Napoleon's Greatest Marshal?

Good evening, fellas! I'm new over here, and I've started to get really interested in the character of Davout in the Russian campaign. I've read some very interesting comments, I see many of you have a crazy level of knowledge. Respect! About his very biography, does anybody know the main and most "scientific" texts in historiography on the topic? I'm selecting a list of books to read and analyze over the summer: I've heard of Gallagher and Chandler, but what else?

I know that dilemma all to well.

Worth knowing but I'm old school like to have and hold a book.

Thank you, appreciate it.

Is there a biography on Desaix? Always been fascinated by him. Davout was no slouch, probably the best of all the Marshals.

@kevin F. Kiley you for your very informative response. Would you say Desaix was as talented as Napoleon in the field?

The last orders that Bernadotte received before leaving Naumberg and Davout at 0300 14 October stated that III Corps 'was to advance to Apolda to strike the left rear of the Prussian army, which by then should be fixed by Napoleon's advance from the Landgrafenberg.' (A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars by Esposito and Elting, text for Map 63).

Berthier's postscript added to the orders was 'If...Bernadotte is with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position assigned him at Dornberg.'

The orders were sent to Davout, who gave Bernadotte a written copy.

From Napoleon's Army by HCB Rogers, 137-138:

At 3am on the 14th October Davout received orders from the Emperor, timed 10pm on 13th October and written from his bivouac on the heights north of Jena. Berthier wrote that the Emperor had identified a Prussian army deployed about two and a half miles away, and extending from the heights of Jena to his front as far as Weimar. He intended to attack in the morning. He directed Davout to march via Auerstadt to Apolda and fall on the rear of the enemy, but left him to choose his own route, provided that he took part in the battle. Berthier added, 'If Marshal Bernadotte is with you, you will be able to march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position indicated to him, that is, Dornberg.''

'Davout immediately summoned his divisional and cavalry commanders and issued orders for the advance of III Corps. He then went off to see Bernadotte, whose I Corps had marched into Naumburg the previous evening. Davout gave Bernadotte a copy of the Emperor's orders and asked him what he proposed to do. Bernadotte , who had no wish to be associated with Davout, chose to assume that the Emperor wished him to go to Dornberg, and said that he would march to Camburg, which was on his way to the town.'

Bernadotte was already supposed to be in Dornberg by the order. That not being the case, he should have marched with Davout and supported him against the main Prussian army. Davout's command suffered 8,000 casualties defeating the Prussians and it is no wonder that he referred to Bernadotte as 'Le miserable Ponte Corvo.'

Bernadotte did indeed reach Apolda at 1600 on 14 October. He was not in the rear of any Prussians nor did he cut the Prussians off retreating from either Jena or Auerstadt. He took part in neither action and heard Davout's battle as he was moving south from Naumburg. Sahuc, commanding a dragoon division, proposed counter-marching to Davout's aid and support, but Bernadotte would not allow him to do so.

What prisoners did Bernadotte take on 14 October, and what Prussian units did he intercept on the 14th? The answer is none, unless it can be shown somewhere that he did. On the 14th Bernadotte's I Corps stopped at Apolda with two divisions (Drouet and Rivaud) with one division (Dupont) and most of his artillery at Dornburg. The French pursuit of the Prussians did not begin until 15 October. Napoleon began to issue orders for the pursuit at 0500 on 15 October. By those orders, Bernadotte was sent to Neustadt, north of the River Ilm.

From F Lorraine Petre's Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia 1806, 171-173:

'The absence of Bernadotte from Jena as well as from Auerstadt is inexplicable, except on the ground of his own selfish and jealous character. Never had a commander a better chance than he had of turning the hard-won success of a fellow general into an easy and overwhelming victory; but then the laurels must have been shared with Davout, which was not what Bernadotte could bear, especially as the lion's share would have fallen to Davout. The Emperor's orders are not forthcoming in original, which must be admitted to be prima facie suspicious. They are, however, clearly given in Davout's history of the operations of the 3d Corps, and Davout is generally reliable and honest. The orders were addressed to him, and he says they ran: 'If Marshal Bernadotte is with you, you can march together; but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position indicated to him at Dornburg.' These orders Davout says he communicated to Bernadotte in writing. Bernadotte himself admits receiving them at 4am on the 14th. (See his despatch of 21st October-Foucare, II, 200.) On the other hand, he ignores the order to march with Davout if he was still himself at Naumburg, and confines himself to an exposition of the difficulties of getting from Dornberg (where he arrived at 11am on the 14th) to Apolda. Looking from the Saale up the valley leading from Dornburg to the plateau, there seem few difficulties, certainly none such as Soult had in the Rauthaul. Besides, we know that Hohenlohe on the evening of the 13th went down to Dornburg with a brigade and up again, all in a few hours, apparently without any difficulty. What Bernadotte says might seem to point to the absence of any order to march with Davout. The Emperor answered him on the 23d October (Foucart, II, 243) as follows: 'However, according to a very precise order, you ought to have been at Dornburg, which is one of the principal passages of the Saale, on the same day as Marshal Lannes was at Jena, Marshal Augereau at Kahla, and Marshal Davout at Naumburg. In case you had not executed these orders, I had informed you during the night that, if you were still at Naumburg, you should march with Marshal Davout and support him. You were at Naumburg when this order arrived; it was communicated to you; but, nevertheless, you preferred to make a false march in order to turn back to Dornberg, and in consequence you did not find yourself in the battle, and Marshal Davout bore the principal efforts of the enemy's army.' To that letter Bernadotte could have replied, if the case were so, that the orders to support Davout if both were at Naumburg had not reached him. He did not do so, and the presumption must therefore be that he did receive them, as Davout says he did. The orders were certainly clear enough, and it seems impossible to find any excuse for Bernadotte's reading the latter part, merely expressing a hope that he was at Dornburg, as a direction to march at that late period by a circuitous road, instead of by the straight one to Apolda;'

'It is on these dispatches, written within a few days of the event, and not for publication, that the affaire Bernadotte must be judged, and they seem conclusive against him.'

Napoleon to Rapp 15 October 1806:

'Bernadotte has behaved badly. He would have been enchanged to see Davout fail in that affair, which does him [Davout] the greatest honor, all the more so because Bernadotte had rendered his position difficult.'

You have every right to your opinion, but it is not borne out by the facts. He was a serving officer, who declared his support for an outlawed individual, his current ‘enemy’ he’d been sent to arrest. This was a full 4 days before his legally constituted sovereign was forced to flee for his safety, largely due to Ney’s actions. Furthermore, he did not merely surrender his forces as Marmont did, he actively defected. His troops were not made prisoner, but largely became belligerents in the enemy forces. If that is not treasonous then someone needs to re-write the dictionary. These facts formed part of the evidence brought before a duly constituted tribunal. Due to the large number of people who heard this address and it’s wide contemporaneous reporting it was not disputed. Everyone, including Ney, was aware of the penalty for treason, and it wasn’t stoppage of cocoa or being confined to barracks. To say otherwise is counter-factual. No amount of affection the historian may have for a historical character should cloud their duty to the material facts, if they still demand the protection of the title. Otherwise all we have is an opinion, more properly stated with a caveat such as “I believe” or “it is widely said that” etc.

I would feel like a troll and being a scourge of repetition to blurb Bernadotte or Marmont or Dupont in this context who is the best Marshal of Nabulieone - in the past this as done zum Abkotzen - I won't wast my time again.

The footnotes for Jack Gill's assessment of Bernadotte, which I have found to be accurate and insightful, are:

-regarding Bernadotte's 'rancor': Bernadotte and Napoleon 1763-1810 by Sir Dunbar Plunket Barton.

-making 'enemies of senior army leaders': Plunkett, Bernadotte and Napoleon.

-'violent verbal outbursts': the outbursts were called 'gasconades.'

-'promoting his own interests': Barton, Bernadotte and Napoleon; John Elting, Swords Around a Throne; TA Heathcote's chapter on Bernadotte in Chandler's Napoleon's Marshals.

I disagree with Gill, he did not fail at Jena, he reached his objective at 16:00 at Apolda and cut the line of retreat of both armies, there the Prussian King wanted to re unite with the forces of Hohenlohe and Rüchel via Apolda.

A fact ignored due to heinous propaganda of Nabulieone and his disciples, but we had this already in this forum zum Erbrechen, and it is scourge of repetition again.

Here extracts from the old forum

5e Bulletin de la Grande Armée
Iéna, 15 octobre 1806.
(…) Le maréchal Davout reçut l’ordre de déboucher par Naumburg, pour défendre les défiles de Kösen, si l’ennemi voulait marcher sur Naumburg, ou pour se rendre à Apolda pour le prendre à dos, s’il restait dans la position où il était.
 Le corps du maréchal prince de Ponte-Corvo fut destiné à déboucher de Dornburg pour tomber sur les derrières de l’ennemi, soit qu’il se portât en force sur Naumburg, soit qu’il se portât sur Iéna.(...)
those statements exactly mirror the state of knowledge of both Napoleon and Bernadotte at the 15th.

Le Maréchal Soult au Major Général.
Du bivouac en arrière de Ulrichshalben, 15 octobre 1806, 2 heures du matin.
(...)
Je suis parfaitement lié par la droite avec les troupes de m. le maréchal Bernadotte qui sont campées à Unter – Ober – Rossla, par la gauche aussi par des partis avec les troupes qui one été portées sur Weimar.
 Une forte colonne ennemie s’était dirigée immédiatement après la bataille sur Rossla où elle comptait passer l’Ilm, mais ayant aperçu la tête de la colonne de M. le maréchal Bernadotte, elle revint sur Ulrichshalben où je l’ai poursuivie.
(...)
Foucart, Iéna, p. 643

unfortunately my old link to the forum is not working any longer where I demolished all those lies about Bernadotte.

For Bernadotte...

From With Eagles to Glory by Jack Gill, 256, 273:

'...The Revolution gave him an opportunity to rise and he was soon a General of Division fighting with republican fervor...in Germany and Italy. His early military career showed him to be possessed of not inconsiderable tactical talent, a notable ability to motivate troops and a vaulting ambition. Success brought him prominence, but he ran foul of Napoleon in the Consulate years, his political aspirations, touchy pride and high self-esteem coming between the two men and laying a foundation of suspicion and rancor, especially on Bernadotte's part, that would not dissipate. His perplexing behavior at the double battle of Jena and Auerstadt, where he failed to arrive on either battlefield, cast a shadow over his reliability and by 1809, he had managed to make enemies of a number of the army's senior leaders, including Berthier...He was equally famous, however, for an inflated opinion of his own importance, a similar view of his own military genius and a propensity to let temper overcome wisdom in violent verbal outbursts...[he was] also an eristic, ambitious and untrustworthy subordinate and comrade, too fond of intrigue and principally concerned with promoting his own interests...'

Davout was both an excellent tactician as well as an excellent strategist. His two titles were for battles he won on his own-Auerstadt and Eckmuhl.

Davout's economy of force mission at Austerlitz was outstanding and it allowed Napoleon to mass his units elsewhere for the decisive action in the center.

And it should be remembered that Davout was never defeated and his troops were always the best trained and equipped in the army.

Davout is famous for his outstanding defense of Hamburg in 1813-1814.

Neither Bernadotte nor Dupont had a record to compare with Davout's and both had failed outstandingly in the field-Bernadotte in 1806 and Dupont in southern Spain, surrendering at Baylen when he could have broken out and gone north. Both were eventual failures as commanders.

Grenier would have made an excellent marshal and Vandamme probably should have been promoted also. If they had lived, both Desaix and Kleber. Montbrun would be an excellent choice as would Drouot and Senarmont as well as Mouton.

A possible topic for future posting, who SHOULD have been a Marshal?

Back to Davout - or Davoust - or D' Avout, he will always pop up as best marshal, but I have my doubts about the justification regarding operational art of war.

Yes, Austerlitz, he brings some of his units at the battle field at all cost, same did Ney at Jena, yes Auerstedt, by accident he stumbles into the Prussian main army under Braunschweig - it wasn't planned neither by Nabulieone - nor by him - from then on the 3e corps doesn't play a major part in the 1806 / 07 campaign in marked contrast to Lannes and also Bernadotte / Victor / Dupont, Lannes performance at Friedland - of equal importance as to Auerstedt, in my view.

He shows his strategical sense of operation or better his skill in the operational art of war at the beginning of the Danube campaign when poor Berthier, out of his depth was crying for help, there due to being Nabulieone's chief clerk he was out of his depth.

Also in 1809 - at Wagram he plays a very important part to win the victory, along with others.

1812 - despite he is there - a lackey like Jerôme gets a wing command - what was going on in the brains of brain addled Nabulieone, one is asking, but by and large Davout's performance in 1812 was lacklustre.

In 1813, when Marmont is proving to be a very hard fighter, Davout has to cool his heels in Hamburg. Important yes, but would you place an superior officer who could have and showed at least the traits of it, in the operational art of war - place to defend a fortress? Aren't there others around who could do the same and to employ Davout in a position for operational art of war, like marching onto Berlin?

For that consequence he is absent also in 1814 and in 1815 he is minister of war, come on Nabulieone - is he that bad - or have you lost all your wits?

It is a myth that Davout got the hardest assignments, in 1806 / 07 it were the corps of Lannes and Bernadotte / Victor.

Neither behaved Dupont disgraceful in Spain, another viticim of Nabulieone wore shippers and propaganda - there was a great article at the old series which demolished that as fiction.

I am not engaging in a discussion about this, it would be useless and a scourge of repetition.

There is no divisional commander in 1805 to 1807 who comes even cloth to Dupont, Haslach Jungingen alone is an incredible achievement.

Interesting that no-one has mentioned Soult so far (at least from what I've seen - I've tried to keep up). I have a great deal of respect for the guy, but is our not mentioning him just that he was outclassed by others (ie not the best), or is there something else?

Marmont was not loyal-he betrayed his oath, his country, his troops, and Napoleon. Unfortunately, he listened to Talleyrand, who was only loyal to himself and how much money he could make on the deal.

Napoleon II was three in 1814. That is why there would have been a regency with his mother as regent until he became of age.