Archduke Charles has always been regarded as Austria's best commander. Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, was respected by Napoleon and had served as Austrian ambassador to Paris after Metternich. He also got on very well with Metternich, as he did with almost everyone.In 1813, Metternich shamelessly said, "we need a commander in chief, not a politician", and then chose the politician Schwarzenberg.Charles didn't get the chance because of his terrible personal relationships, not military record.
Reference citations are available in Craig, G. A ., 'Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance against Napoleon, 1813-1815,' in War, Politics, and Diplomacy. Selected Essays, New York, 1966, pp. 22-45.
Rothenberg also mentioned it in Napoleon's Great Adversary Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814
Schwarzenberg commanded what might have been the best Austrian performance of the period when commanding the Austrian Auxiliary Corp in Russia in 1812-'Operating on Napoleon's right flank in cooperation with Reynier's Saxon corps, the Austrian scored a number of successes and suffered no defeats, withdrawing in good order at the end of the campaign.'-John Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 499-500.
Further, 'It is to Schwarzenberg's honor that, after learning that Francis had reached a secret agreement with Russia and would send him no reinforcements, he did his duty. After a victory he and Reynier won at Gorodetsina, he wrote that Vienna would not rejoice over it, but the he was proud to have justified Napoleon's trust in him.'-John Elting, Swords, 722 note 10.
Napoleon refused to leave the army before crossing the Berezina, where his leadership and command were instrumental in getting the army out of Russia and defeating two Russian armies that tried to stop him.
But the success was not due to Napoleon's genius but rather a combination of factors. In analyzing this battle, three key factors for Napoleon's success can be emphasized : the role of dedicated and skilled troops, good Allied leadership at corps and regimental level and, most crucially, the lack of Russian military initiative.
Mikaberidze, Berezina, p.226
Nabulieone couldn't desert his army, or if you prefer leave them prematurely - before the Beresina - only after having crossed it with the army, he had a fair chance to run away without getting captured.
I am not aware that superior leaders urged him to make a runner, though I agree that they advised him to retreat from Moscow much earlier but this fell on deaf ears - due to his narcissistic personal disorder or complete misjudgment of his actual position.
More propaganda. The idea of a 'narcissistic personal disorder' is not fact, merely bias against Napoleon.
There is excellent information available on the Berezina crossing as well as Napoleon's decision to leave for Paris after the battle. He left Murat in command and he did desert. Eugene and Berthier saved the remnants of the army and Eugene built up an effective army, named the Army of the Elbe, to face the still-advancing Russians and the Prussians.
Yes Erzherzog Karl would be in the lead, one of the most intellectual generals of his time, who wrote numerous of interesting books and essays - a pity that such a plethora of books are written about Scharnhorst, but Karl was at least on par with him and of course much better in the operational art of war. Not without reason his 1796 campaign earned him the title of savior of Germany - again alas overshadowed by the Italian campaign of Boney.
However I have to say that his later campaigns seem lack luster to me and disastrous - as 1809.
I am surprised that nobody brings up Schwarzenberg, top notch in 1812 and then forging an Allied army victorious.
The Archduke Ferdinand ran from Ulm so as not to get captured. Chasteler sneaked out of the Tyrol when the situation deteriorated to the point where he might have been captured and perhaps executed by the French.
Mack, who chose to stay and fight at Ulm, was the scapegoat for the disaster.
@Hans - Karl Weiß Agree on Oman. He consistently demonstrates the failure of Dupont at Baylen.
From page 127, Volume I of Oman's A History of the Peninsular War:
'Napoleon knew [Dupont] as a brave and loyal subordinate, but had never before given him an independent command. He could hardly guess that, when left to his own inspirations, such a brilliant officer would turn out to be dilatory, wanting in initiative, and wholly destitute of moral courage.'
Further, on pages 130-131, regarding Dupont's occupation and sack of Cordova:
'...without any excuse of this sort, Dupont's army behaved in a way that would have suited better the hordes of Tilly and Wallenstein. Their commanders could not draw them away from their orgies and outrages till the next day: indeed, it seems that many of the French officers disgraced themselves by joining in the plunder. While the men were filling their haversacks with private property, there were found colonels and even generals who were not ashamed to load carts and coaches with pictures, tapestries, and meal-work from churches and public buildings, and bags of dollars from the treasury, where no less than 10,000,000 reals of specie had been found. Laplanne, whom Dupont appointed commandant of the place, took 2,000 ducats of balckmail from the Count of Villanueva, on whom he had billeted himself, in return for preserving his mansion from pillage. When the French left Cordova, nine days later, they had with them more than 500 wheeled vehicles seized in the place which were loaded with all sorts of plunder.'
'Dupont had hardly settled down in Cordova, and begun to substitute crushing military contributions for unsystematic pillage, when he found himself cut off from his base...The French had left no detachments behind to preserve their communications...'
And from 19 June to 18 July he occupied and stayed in and around Andujar doing nothing but waiting...a
Now, what point were you trying to bring up regarding Oman and Baylen?
So Schwarzenberg's military capabilities seemingly are overshadowed by the political ones, attributed by Metternich.
Reading quite a few memoires of Saxon officers at the 1812 campaign the Austrian army got good critics, such as their train among else.
Archduke Charles has always been regarded as Austria's best commander. Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, was respected by Napoleon and had served as Austrian ambassador to Paris after Metternich. He also got on very well with Metternich, as he did with almost everyone.In 1813, Metternich shamelessly said, "we need a commander in chief, not a politician", and then chose the politician Schwarzenberg.Charles didn't get the chance because of his terrible personal relationships, not military record.
Reference citations are available in Craig, G. A ., 'Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance against Napoleon, 1813-1815,' in War, Politics, and Diplomacy. Selected Essays, New York, 1966, pp. 22-45.
Rothenberg also mentioned it in Napoleon's Great Adversary Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814
Schwarzenberg commanded what might have been the best Austrian performance of the period when commanding the Austrian Auxiliary Corp in Russia in 1812-'Operating on Napoleon's right flank in cooperation with Reynier's Saxon corps, the Austrian scored a number of successes and suffered no defeats, withdrawing in good order at the end of the campaign.'-John Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 499-500.
Further, 'It is to Schwarzenberg's honor that, after learning that Francis had reached a secret agreement with Russia and would send him no reinforcements, he did his duty. After a victory he and Reynier won at Gorodetsina, he wrote that Vienna would not rejoice over it, but the he was proud to have justified Napoleon's trust in him.'-John Elting, Swords, 722 note 10.
so nobody for Schwarzenberg?
Napoleon refused to leave the army before crossing the Berezina, where his leadership and command were instrumental in getting the army out of Russia and defeating two Russian armies that tried to stop him.But the success was not due to Napoleon's genius but rather a combination of factors. In analyzing this battle, three key factors for Napoleon's success can be emphasized : the role of dedicated and skilled troops, good Allied leadership at corps and regimental level and, most crucially, the lack of Russian military initiative. Mikaberidze, Berezina, p. 226Nabulieone couldn't desert his army, or if you prefer leave them prematurely - before the Beresina - only after having crossed it with the army, he had a fair chance to run away without getting captured.
I am not aware that superior leaders urged him to make a runner, though I agree that they advised him to retreat from Moscow much earlier but this fell on deaf ears - due to his narcissistic personal disorder or complete misjudgment of his actual position.
Yes Erzherzog Karl would be in the lead, one of the most intellectual generals of his time, who wrote numerous of interesting books and essays - a pity that such a plethora of books are written about Scharnhorst, but Karl was at least on par with him and of course much better in the operational art of war. Not without reason his 1796 campaign earned him the title of savior of Germany - again alas overshadowed by the Italian campaign of Boney.
However I have to say that his later campaigns seem lack luster to me and disastrous - as 1809.
I am surprised that nobody brings up Schwarzenberg, top notch in 1812 and then forging an Allied army victorious.
The Archduke Ferdinand ran from Ulm so as not to get captured. Chasteler sneaked out of the Tyrol when the situation deteriorated to the point where he might have been captured and perhaps executed by the French.
Mack, who chose to stay and fight at Ulm, was the scapegoat for the disaster.
Archduke Charles, is there really any other choice ?