Archduke Charles has always been regarded as Austria's best commander. Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, was respected by Napoleon and had served as Austrian ambassador to Paris after Metternich. He also got on very well with Metternich, as he did with almost everyone.In 1813, Metternich shamelessly said, "we need a commander in chief, not a politician", and then chose the politician Schwarzenberg.Charles didn't get the chance because of his terrible personal relationships, not military record.
Reference citations are available in Craig, G. A ., 'Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance against Napoleon, 1813-1815,' in War, Politics, and Diplomacy. Selected Essays, New York, 1966, pp. 22-45.
Rothenberg also mentioned it in Napoleon's Great Adversary Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814
Schwarzenberg commanded what might have been the best Austrian performance of the period when commanding the Austrian Auxiliary Corp in Russia in 1812-'Operating on Napoleon's right flank in cooperation with Reynier's Saxon corps, the Austrian scored a number of successes and suffered no defeats, withdrawing in good order at the end of the campaign.'-John Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 499-500.
Further, 'It is to Schwarzenberg's honor that, after learning that Francis had reached a secret agreement with Russia and would send him no reinforcements, he did his duty. After a victory he and Reynier won at Gorodetsina, he wrote that Vienna would not rejoice over it, but the he was proud to have justified Napoleon's trust in him.'-John Elting, Swords, 722 note 10.
Napoleon refused to leave the army before crossing the Berezina, where his leadership and command were instrumental in getting the army out of Russia and defeating two Russian armies that tried to stop him.
But the success was not due to Napoleon's genius but rather a combination of factors. In analyzing this battle, three key factors for Napoleon's success can be emphasized : the role of dedicated and skilled troops, good Allied leadership at corps and regimental level and, most crucially, the lack of Russian military initiative.Mikaberidze, Berezina, p. 226
Nabulieone couldn't desert his army, or if you prefer leave them prematurely - before the Beresina - only after having crossed it with the army, he had a fair chance to run away without getting captured.
I am not aware that superior leaders urged him to make a runner, though I agree that they advised him to retreat from Moscow much earlier but this fell on deaf ears - due to his narcissistic personal disorder or complete misjudgment of his actual position.
Yes Erzherzog Karl would be in the lead, one of the most intellectual generals of his time, who wrote numerous of interesting books and essays - a pity that such a plethora of books are written about Scharnhorst, but Karl was at least on par with him and of course much better in the operational art of war. Not without reason his 1796 campaign earned him the title of savior of Germany - again alas overshadowed by the Italian campaign of Boney.
However I have to say that his later campaigns seem lack luster to me and disastrous - as 1809.
I am surprised that nobody brings up Schwarzenberg, top notch in 1812 and then forging an Allied army victorious.
The Archduke Ferdinand ran from Ulm so as not to get captured. Chasteler sneaked out of the Tyrol when the situation deteriorated to the point where he might have been captured and perhaps executed by the French.
Mack, who chose to stay and fight at Ulm, was the scapegoat for the disaster.
So Schwarzenberg's military capabilities seemingly are overshadowed by the political ones, attributed by Metternich.
Reading quite a few memoires of Saxon officers at the 1812 campaign the Austrian army got good critics, such as their train among else.
Archduke Charles has always been regarded as Austria's best commander. Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, was respected by Napoleon and had served as Austrian ambassador to Paris after Metternich. He also got on very well with Metternich, as he did with almost everyone.In 1813, Metternich shamelessly said, "we need a commander in chief, not a politician", and then chose the politician Schwarzenberg.Charles didn't get the chance because of his terrible personal relationships, not military record.
Reference citations are available in Craig, G. A ., 'Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance against Napoleon, 1813-1815,' in War, Politics, and Diplomacy. Selected Essays, New York, 1966, pp. 22-45.
Rothenberg also mentioned it in Napoleon's Great Adversary Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814
Schwarzenberg commanded what might have been the best Austrian performance of the period when commanding the Austrian Auxiliary Corp in Russia in 1812-'Operating on Napoleon's right flank in cooperation with Reynier's Saxon corps, the Austrian scored a number of successes and suffered no defeats, withdrawing in good order at the end of the campaign.'-John Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 499-500.
Further, 'It is to Schwarzenberg's honor that, after learning that Francis had reached a secret agreement with Russia and would send him no reinforcements, he did his duty. After a victory he and Reynier won at Gorodetsina, he wrote that Vienna would not rejoice over it, but the he was proud to have justified Napoleon's trust in him.'-John Elting, Swords, 722 note 10.
so nobody for Schwarzenberg?
Napoleon refused to leave the army before crossing the Berezina, where his leadership and command were instrumental in getting the army out of Russia and defeating two Russian armies that tried to stop him.But the success was not due to Napoleon's genius but rather a combination of factors. In analyzing this battle, three key factors for Napoleon's success can be emphasized : the role of dedicated and skilled troops, good Allied leadership at corps and regimental level and, most crucially, the lack of Russian military initiative. Mikaberidze, Berezina, p. 226Nabulieone couldn't desert his army, or if you prefer leave them prematurely - before the Beresina - only after having crossed it with the army, he had a fair chance to run away without getting captured.
I am not aware that superior leaders urged him to make a runner, though I agree that they advised him to retreat from Moscow much earlier but this fell on deaf ears - due to his narcissistic personal disorder or complete misjudgment of his actual position.
Yes Erzherzog Karl would be in the lead, one of the most intellectual generals of his time, who wrote numerous of interesting books and essays - a pity that such a plethora of books are written about Scharnhorst, but Karl was at least on par with him and of course much better in the operational art of war. Not without reason his 1796 campaign earned him the title of savior of Germany - again alas overshadowed by the Italian campaign of Boney.
However I have to say that his later campaigns seem lack luster to me and disastrous - as 1809.
I am surprised that nobody brings up Schwarzenberg, top notch in 1812 and then forging an Allied army victorious.
The Archduke Ferdinand ran from Ulm so as not to get captured. Chasteler sneaked out of the Tyrol when the situation deteriorated to the point where he might have been captured and perhaps executed by the French.
Mack, who chose to stay and fight at Ulm, was the scapegoat for the disaster.
Archduke Charles, is there really any other choice ?