"A wealth of detail about the Guard-including its history, officers, units, and music. (An English translation by Anne SK Brown, The Anatomy of Glory: Napoleon and His Guard, was published in 1961 by Brown University P:ress, Providence, RI. Its text is slightly abridged, but its illustrations are magnificent.)"
"This is the masterpiece on Napoleon's 'Immortals', the Imperial Guard. A lavish and sumptuous work, it combines vivid narrative with valuable and unique uniform illustrations, including 74 full color plates, to make one of the most magnificent books on military history ever published."
"Napoleons Imperial Guard was arguably the most famous military formation to tread the battlefields of Europe. La Garde Imperial was created on 18 May 1804, and from its origins as a small personal escort, the Guard grew in size and importance throughout the Napoleonic era. Eventually, it became the tactical reserve of the Grande Arme, comprising almost a third of Napoleons field forces. The men of the Imperial Guard were the lite of the First Empire, its officers and men the military aristocracy of post-Revolutionary France.Used only sparingly, the Guard acquired a reputation of invincibility. Such had become its prestige, when the attacks of the Guard were repulsed at Waterloo, they signaled not only the defeat of the French army but also the end of an era.In this magnificent study, unparalleled in depth and scope, the renowned French historian Commandant Henry Lachouque has produced a lavish and sumptuous work. It combines vivid narrative with valuable and unique uniform illustrations, including seventy-four full color plates from the Anne S.K. Brown collection, to make The Anatomy of Glory one of the most important and most sought-after books on military history ever published."
Greenhill republished it in 1997 with a new Introduction by John Elting.
From an article by Dawson placed on the old NSF site, maybe still available and worthwhile to consult.
The emperor personally accused the grenadiers for longing to be back in Paris with their mistresses and being 'back on the piss again'[118].. This attitude was perhaps partly due to the origins of a number of grenadiers, and being quartered in Paris at the end of most major campaigns. Other commentators note how NCOs' who were promoted into the guard as privates resented this and often challenged the authority of their new NCO's, not wishing to give up their rank and privileges[119]. Indeed in November 1808 according to surgeon Percy120]: The Imperial Guard, especially the infantry had got drunk. The men had found wine everywhere and had over indulged. The tracks were strewn with grenadiers a pied who were dead drunk. Some had lost their bearskins, others their muskets and at each halt they were still drinking. It was that years wine, which was very strong and still not totally fermented. It caused a long and brutal drunkeness, accompanied by vomitting and followed usually by diarrhoea. More than 200 of these men would spend the night on the ground in the open. The same thing happened when the guard moved in Leipzig in March 1813, general Rouget being forced to issue the following order: General Rouget will punish with arrest the commander of the company whose soldiers commit the least fault and make a public exhibition of themselves, The roll calls must be made more sternly: the general is convinced that whilst these are taking place, many soldiers who ought to be their roam the streets[121]. Similar stern words were needed only a few months later regarding the conduct of the grenadiers: Many chasseurs and grenadiers have for several days indulged in incredible excesses. Yesterday in particular, whilst passing through fulda, a large number of them were arrested and through their conduct have given serious cause for concern.[122] General Friant the following day on the 30th October, claimed that his orders had not been carried out, the duty Officers and NCOs being placed under arrest for failing to do their duty.[123] A day later these self same drunkards would go into battle at Hanau and regain much of their lost morals and reputation. Their attack perhaps being fueled by the Officers wishing to redeem themselves. Alongside the 1e grenadiers looting, drunkeness, and egotism, the regiment had critical functions which no other regiment in the army could fulfil: it provided an inspiring example of coolness on the battlefield, the cement which held the army together in 1813-1814, and as well as through its own existence was a powerful motivation for men to earn their admission to the guard, and to share in the privalidges and status of the regiment and their special, if somewhat strained at times, relationship with the Emperor. Approximately 8-10,000 men joined the 1e Grenadiers from the line in the ten years to 1813, with under 1500 being sent back as NCO's and Officers. The propaganda machine of Napoleon and subsequent authors like Marco de Saint-Hilaire created an illusion about the guard of it being a monolithic crack combat force of the highest morals and character. This illusion came crumbling down at Waterloo, when the guard with too high an expectation placed upon it from the Line, failed to win a decisive break though the allied lines and fell back, precipitating the line to collapse. The old guard took more from the line than they gave back in terms of man power. Its great value was in its imperturbability, capable of great feats of skill of arms as at Austerlitz, Eylau, Dresden and Montmirail, and inspiring awe and fear in friend and foe alike.@Kevin F. Kiley The reason why I asked for clarification is that you specifically criticised Ed Coss’s work recently for using Marmont. From what I discern from your reply, parroting as it does Elting, is that it is OK to use Marmont, as long as it’s not anything critical of Napoleon? Am I correct in that interpretation of your position or could you clarify further, perhaps in your own words? I’m only seeking clarity and consistency. My point still stands though, that without adequate referencing we don’t know how Marmont has been used, for good or ill. Despite your assertion “So, it looks like both footnotes are in the book as well as citations for quotations.” There are still zero author footnotes or citations, and as I illustrated with Capt Prax’s directly quoted words, inadequately cited and potentially badly handled. You have singularly not addressed any of these points. I believe I made it quite clear that I was talking about the 1997 edition, indeed that is the one you cited on Amazon as well. Lachouque had indeed been dead for some 26 years by that point, so the editor of that edition could not easily have had contact with him. I still contend that the decision to not include citations was scholastically a poor one. Sacrificing scholarly rigour for readability is a common practice in primers, but I would be wary of doing that in something to be regarded as definitive. It is instructive that in all the dust jacket reviews and Elting’s introduction much is made of readability and reputation but pointedly no reference either to accuracy or scholarship. Elting did make a point about durability and already a quarter of a century in, and now us discussing it most a quarter of a century after that, he was on the money. Sometimes it’s what they don’t say that speaks volumes. Because we have a policy of non repetition I will not be drawn into discussion about Swords.
You should get some facts straight about the English version of the book. There, as has been already posted, four editions of the translated book by Mrs Brown. The first two were published in 1961 and 1962 and Commandant Lachouque died in 1971. So, he was still alive when Mrs Brown was translating the work. It is also evident, from Mrs Brown's Preface, that she talked to Commandant Lachouque during the process. And her Preface is dated in 1959, twelve years before Commandant Lachouque died, not 'a quarter century earlier' as you stated.
It seems to me that you are tending toward misrepresentation of the work, first stating there were no footnotes, then hinting that Mrs Brown did not know Commandant Lachouque when, if you read the Preface, she most certainly did, and then insisting that the book is not sourced which is incorrect.
It also seems to me that you are critical of any books that can be seen as 'pro-Napoleon' or pro-French beginning with your inaccurate assertion that Cronin's biography is hagiography when it is not, as well as insisting that Swords Around a Throne is not properly sourced when it most certainly is, and then the above criticism of The Anatomy of Glory. And then you have repeatedly insisted that you are not anti-Napoleon.
As for Marmont and his nine-volume memoir, the following might be helpful:
From the Recommended Reading List of A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars by Vincent Esposito and John Elting:
Memoires du Marechal Marmont, Duc de Raguse by Auguste Marmont. "The story of a brilliant man, trying to justify himself before a hostile generation-largely by throwing the blame on others. Marmont took an intelligent interest in soldiering and the problems of command; his book remains a must for every student of this period, both for its professional content and its unconscious self-portrait of a soldier who was too willing to listen to politicians and his own vanity. He remains, however, an untrustworthy witness, where his own conduct comes into question."
I’ve had this book since the 97 edition, and it is very readable, if a little flowery in style for modern tastes. This of course could be in part of the translation, but it is definitely a work of it’s time ie late 40’s early 50’s. It could of course be entirely put down to my personal preference. It is also worth noting the Henry Lachouque was a decorated forme French Infantry officer from WW1. He was also a noted ‘Napoleonophile’ being a founder of The Association of Friends of St Helena. He was instrumental in the restoration of Longwood in the 1930’s, as well as the deputy curator of the Malmaison museum throughout the German occupation. That gives him great access, but must bring into question his impartiality. There is a bibliography but no footnotes. This was perfectly acceptable at the time, I doubt though that any modern author could get away with a work of this scope and depth on trust that it was ‘largely compiled from documents in the archives of the Historical Services of the Army’. This means that it is very difficult to trace where an idea or statement came from. Left with that. We cannot therefore be sure when he speaks of the relationship between Napoleon and the guard how much of that is evidenced, or how much of that came from the author’s influence. So, all in all an excellent bedtime read, which I enjoyed immensely. It tells a great story, with Napoleon it’s obvious hero amongst a panoply of heroes. However, as a reference book it is a dead end, being nothing more than a fatter version of a primer. It has therefore sat largely unused on my bookshelf these last two decades. You can even get most of the great pictures from elsewhere these days If you can get a remaindered copy cheap, go ahead. You’ll probably enjoy it. I’d think twice about shelling out serious money thinking it will be a companion book of daily reference. Just a personal view of someone who bought it at full cover price when it came out in it’s 97 version.
As an addendum, there is an edition, La Garde Imperiale, in French, which is also very well-illustrated with work by Detaille, de Myrbach, Rousselot, Leliepvre and others. Not all are in color, however.