I want to start a discussion regarding Moore's military record.
At first (when I just had a general surface level understanding of him), I thought of him as being similar to Barclay de Tolly in terms of achievements; Like Barclay, being involved in military reforms and saving an army from destruction for it to triumph in the end under another commander (with their respective Russia and Corunna retreats).
Now however, my estimation of him has gone down. Firstly, he was the overseer of the Light Infantry training at Shorncliffe and not the creator nor implementer of the training program (that was chiefly Colonel Kenneth Mackenzie). Secondly, Charles Esdaile has made multiple points regarding the Corunna campaign which make him out to be a bungler whose army survived through luck.
So, how does everyone else rate him? Am I wrong? Is there something I've missed? Feel free to make your opinions known.
He was dealt a very bad hand for the Corunna campaign - from the time of year, to limited logistics and a lack of shipping, and with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight it's easy point to errors where he didn't play his hand particularly well - such as the multitude of routes he took into Spain. But I things probably looked very different from his point of view, especially with the orders he had.
The main issue I have with the way he's seen as 'the father of Light Infantry' in the British army is that if you look at all the works written on light troops during the 18th century you can see the evolution of thought on the subject. And singling him out ignores other contributors like Howe, Grey, de Rottenburg etc. The vast majority of light infantry in the British Army had nothing to do with Shorncliffe. He was less the father of LI and more one of the many midwives.
None of the Russian ships did (they were handed over on the premise they would be returned at the end of the war), but 15 Danish ships of the line were brought back from Copenhagen in 1807. However only three of them saw active service in the RN — most of the others were converted into prison ships. The Portuguese ships were the property of an allied government, and thus not part of the RN.
I am amazed at the ignorance of many authors of standing who cannot comprehend.
The Secretary of State of War decided upon policy and has input in appointing the commander in consultation with the C-in-C.
Generals go to where they are told.
Moore requested to be sent to India and this was refused.
Moore was heavily consulted in new technology, amphibious landing and the life. Remember that his plan for the invasion of Alexandria was consulted for DDay 1944.
Burrard was 2-i-c at Copenhagen.
Dalrimple was Governor of Gibraltor and was heavily involved in support the Spanish especially Castanos.
Britain could not fight alone and needed allies.
Britain followed the Naval strategy and nibling at the edges.
Moore in 1809 had the only disposable force Britain had.
Interesting that this army went to Walcheren 1809 and was already sick. Look at the reduction of the garrison of Kent and SE subsequently and the trippling of the British in the Peninsular. Walcheren succeeded in terms of the Naval Strategy. Destroyed and put back the ability for the Dutch to built Ships of the Line.
Napoleon failed to obtain the fleets of Portugal, Russia and Denmark. The Russians had a powerful fleet in Lisbon in 1807 but their admiral kept aloof from Junot. The ships were then taken back to Portsmouth in 1808 and most were scrapped in 1813.
A General does not got out to do the basic training. He builds a team to do that and inspires them. Moore created concepts that became the modern British Army. The care of the men by the officers. The bottom up rather than top down. Punishing the mess in order to use pear pressure to keep soldiers in line. Officers were expected to be able to do what they expected the men to do.
If we mean men like carabinier Favreau then his training was barely a few days. Probably all he could do to stay on his horse, never mind defend himself or manoeuvre in a unit. https://museum-of-artifacts.blogspot.com/2018/10/the-breastplate-of-cuirassier-23-years.html?m=1
This is in bold contrast to Napoleon, who was praised by Clausewitz as a trainer (not only troops, but commanders as well), as well as by Von Funck.
What is a trainer of troops, teaching them how to march in step?
In that way Boney wasn't one, he formed an organisation, which was tailored to his suits and style of war, as any great commander would do.
The training of the units - was left to their corps commanders, see for example Ney's instruction of those of Davout.
I would welcome any quotes of Clausewitz or von Funck on this to see them in context.
I think the problem is that Corunna overshadows everything else. The criticisms alluded to are almost universal though: Soldiering is a team game, therefore we can always point out that an individual was not as important as others think they are. Operations are extremely complex affairs with many moving parts and complex risk profiles. No commander can survive without their fair share of fortune. It is easy therefore to see any commander, no matter how talented, at times ‘riding his luck’. We have a predisposition towards the heroic. Both contemporaries and historians tend to build pedestals upon which to install figures. It makes toppling them off in the coconut shy of social media relatively easy. I would tentatively suggest therefore that the journey you describe with Sir John speaks rather more of our modern processing of history than the man himself. Like Nelson, he died a hero’s death. Unlike Nelson, his legacy is not attached to a resounding victory. However, it is likely that contemporary opinion would have been over-shadowed by his sacrifice. We see an echo of this, with all those accounts of Napoleon at Waterloo describing his desire to be killed in battle. I do wonder though if we have seen everything there is to write on him. Personally, I’d love to see something from any modern generals with experience of commanding expeditionary forces, as I think they may have useful insights.
did anybody read this:
Sir John Moore and the
Universal Soldier
VOLUME 1: THE MAN, THE COMMANDER AND THE
SHORNCLIFFE SYSTEM OF TRAINING
Stephen Summerfield and Susan Law
Epilogue by General Sir Nick Parker.
Ken Trotman
In association with
SHORNCLIFFE LECTURES No. 3
Maybe other volumes were published as well.
It also seems that Moore's role at the battle of Alexandria is frequently passed over in the haste to get on to discussing Shorncliffe and Spain. Moore's Reserve division formed the right flank of Abercromby's position before Alexandria and bore the brunt of the French pre-dawn attack on March 21st. Although at times the chaotic fighting descended into something of a 'soldiers' battle,' with the line penetrated on several occasions and Abercromby himself, it is said, obliged to tangle with a pair of French dragoons, Moore who had quickly dismissed demonstrations over on the left as diversionary attacks, ensured his troops were ready to meet the main attack on the right.
A more recent biography of Moore is Sir John Moore The Making of a Controversial Hero by Janet Macdonald, Pen and Sword 2016. See the review on the Napoleon Series website. It is known that Wellington pressed Moore to become the Commander of the army in Portugal after Cintra and Wellington would take a command in his army. In fact Wellington was placed on the staff of Moore's army when Moore was to command in Spain. The Cintra Inquiry and Moore's subsequent retreat prevented Wellington from joining.
The government had confidence in Moore and if he had decided to retreat to Portugal instead of Corunna, Moore would be given the chief command and General Cradock, Moore's superior then commanding there, was to be recalled.
According to Hibbert's Corunna Wellington's opinion expressed to Lord Fitzroy Somerset was 'You know, Fitzroy, we'd not have won, I think, without him.' Referring to the regiments Moore trained 'the backbone of the Army.'
>"I'd like to see a really good biography of Moore - something in the style of Rory Muir's work - but there just hasn't been one). But then I have the same desire for a series of such books on Napoleon's marshals. If a third of the ink that has been expended on Wellington and Napoleon was to be directed elsewhere..."<
I agree about both of them. There are many characters from our era I'd love to see get a good, modern biography. That's not to say good books don't still get published--Muir's biographies or the recent "To Kidnap a Pope" are good examples--but I hope some of the others get their historians.
I think part of it is celebrating Moore is seen as a backhanded slap to A. Wesley, and all the honors can't be shared.