide a clear field of fire… Meanwhile the two weakest battalions of the brigade, which had suffered severely two days prior during the battle of Quatre Bras were posted in the second line of the brigade. The 27th Jägers Battalion was more or less placed behind Bijleveld’s battery, while the 5th National Militia Battalion was to the rear of their left flank. Both battalions had a little over a hundred to one hundred and fifty active men left. In the front line of defence van Bijlandt and Perponcher placed the relatively unscathed battalions… From right to left these were the 8th National Militia Battalion, the 7th Line Battalion and the 7th National Militia Battalion. All battalions were positioned behind the hollow road and outside the enemy’s line of sight on the reverse slope. The three battalions in the first line each detached a flanker company or two, which each had its reserve placed in the hollow road and the skirmishers on the forward slope, aligning with the 95th Rifles positioned in the sandpit east of La Haye Sainte.’

In his description of d’Erlon’s attack, Muilwijk only quotes Sheltens and Perponcher’s chief-of-staff that I quoted elsewhere. However, he also writes,

‘Opposite Bijlandt’s three battalions in the first line it was Donzelot’s division that approached against the partial fronts of the 8th National Militia and the 7th Line, while based upon the combination of accounts of both Netherlands and British soldiers, given the frontage presented by Bijlandt’s brigade, the left of Marcognet’s division approached against the 7th National Militia.’

He then quotes Captain Martin of the French 45th de ligne, which is worth including here,

‘Finally we arrived on the height. We were about to receive the prize for all that bravery. Already the English began to take to their heels, already their guns retired at the gallop. A hollow road lined with hedges was the sole obstacle that separated us from them. Our soldiers did not wait for the order to overcome it. They threw themselves across it, jumped over the hedges and opened up their ranks to run at the enemy. Fatal imprudence!’

He then describes how the brigade fell back behind the British second line and rallied as the British cavalry went forward to make their charge which broke the French attack.

Etendue de terrain qu'occupe une Troupe en ligne.

"D'après la mesure donnée de la place qu'un homme occupe dans le rang ; l'étendue de terrain qu'occupe une subdivision en ligne comprend toujours autant de pas de deux pieds qu'il y a d'hommes au premier rang.

(...) Ayant admis en principe que l'espace de front qu'occupe un soldat dans le rang est de deux pieds, et que son pas est aussi de deux pieds," ..

www.google.fr

from the guides !

Hi Zack, I have added my full name to the profile but not sure it has updated properly? Does it take some time before it shows?

Hi Zack sorry now sorted. by the way I have really enjoyed your Waterloo anniversary series.