The stereotype of Napoleonic Warfare and indeed any gunpowder war before the World War 1 is that soldiers just line up and shoot without regard to marksmanship because they assume that an enemy will get hit in the mass fire of volley. So much that I seen comments about how you don't even have to hold your rifle properly and you just shoot it in the American Civil War and earlier because you are guaranteed to hit an enemy in the mass rigid square blocks they are stuck in.
However this thread on suppressive fire in modern warfare made me curious.
https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/7vkubw/how_important_is_individual_marksmanship_is_in/
The OP states despite the cliche that hundreds of bullets are spent to kill a single enemy and most tactics in modern war involves spraying at an enemy to get him to become too scared to shoot back and hide while you have one person sneak up behind the now cowering enemy and kill him, plenty of marksmanship training is still done in modern warfare.
So I have to ask if marksmanship was important even in volley fire seen before WW1 in the American Civil War and other earlier time periods in particular Napoleonic? Is it misunderstood much like modern suppression tactics is by people where they get the wrong impression that you just spray bullets on an enemy and marksmanship doesn't matter because your buddies will sneak behind them and kill them? Is it more than just "spray bullets nonstop and hope it hits the guy in front of you who's in a bayonet block"?
If its true that soldiers prior to the World War 1 particularly the Napoleon years just shot bullets aimlessly without bothering to try to target on an enemy because they expected their mass volleys to hit so many marching enemy troops in square formations......... Why did they still hold rifles in the basic aiming stance and arm structure? Why didn't they just tell soldiers to hold rifles from the hips and shoot in any angle or any stance they want?
Demian points out the crucial fact that regardless how well trained for aiming the soldier was and regardless to the quality of arms - you cannot aim when firing in rank in file due to the tactical formation.
This was a different story for skirmishers, and here most armies did extensive training for aiming and shooting - and not only the Brits, or French - this is well documented for the Prussian, Saxon and Bavarian army - for example as well.
Those shooting competitions were conducted for example in the Prussian army for the Schützen as well, and even the officers took part in it - for more you must wait on a chapter I wrote in a multi author book to be published by Helion.
The most over looked topic is not aiming and hitting, or not training or training - but fire discipline, here seemingly the British Army was the best who could initiate a fire fight, stop it and charge.
so it is impossible to expect that a sure shot can happen. Yes, even the best Jäger (marksmen, sharp shooters expert to hit with a shot, so to speak Hessian, Austrian, Prussian Jäger units) as soon as they would have to fire in rank and file, they would not hit better by the ruling constriction and disorder than the usual line infantry man.“It is an interesting question: expense seems to have been one issue. Austrians, for one example, complained about lacking funds for live-fire. On the other hand, some countries (certainly France, likely others) including shooting competitions in military celebrations (such as a monarch's birthday) and offered monetary prizes to the best shots.
Getting individual soldiers to aim properly was a challenge, especially in the urgency and excitement of combat. Reading recently about Gettysburg (in relation to the recent anniversary), many Union officers walked the firing line (NOT volley fire) reminding their men to aim low as the tendency was to aim to high and overshoot the target.
The British certainly stressed individual marksmanship, as did the Americans and the French. In point of fact, Napoleon stressed it.
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Part II This source is form Demian an Austrian officer who published a three volume work for his officers, a sort of handbook about arms, tactics, how to produce arms, black powder etc. Though not everything can be applied for the French soldier the trend would be the same. Demian : Anleitung zum Selbst-Studium der militärischen Wissenschaft. Für Offiziere der k.k. österreichischen Armee, Erster Theil : Waffenlehre, Wien 1807 „ If one is looking into the usual instruction of the firing and its true purpose, which should be to hit an hostile item, one finds that these instructions are teaching precisely the non hitting, because : 1. Up to now the line infantry was not trained to fire at an aim. And still aiming is an art, which like others has to be learned and practised; if this is not the case then hitting would be at random. The line infantry man therefore must be taught and must practise when his shots should hit. 2. One is aiming (technically joue, schlagt an, in English maybe arm) always at the half man, without taking into account the different distances and terrain, despite according to the closer or farer distances, also the difference in terrain, demands a higher or lower aiming. 3. The man is pushed for quickness. One has tried to increase with the number of shots also the effect of the fire, and one was giving a lot effort to make the soldier fire seven to ten times per minute. However the experience teaches us that the soldier is shooting worse the quicker he loads, and that all speed and skill in loading is useless without proper aiming. Because not the skill [in loading] but the hitting makes the firing effective. The push for speed at aiming means to train them and use them to shot in the air. And to that already wrong instruction for firing one has to add the natural fear of the man, by which aiming in the heat of battle is almost impossible. Who was in a fire fight without noticing that in this moment the soldier is acting as a machine, that means he loads his gun, shots in the air, loads again and thinks less to damage the enemy than more to distract himself by the work to ban all thought of fear which are surrounding him in this moment. As soon as the soldier is seeing the enemy he wants to start to shoot being afraid that the other will overtake him in that and only few officers have the power to restrain their soldiers, or when they are able to do this they have not the knowledge about the shooting distance of the gun or to judge the distances. In case however the soldier is not lacking in cold blood and deliberation in a serious fire fight, and he is not acting as a machine, so alone because of the disorder and pushing for quickness, which is usual in a fire fight, is preventing to let him think about aiming. The experience teaches that the soldier is hardly listening at the commands of his officer in this critical moment and that every body as soon as he finished loading wants to shot. When one is closing the pan, the other is working with the ramrod, the third is making ready, the forth is arming and the fifth pulls the trigger. Is one taking into account the disorder which is caused by the falling of the dead, and the retreat of the wounded, as the quite dense smoke of powder which is enveloping the men, so it is impossible to expect that a sure shot can happen. Yes, even the best Jäger (marksmen, sharp shooters expert to hit with a shot, so to speak Hessian, Austrian, Prussian Jäger units) as soon as they would have to fire in rank and file, they would not hit better by the ruling constriction and disorder than the usual line infantry man.“ Demian page 34 to 37 Just some comments, about the rate of fire, Demian mentions seven to ten shots per minute. These are no actual shots but made on the drill ground not using black powder and just doing the manuals. The old Austrian pre 1801 model of musket had a self priming pan and a cylindrical ramrod, so the loading was simplified and could be fairly quick when not using powder. However Demian points rightly out how useless a quick fire is because it is not aimed. Volley firing is even worse because nobody would have no time to aim or to point his gun out of the fear he would be the last to pull the trigger. But as Demian points it well out this would be difficult to use in close order. In skirmishing this is however different, you would chose your own rate of fire and indeed have time if needed to aim, in case that you would do other firing than harassment firing. And French skirmishers fired form great distances up to 600 and more paces and hit. One Prussian unit at Jena thought the bullets rained form the air. Again also Demian comes to the conclusion (derived form personal experience, which we all lack) that the command structure so well preserved on the drill ground is breaking down under the mental stress and physical constriction in combat. The regular automat like volleys which impressed so much the onlooker at the battle of Mollwitz in the first Silesian War, were impressive not only because their fastness but because of the control of officers and men. But already in the 7 YW, when heavy casualties were taken the Prussian could not continue with this clockwork precision. About not trained to hit, this is Demian's impression and it is not true, there was training, but as he well described the best trained soldiers with the best muskets wouldn't be able to perform aimed shooting there the tactical formation would simply not allow it.