C2 675 Grande Armée juin 1809

It is fascinating to look at the returns post-battle where the battalions have around 300-400 men present and even more in the hospital and detached, as you noted. . Colonel Meda, in his letter to Marshal Davout, asked for his chasseurs back as they were providing an escort for the Marshal before the start of the major battles in 1809. Meda says, "I beg you, General, to send me all the hunters who are in the headquarters, they are the best mounted and the most educated, I really need them; I was happy today, I can be better anotherday, and the enemy knowing my forces can double theirs and take revenge at the first moment" (Saski, 1900, p. 142).

In case this was Nabulieone's line of thought - then I cannot comprehend the reduction of the companies from 9 to 6 - battalions shrinking dramatically - especially when the elite companies were detached.

@Hans - Karl Weiß

Colonel Berthezene in his memoirs believes it was a political and he says, "At the time of the innovations which I have related, there was an important one in the army: the regiments underwent a new organization. They were increased to five battalions, including four for war, instead of three, of which they had been composed until then; but the battalions were reduced from nine companies to six for the battalions of war, and to four for those of the depot. By this measure, the number of companies was increased by regiment, without any advantage for the war battalions, which, on the contrary, in several circumstances, experienced a real decrease. It is easy todo the math: in fact, these regiments, which had only two battalions in the army, when these were nine companies, had eighteen companies; with three new six-company battalions they did not have more. Those which had three battalions in the army, and this was the largest number, had twenty-seven companies, while with four new battalions, they had only twenty-four, which constituted them. a pertereal of three companies. It is probable that this change was due to political thought, and that the desire to send part of our old troops to Spain, without reducing the number of regiments and battalions of the Grand Army, determined this formation. It seems bad to me: it gives battalions that are too weak or companies that are too strong, and one of the most serious inconvenience it offers is that it reduces too much the number of companies in the center, which, reduced to four, can no longer suffice to supply two elite ones" (Berthezene, ,1855, pp. 163-164)

@Michael Lint

It is a very interesting task to examine the casualties in the campaigns more closely, as the official figures were often only a product of propaganda. The reports from the field hospitals can provide new and valuable information. It would be very instructive to learn how the losses are made up. Of course there were the dead and the wounded, but my guess is that the sick and deserters made up by far the largest group of "casualties". The deserters will have become an increasing problem over the years. I have read reports that in 1813 some french troops had lost up to 30 percent of their strength due to deserters.

I am currently working on the biographical data of the french generals and their aides de camp. Finding the Aides de Camp of corps and division commanders is not always easy, as some served longer, others changed frequently. It becomes particularly difficult with the chiefs of staff, the fortress commanders or the generals who served as military governors in the divisions militaire ...

I am therefore interested in all lists or OOBs that give the names of the Aides de Camp. Most of the OOBs that have been printed so far remain very superficial, with the exception of Alombert & Colin's lists for the war of 1805, for example.

That's why I was particularly happy about the lists from C2 675 that you had posted. I assume that there is still a lot to be found in the SHD archives and hope to be able to take a look at it at some point.

@Immo Frese

I agree the more you examine the returns and then check the regimental rolls things just do not add up. Now I am not saying the controles de troupes are 100% accurate, but the 72e Ligne at the Battle of Thann suffered far more than the 57e Ligne at least according to their rolls. Both of these regimental rolls are more thorough than most I have looked at so far. . It is extremely interesting to read how the men were wounded and such.

Below is the 2nd and 3rd Corps April 1809 with Generals and aide de camps.

@Michael Lint

Thank yo very much, Michael!

I'm very excited to see the results of your research.

For the majority of the soldiers it must have been a terrible expirience to have been wounded. Especially since the medical services were completely inadequately equipped. Since Marshal Davout was known for carefully checking the equipment of his troops, the soldiers of the III. Corps were probably even more "lucky" than others. It would be interesting to compare the medical equipment used by the army corps in the war of 1809. I think there could have been greater differences between Masséna's and Davout's corps ...

@Immo Frese

Immo Frese,

I have sadly not visited the SHD, but I was able to purchase documents from an author who has a vast amount of material. His website is below if you would like to contact him and purchase documentshttps://officiersdenapoleon.jimdofree.com/ . I would rather go to the SHD myself, but that isn't possible in the near future, and his help has allowed me to make leaps and bounds on my current research. So well worth it, in my opinion! I am also in contact with Frederic Berjaud, who has been gracious in giving me information for the 3e and 57e Ligne. Plus, I think we should share information to further our understanding of the material.

Michael