General Discussions

While reading up on Austrian politics in the 1801-05 period - very complicated, but vital for understanding what followed - inevitably the question arose of why Austria went to war when she was on her knees financially and militarily. It is a question addressed by Oskar Regele in Mitteilungen des Kriegsarchivs 21, but there seems to be an older answer in this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGjjnK15pks&t=632s It has been a few (ahem) years since I took Ancient History A-level (A!), but it included the Peloponnesian War and I think I read Thucydides about three times. However, he postulates that we must 1) consider the undercurrents, not just the immediate causes, 2) look at the fear created in the declining power by the actions of the rising state, not just existing ones but how they are likely to be used in not just a hard power sense, but also economically, 3) look at the role of smaller and third party states in stirring up the main conflict for their own advantage, while it is a focusing event that actually sets off the conflict when the normal restraints are abandoned by the weaker, more cautious power.

It seems to fit 1805 perfectly! Maybe Mack should not get all the blame?