Napoleon's Biggest Mistake?

On the “it’s only wrong when Napoleon does it” I’m wondering how equitable that is.  Some on this thread have branded Louis a coward for fleeing into exile in the face of military failure and overwhelming force in 1815.

I would say - au contraire, only when Nabulieone is doing it - it is right, slaughtering POWs for example. In case other commanders would have done it - the cult would raise a great out cry and defend by teeth and claws - their demi God.

Yes indeed poor Louis is branded a coward but Nabulieone deserting the Armée d'Orient or his ruined army in 1812 has of course very good reasons, to flee, when he shits bricks so that he has to put on an Austrian generals uniforms in 1814, perfectly acceptable, if another contemporary would have done it - cowardice.

"So much for the “Napoleon Man of Peace” meme then?"

That appears to be a strawman argument as no one has 'advanced' that 'meme' except for you. Why is that? 🙄

@Kevin F. Kiley It’s not a straw man argument, because I’m not arguing with anyone. I was just asking for your take on it in relation to your proposition that 1815 was bloodless. Is it your contention ‘Man of peace’ concept doesn’t exist, or that it does but doesn’t apply to what you are saying? It’s just that the landing on the coast at the head of a formed unit and then sending messages soliciting the defection of the country’s armed forces doesn’t seem very peaceful. @Charles Esdaile ‘s description of it as a military coup seem to hold greater attraction.

😊

Isn't that the truth. I refer back to the thread on British anti-Napoleon propaganda...

If someone starts a thread on “Wellington’s 3 greatest mistakes” I’m unlikely to be shocked if some get posted. I’m also unlikely to regard it as French anti-Wellington Propaganda because I’m not really into conspiracy theories.

@david Tomlinson If you are intimating that British anti-Napoleonic propaganda is a 'conspiracy theory' then that idea is counter-factual.

Amazon.com: Bonaparte and the British: prints and propaganda in the age of Napoleon (9780714126937): Clayton, Tim, O'Connell, Sheila: Books

I have the book and it is period British propaganda.

@Kevin F. Kiley 'They left voluntarily for Belgium' - I think that's a gross mis-representation of their motives. They fled Paris in the face of an invading enemy force (Napoleon marching up from the south with ranks swelling with desertions from Louis's army). That's not voluntarily leaving, its a prudent and tactical withdrawal. Staying behind would have been extreme folly. I'm sure you're aware that Charles Esdaile describes what happened in 1815 as being akin to a military coup.

@Zack White And what were the Bourbon's motives? I would submit that cowardice is one of them at the very least.

Napoleon's return from Elba was bloodless in that no casualties were caused.

The one Bourbon that actually showed courage during this episode was the former Princess Royale, who had been married off to Angouleme who tried to hold Bordeaux. She at least tried to resist. Napoleon remarked that she was the only man in the family.

@Kevin F. Kiley Come, Kevin, let us interpret this fairly - in 1793 Louis XVI had been executed. Now a man who had already forced his way to power in a coup, and had previous of executing members of the royal family, was returning from exile in order to try and topple the monarchy. I don't consider the Bourbons a good dynasty of rulers, but they weren't imbeciles - they knew full well that the situation was untenable, and that to stay in Paris was to risk their lives. Had they stayed, they risked a repeat of 1793, and we would be lambasting them for not seeing that their position was untenable.

It's hard to describe Napoleon's return from Elba as bloodless, considering the Waterloo campaign - he really should have factored the fact that he was the one thing which united the coalition powers into his machinations. The only reason that his march on Paris did not result in blood is because the army flocked to him (and so we're back to the military coup argument again).

As for Napoleon's characterisation of the Bourbon's - he's not exactly an unbiased source is he. The Bourbon's did what was sensible. Branding them cowards for conducting what was their equivalent of a tactical withdrawal makes no more sense that it would if we branded Napoleon a coward for pulling back from Moscow - both arguments simply do not work.

@david Tomlinson When we covered Henry V in class, we watched Kenneth Branagh's version of it. When the tennis ball scene was shown, one of the students said 'I get it now-it was an insult!' I just smiled at him and said 'Well done.'

@Kevin F. Kiley it just goes to show that words on a page (or screen) vs words delivered cast a completely different light. Perhaps there is a lesson for historians, that those who heard and saw Napoleon speak got a different impression from those that read his words today. There was that famous Presidential debate results survey, the radio audience got Nixon ahead whilst those watching TV gave it to JFK. That might explain why some people find a detached appreciation of his errors so difficult. It is the legendary figure they have fallen in love with, not the real Napoleon at all. Caressed lovingly by the hagiographer’s hand yet it is only a warts and all exposition that can truly highlight missteps and errors. However, in a pre-cursor to today’s social media echo chambers, these dissenting voices have no part in their pantheon.

@tomholmberg

Goethe's ego was as over blown as Nabulieone's - also in case of clever propaganda.

Like he wrote his impressions of the campaign of 1792 way after the napoleonic wars, so it is quite easy to state to have witnessed an event which will change the world.

Also he published the content of his interview with Nabulieone when the later had no chance to rectify - self promotion all over.

It is not so much the notion of mistakes, it is the view of the period through the eyes of Nabulieone and persons are judged as he victimized them.

See the best Marshals thread, Marmont was exceptionally gifted and praised in a lot of memoires - but as long as you dare to bring up his name in whatever context a Pavlovian reaction will happen.

To discuss contemporaries of the French emperor or the emperor of the French is seemingly impossible in case those stood against him or like Dupont failed at Bailen and for that must be in the bad box, because the master said so.

@david Tomlinson

for that reason, a man of destiny, I call it kismet.

@david Tomlinson >"It’s the age old question, was it the skill of the gambler or the fall of the cards?"<

That sort takes the air out of sports fandom.

Punditry should never be confused with wisdom! (or even ‘real’ history) Including this debate of course, Ooops!

Interesting. I'd agree with the significance of all three, although I would argue that the continental system takes precedence as the root cause of the Peninsular War (at least as far as Portugal was concerned, thereby turning Napoleon's attention to the Iberian Peninsula), and of course was a source of irritation for Russia (though not the only one).

I take your point @tomholmberg , but I don’t think losing was his mistake, just the symptom. The consistent root cause of his mistakes was the same one as his successes. His crippling overconfidence. On a personal level he would probably regret his divorce of Josephine the most, his quest for dynasty overwhelming his personal happiness. He cut a particularly sad figure at St Cloud after Waterloo. All human beings tend to believe they affect the world rather more than they do. The three errors @Kevin F. Kiley highlighted share that characteristic. A belief that he could bend an entire continent to his will. A belief that he could overcome the resolve of his Peninsular enemies. A belief that the limitations of geography and climate did not apply to him.