I want to start a new feature where each week a pose a question that will hopefully spark some POLITE discussion across the forum.
This week's question: who was Napoleon's greatest marshal?
You pick the criteria that you want to use for judging it (that's part of what should make the discussion interesting).
Happy posting!
Z
Davout, the only other real option is Massena but his best days were during the Republic, though winning Caldiero doesn't get enough respect, while Soult (in Wellingtons words) knew how to get to a battle but didn't know what to do when he got there. Davouts victories include opponents such Blucher/Archduke Charles and Barclay and Bagration.
He against Wellington is a great what if and it would've been a real 50/50 though if Davout rather than Ney had commanded at Quatre Bras I think Davout would've won that.
So the notorious 'What if" adds to one's merite??
Who needs a what if. His actual record speaks for itself
Apparently the British didn't think much of "Davoust"
print; satirical print; broadside | British Museum
Grouchy. He was never really defeated and any poor outcomes were not of his own making!
The one indispensable marshal was Berthier, the chief of staff. He was essential to Napoleon's method of waging war and he is one of history's great chiefs of staff. He was definitely head and shoulders above any other chief of staff of the period and his general staff was the most efficient of the period. And he also pulled double duty as Minister of War from 1800-1807.
Ferdinand von Funck, the Saxon liaison officer in the French headquarters commented that 'All the problems connected with the needs of the army and their transport...were thrown in him...The armies were scattered from Bayonne to the Bug, from Calabria to the Helder, and as far as Stralsund; they were shifting their positions incessantly, had to be supplied and directed, and the whole of it passed through [Berthier's} hands...He always was the clearing house through which all business was transacted...the infallible day book to which Napoleon was referring every minute of the day to make sure how his balance stood. For this reason he had to be in attendance on him on every battlefield, on reconnaissance, at every review...without fail on every study of terrain.'
Berthier's immense accomplishments are generally overlooked. He organized the Armee de la Reserve in 1800 and moved it across the Alps into northern Italy. In 1805 he planned the movement of the Grande Armee from the Channel camps to the Rhine, and then into Germany and Austria. He organized the second Danube crossing before the battle of Wagram in 1809. In 1812 he organized the huge concentration of the Grande Armee in eastern Europe for the invasion of Russia, moving units from as far away as Spain for the concentration.
Napoleon lamented that Berthier had not been with the Armee du Nord in Belgium in 1815, believing that 'if Berthier had been there he would not have met that misfortune.'
Napoleon can lament whatever he wanted, but Berthier was dead, as was Duroc, as was Lannes, as was Desaix and many many more. That are the spoils of war.
Apart from that, Berthier didn't do so well in 1809 during the start of the campaign. He did manouvre the troups three years earlier, so he should have done better, as Napoleon would have expected from him. He did not.
@Alfred Brans The staff mess in 1809 was Napoleon's doing, not Berthier's. Contrary to 'conventional wisdom' Berthier was never the commander of the Army of Germany, Napoleon was even though he attempted to command from Paris.
Berthier was nominated as major general and chief of staff of the newly-christened Army of Germany by Napoleon in a decree of 4 March 1809. He was thus in his old job and was not the commander then or at any other time of the Army of Germany.
Napoleon communicated with Berthier by courier and by telegraph. Unfortunately, the communications and orders did not arrive in sequence, which completely confused the issue of what Napoleon wanted to do. Berthier finally, firmly but politely, told Napoleon that his presence in Bavaria would be helpful and avoid further confusion.
The situation, including primary source references, can be found in By Command of the Emperor by SJ Watson, pages 161-168.
Kevin, I agree wholeheartedly with you. ‘If Berthier had been there he would not have met with misfortune’. But that is because I prefer to think of Napoleon/Berthier as a double act militarily. In the same way as many see Blücher/Gneisenau as a team. Napoleon was clearly a much poorer performer solo. He lost, and lost badly after all!
How the Marshals rated
https://www.napoleonguide.com/marshrate.htm
Ney. He was not the most reliable of Napoleon's marshals, but he was extrordinarily brave, which is probably the most important trait of a military commander. One can be a brilliant strategist, but if one can't handle the stress and fear of war, and be ready to die, one shouldn't be an officer.
Davout was also on horseback at Borodino, but he did not fight with his men as Ney did at Krasny or Kovno. As far as I know, Davout never attacked at the very head of his troops (although he was close to fighting on several occasions), as Ney did at Waterloo.
Ney was also a good strategist. A fool would likely have surrendered or panicked and get destroyed in the face of overwhelming enemy forces near Krasny in 1812. But Ney doesn't seem to have panicked that much (I think I read that in Fezensac's journal or Holzhausen's "Die Deutschen in Russland"), and re-joined the main army without accurate maps. If I remember correctly, it was Ney who made the plans for the charge of Duroc's cuirassiers on Berezina's west bank.
I think Ney was the greatest marshal, as he was a bold soldier but also a good planner.
Lannes had the title Bravest of the Brave before Ney
@Geraint Thatcher For what did Lannes receive that title?
For his actions in Italy and elsewhere. He saved Napoleon's life at Arcola despite himself already being wounded https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2015/11/05/napoleon-bonapartes-roland-marshal-jean-lannes/
Poniatowski, as a Marshal, he was only defeated once. 🤓
A difficult question, what be my criteria, be an able independent commander and have civisme.
That leaves only Marmont.
on the other hand, it could also be this chap.
https://www.thenapoleonicwars.net/forum/general-discussions/could-marshal-saint-cyr-have-been-one-of-napoleon-s-best-marshals
Marmont did well in Illyria, but was badly defeated by Wellington in Spain. And in the end he betrayed his troops, his oath of service, and Napoleon.
'The ingrate. He will be much more unhappier than I.'-Napoleon.
And Marmont's betrayal brought back the Bourbons which, among other things, prompted the White Terror which murdered, exiled or imprisoned many of Marmont's old comrades.
I think blaming Marmont for the return of the Bourbons, and what they then did, is overstating it somewhat. The game was already up for Napoleon by that point. Marmont's actions certainly accelerated the end, but which was wiser - fighting on pointlessly and wasting more of his men's lives, or blindly following a leader who was still desperately clutching to power? Ultimately the latter course of action if anything would have shown less loyalty to his men, by leaving more of them dead, surely?
I always find it interesting that Marmont is highlighted as a traitor, and yet Ney's betrayal of his oath to Louis in 1815 is considered okay. They are the same act, except that Ney thought that the grass was greener on the other side, where Marmont seemed to be accepting an inevitability.
@Zack White
Indeed, civisme - patrie before any dictator - no blind obedience - kein Kadavergehorsam, well done Marmont.
Otherwise he is, as some others a victim of the cult of the lost cause.
The Nabulieone wore-shippers forget that he served very loyaly to his master - risking his life constantly on the battle field, being severly wounded more than once.
At least he could conduct campaigns of his own, and not following the trotten path behind Nabulieone.
But yes, it is trendy to bash people like Marmont.
Marmont's treason occurred after Napoleon had decided to abdicate in favor of his son. It's in Caulaincourt. The marshals were trying to convince Alexander to be in favor of a regency for Napoleon II because the allies believed the army was in favor of it and was still loyal to Napoleon.
When news of Marmont's corps being betrayed by its commanders to the allies, Alexander then agreed with bringing back the Bourbons. And Talleyrand's hand was also in this treachery. Marmont's troops were still loyal to France and Napoleon and had no idea they were being betrayed.
Ney was not a traitor. Louis had abandoned the country and ran to Belgium. Ney stayed and fought for France. That is not the action of a traitor. Marmont's actions, on the other hand, were.
Regarding Marmont, the following character sketch (from John Elting's Swords Around a Throne, 140) sums up his problems which eventually led up to his treason and betrayal in 1814:
'[Marmont] fought through 1813 and 1814 in Germany and France, often with success-until in a fit of discouragement, he listened to Talleyrand's wheedling and went over to the allies.'
'One of the most intelligent and best educated of the marshals, Marmont also surpassed most of them as an administrator and organizer. As a tactician he was courageous, imaginative, quick, and deadly. His vanity rendered him ungrateful to superiors and subordinates alike, but he was not meanly selfish: In 1815 he risked the Bourbons' anger in an attempt to save Antoine Lavalette from execution. With all his abilities, there was an unsteadiness about him; periodically he was seized-sometimes at most unfortunate moments-by spasms of depression or carelessness.'
'After Waterloo, cherished by the Bourbons, he lived extravagantly, losing large sums in attempts at scientific farming. He also diddled with the War Ministry's files to improve the history of his 1813 operations. In streets and barracks, his Napoleonic title Duke of Ragusa inspired a new verb raguser-to cheat, sneak, betray. In 1830, when France rose against its Bourbon king, he failed to quell the Paris mob and so fled into exile. He had little money left and, wherever he passed, children whispered that there went the man who betrayed Napoleon.'
To describe Ney as not being a traitor is counter-factual. He was a convicted traitor after due legal process and sentenced to death for the same. The time line is also incorrect. Ney addressed the troops and populace at Lons-le Saunier proclaiming Napoleon’s return on 14th March. Louis did not leave Paris until the 19th. In any event, the Bourbons used the departure of Louis from Lille not Paris as the de facto cut off beyond which an officer could claim the protection of following legal instructions. Any actions or failure to follow orders prior to that was interpreted as potentially treasonous. This data is at the very least inconvenient to those trying to protect Ney’s shining reputation, and proved rather more unfortunate for the Prince de Moskwa himself.
@david Tomlinson The trial and execution of Ney was nothing more than judicial murder brought on by revenge. It is absolutely true that 'the anger of sheep is terrible.'
What age was Napoleon's son? It's a joke, nothing but a joke!
Moreover it shows how pompous Nabulione still was - he had the vain idea that he was in a position to bargain about his surrender, he was destroyed, he should have been more than happy to get off so easily.
Indeed Marmont as well as his troops were loyal to France and not to a blood thirst tyrant destroying France.
@Hans - Karl Weiß Marmont's troops were certainly loyal both to France and Napoleon. Marmont was neither. And his troops had no idea what Marmont had agreed to do.
Napoleon II was three in 1814. That is why there would have been a regency with his mother as regent until he became of age.
That was a normal procedure in royal and imperial succession of the next in line was under age. If I'm not mistaken, Louis XIV was underage when he became king, and he was under a regency since he was five. A regency council ruled for him until he became of age in 1661.
There was an element of distrust though that makes such a regency unworkable. The usual need for a regency on behalf of an infant is the premature demise of the incumbent. When it’s an abdication, there has to be faith that the abdicatee will not seek to make a puppet of the regent. Was Marie-Louise perceived as possessing a strong and independent will, capable of resisting such influence? Would Napoleon concede another more internationally acceptable family member, such as the child’s grandfather? Napoleon was seen by the allies as completely untrustworthy, with too much ambition and guile. History shows them to be correct, because he at the first opportunity broke all his undertaking, invaded by physical force and usurped. Such an abdication was no more credible in 1814 than it was to be in 1815. The crowned heads of Europe had come to regard the word of Napoleon as not worth the paper upon which it was written.
Marmont was not loyal-he betrayed his oath, his country, his troops, and Napoleon. Unfortunately, he listened to Talleyrand, who was only loyal to himself and how much money he could make on the deal.
But Kevin, by your own comments, if I have read this correctly, Napoleon had abdicated. In such a scenario, surely he is nolonger bound to serve Emperor Napoleon, as Napoleon is by definition of abdicating nolonger Emperor. It can't run both ways?
Marmont had plotted with Talleyrand to turn over his corps to the allies before Napoleon abdicated conditionally in favor of his son. And Marmont's troops had no idea what was going on so were surprised and shocked when they were marched into the allied lines.
Have you read Caulaincourt's No Peace With Napoleon? The entire episode is laid out quite succinctly in that volume. The other marshals were appalled at what Marmont did and certainly did not agree with it. Only after Marmont's betrayal did Napoleon abdicate unconditionally. The marshals and Caulaincourt did not want that course of action and wanted a regency for Napoleon II. They certainly did not want the Bourbons back.
@Kevin F. Kiley Macdonald, who was in a position to judge, always held that Marmont did not betray Napoleon: that he was wrong to enter into negotiations with the Allies but that the final decision to take the troops over was made behind his back and against his orders. The matter can, and has been, argued either way on the available evidence.
Interesting that no-one has mentioned Soult so far (at least from what I've seen - I've tried to keep up). I have a great deal of respect for the guy, but is our not mentioning him just that he was outclassed by others (ie not the best), or is there something else?
Look at how many Battles he lost. Not just against Wellington but at Corunna/Albuera/San Marcial and Saint Pierre. He lost a lot. Wellington said he knew how to get to a Battle but didn't know what to do once he got there. Even as a Corps Commander under Napoleon at Bautzen his performance was mediocre at best Zack
@Geraint Thatcher Of all the marshals sent to fight Wellington though, Soult was the one who got closest to actually beating him.
I don't actually have strong feelings on any of these either way, I'm just throwing names into the ring, really! 😉
He certainly had his good days. During the 05-07 Grand Armee Campaigns his 4th Corps was seen as second only to Davouts 3rd Corps
It is a myth that Davout got the hardest assignments, in 1806 / 07 it were the corps of Lannes and Bernadotte / Victor.
Neither behaved Dupont disgraceful in Spain, another viticim of Nabulieone wore shippers and propaganda - there was a great article at the old series which demolished that as fiction.
I am not engaging in a discussion about this, it would be useless and a scourge of repetition.
There is no divisional commander in 1805 to 1807 who comes even cloth to Dupont, Haslach Jungingen alone is an incredible achievement.
Dupont stuck his head into a sack at Haslach and was lucky to be able to fight his way out.
Back to Davout - or Davoust - or D' Avout, he will always pop up as best marshal, but I have my doubts about the justification regarding operational art of war.
Yes, Austerlitz, he brings some of his units at the battle field at all cost, same did Ney at Jena, yes Auerstedt, by accident he stumbles into the Prussian main army under Braunschweig - it wasn't planned neither by Nabulieone - nor by him - from then on the 3e corps doesn't play a major part in the 1806 / 07 campaign in marked contrast to Lannes and also Bernadotte / Victor / Dupont, Lannes performance at Friedland - of equal importance as to Auerstedt, in my view.
He shows his strategical sense of operation or better his skill in the operational art of war at the beginning of the Danube campaign when poor Berthier, out of his depth was crying for help, there due to being Nabulieone's chief clerk he was out of his depth.
Also in 1809 - at Wagram he plays a very important part to win the victory, along with others.
1812 - despite he is there - a lackey like Jerôme gets a wing command - what was going on in the brains of brain addled Nabulieone, one is asking, but by and large Davout's performance in 1812 was lacklustre.
In 1813, when Marmont is proving to be a very hard fighter, Davout has to cool his heels in Hamburg. Important yes, but would you place an superior officer who could have and showed at least the traits of it, in the operational art of war - place to defend a fortress? Aren't there others around who could do the same and to employ Davout in a position for operational art of war, like marching onto Berlin?
For that consequence he is absent also in 1814 and in 1815 he is minister of war, come on Nabulieone - is he that bad - or have you lost all your wits?
The hyper-critical Dutch officer, Dedem van der Gelder, said that if he had to go to war again he would want to serve under Davout.
Davout was made Minister of War in 1815 because Napoleon could count on Davout's loyalty and he did not want a repeat of 1814 regarding Paris. Davout was also responsible for getting an unprepared army ready to invade Belgium.
From The Iron Marshal by John Gallaher, ix-x:
'Louis N. Davout was one of the most capable military commanders and administrators of the Empire. His defeat of the Prussian army at Auerstadt (1806) ranks as one of the greatest victories of the period. The service he rendered at Austerlitz, Eylau, Wagram, and Borodino contributed substantially to those victories upon which the Empire rested. It might further be pointed out that he was not with the army at Leipzig or Waterloo when Napoleon suffered his two great defeats. His administrative work in Germany and Poland contributed greatly toward holding together the Empire. He was hard working and honest, and he pushed those under him almost to the breaking point. He was totally intolerant of sloth, neglect, and incompetence-traits which did not mar his own character. The result was an excellent army corps but an unpopular commander...'
Davout remembered and rewarded competence and stood up for his officers when they acted according to his orders. He permitted no looting and was never defeated. The troops called him 'The Just.'
A possible topic for future posting, who SHOULD have been a Marshal?
Yes it would be an interesting topic, but as here - I am fearing another scourge of repetition, like when people like Marmont or Dupont are brought up - they are not evaluated by their military talents but how slavishly they followed the emperor of France, King of Italy and mediator of the confederation of the Rhine. In case they let him down they are dismissed as traitors - and God knows what else.
What is with those killed and wouldn't have fitted into Nabulieone's system? And I am not blaming N - for he has to form a team along with those he thinks be can get along, so they must suit his selections. Could a man like Kleber fit into such a system?
And what happened with the shunned ones, like Richepanse, or Lecourbe, very highly talented and indeed it took 1812 so that Gouvion St. Cyr had to become a marshal.
@Hans - Karl Weiß Napoleon was Emperor of the French, not Emperor of France-there is a difference.
I would suggest not responding to this now, but wait for it to get it's own thread (this thread is long enough already). 😉
Grenier would have made an excellent marshal and Vandamme probably should have been promoted also. If they had lived, both Desaix and Kleber. Montbrun would be an excellent choice as would Drouot and Senarmont as well as Mouton.
Davout was both an excellent tactician as well as an excellent strategist. His two titles were for battles he won on his own-Auerstadt and Eckmuhl.
Davout's economy of force mission at Austerlitz was outstanding and it allowed Napoleon to mass his units elsewhere for the decisive action in the center.
And it should be remembered that Davout was never defeated and his troops were always the best trained and equipped in the army.
Davout is famous for his outstanding defense of Hamburg in 1813-1814.
Neither Bernadotte nor Dupont had a record to compare with Davout's and both had failed outstandingly in the field-Bernadotte in 1806 and Dupont in southern Spain, surrendering at Baylen when he could have broken out and gone north. Both were eventual failures as commanders.
For Bernadotte...
From With Eagles to Glory by Jack Gill, 256, 273:
'...The Revolution gave him an opportunity to rise and he was soon a General of Division fighting with republican fervor...in Germany and Italy. His early military career showed him to be possessed of not inconsiderable tactical talent, a notable ability to motivate troops and a vaulting ambition. Success brought him prominence, but he ran foul of Napoleon in the Consulate years, his political aspirations, touchy pride and high self-esteem coming between the two men and laying a foundation of suspicion and rancor, especially on Bernadotte's part, that would not dissipate. His perplexing behavior at the double battle of Jena and Auerstadt, where he failed to arrive on either battlefield, cast a shadow over his reliability and by 1809, he had managed to make enemies of a number of the army's senior leaders, including Berthier...He was equally famous, however, for an inflated opinion of his own importance, a similar view of his own military genius and a propensity to let temper overcome wisdom in violent verbal outbursts...[he was] also an eristic, ambitious and untrustworthy subordinate and comrade, too fond of intrigue and principally concerned with promoting his own interests...'