Let's take a step back and let's look at a general, who waged an excellent campaign - followed by an utter disaster, then a successful side show, followed by two years of glory, tarnished in the following years - and ending his career in a succession of 4 defeats (one of apocalyptic size) in a row.
How does such a general earn to be a genius in war - who is only as good when the army has the size he can cope with and the army is able to life off the land?
The outcome - a ruined country which was occupied for years.
there is a series of Vachée in Revue Militaire Générale,
Étude du Charactère Militaire du Maréchale Davout starting in Tome 1, Janvier à Juin 1907, in a series of articles - thanks to my friend Steve Smith, this was made available for me, for a comfortable read, evidently the Davout / Berthier feud is confirmed, so I cannot share that there is no evidence, on the contrary there is plenty.
Davout, qui était peut-être l’un des maréchaux les plus impopulaires parmi ses pairs, semble avoir eu un talent particulier pour se faire desennemis dans les hautes sphères. En 1809, il se fait ainsi un ennemi, et pour longtemps, du maréchal Berthier, le chef d’état-major le plus
Houtroulle : Davout le Terrible, pages 172 and 173, another author confirming the Davout / Berthier feud originating in 1809, won't waste my time citing - there I guess the author is also not trustworthy.
'Feuding' and 'despising' are two entirely different things. One denotes argument, the other something much worse.
Material on the 'argument' between Davout and Berthier can be found in The Iron Marshal by John Gallaher.
It should also be noted that Davout was not popular with the other marshals and he could have cared less if he was or not. He was skilled, efficient, and an excellent field commander and his administrative ability was on the same level.
The root of the problem in 1809 was Napoleon. He tried to command from Paris using a combination of semaphore and courier and the messages/orders sent to Berthier did not arrive in sequence, so the orders given to Davout were confusing to say the least. Berthier finally bluntly told Napoleon that he needed to get in theater to straighten out the mess.
Further, Berthier was never the commander of the Army of Germany and functioned as he usually did as Major General and chief of staff.
In April of 1812 Davout wrote an irate letter to Berthier regarding the sending of a senior ADC from Berthier to Davout's headquarters to report on the state of Davout's corps. These went to all of the corps headquarters, but Davout believed the ADC (Lejeune) was sent to spy on him. Berthier replied to Davout's letter not only amicably, but with a copy of Lejeune's report. Berthier also signed the letter with 'You know my long-standing friendship'
Davout graciously replied and also sent a copy to his wife with the annotation 'this explanation will prevent misundertandings between men of good will who, from their devotion to the Emperor, should always find plenty of reasons for reconciliation.'
31.) Thirty-fourth paragraph, lines one and two:- ‘Napoleon required above all else in his subordinates obedience rather than military flair.’This is an inaccurate assessment of what Napoleon ‘required’ from his subordinates. It is more a description of Wellington than Napoleon.
I disagree - the command style of Boney required blind obedience.
Tenez-vous-en strictement aux ordres que je vous donne ; exécutez ponctuellement vos instructions ; que tout le monde se tienne sur ses gardes et reste à son poste; mois seule sais ce que je dois faire." Correspondance militaires de Napoléon, Paris 1893, tome IV, Nr. 739
More examples can be found in Vachée, Colin or Béraud
Or cette activité est strictement délimitée par Napoléon dans une lettre du 14 février 1806 : « Tenez-vous en strictement aux ordres que je vous donne ; exécutez ponctuellement vos instructions ; que tout le monde se tienne sur ses grades et reste à son poste ; moi seul je sais ce que je dois faire ».(…) Les états-majors des corps d’armée n’ont aucun pouvoir de décisions opératique. En cas de dysfonctionnement de circuits de transmission, les états-majors de corps deviennent alors incapable de prendre les initiatives nécessaires. Les limites de ce modèle apparaîtront dès 1812 et seront les principales causes de l’échec de la campagne de 1813.p.234Béraud, Stéphane : La révolution militaire napoléonienne 1 Les Manœuvres, Bernard Gionvanangeli Éditeur, 2007, 2013
But I guess that those authors are also not trustworthy - and all what they say is counterfactual and a historical.
I won't go on the respond to the so called mistakes and outpointing them - as I see again a scourge of repetition allover.
Looking at those replies, I cannot agree with some of them, like
33.) Thirty-fourth paragraph, line eight:- ‘Berthier despised Davout…’This is an inaccurate assessment and I have seen no evidence of it being accurate.
I could list Segur who well explains the Davout / Berthier feud, but - most likely Segur is deemed a historical and not reliable.
First, his 'recollection' of the Polish charge at Somosierra is wrong, and he was there and wounded for his trouble.
Second, his 'recollection' of the Russian campaign got him called out by Gourgaud and wounded in a duel for his 'remembering with advantages.' Gourgaud was there at the same time as de Segur, and it the more reliable witness.
I submit that anything de Segur writes should be checked before believing it along with a very large salt pill.
words like this stifle discussion - only because you say it is a historical, it isn't by default. You seem to believe to be chief judge about this topic, which you aren't.
No, it doesn't. What it does is point out nonsense that some what passed as factual history. It isn't.
If you believe so strongly in the 'psychiatric diagnoses' of Napoleon, then support it with serious and credible references. If you cannot, then the point is moot.
@Kevin F. Kiley I've spoken to you before about respectful interactions. Stop with the use of terms like 'nonsense' and 'ahistorical' as a way of dismissing opinions that you personally disagree with, or find yourself another forum to post in. This is your final warning.
I am sorry that you cannot see it but is is well explained in the article, of course you shouldn't use one article as reference alone, neither cherry picked memoires - those won't do as well. In case you trouble yourself to read it closely you will see that the author makes direct references in his arguments and stays transparent - so it is easy to follow up his arguments - and nobody is forced to agree with those, nor with mine, nor with yours.
The author of the article correctly points out the the character - and his deficiencies of Boney played an important role in the limits of his style of war and his final catastrophic ending.
His narcissist behaviour prevented him to educate and train other of his captains to become a leader capable of independent command - nor to listen to any other opinion than his own, again the decisions to wage the Russian campaign of 1812 is a prime example on this. Again this can be seen how he ridiculed persons like Caulaincourt, who knew of course better than megalomaniac Boney when commenting about the Russian winter and how sudden the weather could change for the worst.
The evidence is there - and I am sorry if there are problems to see those.
What 'evidence'? The bibliography is inadequate, there are no footnotes, and there is too much opinion not backed up by facts. I found at least 39 errors in fact and/or biased opinions in the article. It is poorly done and should not be used as a reference.
Napoleon developed an insatiable lust for power that caused ceaseless demands on the resources of France. His belief in his own destiny, and that he was set apart form ordinary man warped his judgment. Combined with this was the growing deterioration of his physical health. He suffered from piles and bladder trouble and his physical abilities hindered him on at least two battle fields, Borodino and Waterloo. The demands that he retain absolute centralized power over both the military and civil administrations of France during the later period pushed him way beyond the bounds of proper control. The development of his personality during these last years had an everlasting impact on the course of events and his abilities as a military commander.
I can subscribe to that.
His narcissistic behaviour disorder was bad enough - but in combination with megalomania - a receipt for disaster, as the catastrophic losses of the campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 prove.
Napoleon required above all else in his subordinates obedience rather than military flair.
true
This traditional reputation must be viewed not only in regards to his victories, but also his failings as a military commander. It is in this light that judgments must made on Napoleon's military capabilities.
I agree, but this isn't usually done, he was shaping the operational art of war till maybe 1809 but then his limitations on warfare became pretty evident.
"His narcissistic behaviour disorder was bad enough - but in combination with megalomania - a receipt for disaster, as the catastrophic losses of the campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 prove."
And where is any evidence or proof that Napoleon was suffering from a 'narcissistic behavior disorder' or from megalomania? It is merely psychobabble and it most certainly isn't found in any of the credible period memoirs from those closest to him such as Rapp, Savary, Gourgaud, Bertrand, Baron Fain, Marchand, and others. And these men most certainly were not 'sycophants and servile acolytes.'
Trying to psychoanalyze someone who has been dead for 200 years is folly and just plain ridiculous.
@Kevin F. Kiley Read The Sword and the Spirit when it comes out - you'll see that the naricistic behaviour disorder is as amply apparent as its possible to determine without having the patient in the room.
One has just to look what army way larger in 1800 - otherwise one sees the grudge of Boney that Moreau rejected one of his sisters and stayed loyal to a companion, alien to such a glory and career monger as Boney.
Anyway I won't discuss this matter further to avoid the scourge of repetition.
I am more interested why Boney failed so miserable in Egypt / Syria as well as 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 - certainly his character played a huge part, as pointed out in the article.
Correspondence VI, Number 4694, 201, 22 March 1800
‘The Army of the Rhine (infantry) will be divided into four Grand Corps d’Armee.
The First and Third Corps, each comprising three divisions:
1st Division-5,000 men.
2d Division-10,000 men.
3d Division-5,000 men.
The Second and Fourth Corps, each of four divisions:
1st Division (or advance guard)-5,000 men.
2d Division-10,000 men.
3d Division-10,000 men.
4th Division-5,000 men.
The first three Grand Corps will be designated corps d’armee of the Army of the Rhine; the fourth, reserve corps.
The cavalry will be divided in divisions each comprising from 2,000 to 3,000 horses.
The cavalry division attached to the reserve corps will be 3,000 men strong, two thirds of which will be chasseurs or hussars, and the rest dragoons and cavalry.
Each small division will have six guns and each large one twelve. There will be three guns for each cavalry division.
‘My intention…is to organize an army of the reserve, the command of which will be at the disposal of the First Consul. It will be divided into a right, center, and left. Each of these three large corps will be commanded by a lieutenant general who will have, in addition, one cavalry division like wise commanded by a lieutenant general.’
‘Each of these three large corps will be divided into two divisions, each commanded by a general of division and two generals of brigade, and each Grand Corps will have in addition a high-ranking artillery officer…’
‘Each corps will comprise 18,000 to 20,000 men, including the two regiments of hussars or chasseurs and sixteen guns, a dozen of which will be served by foot companies and four by the horse artillery.’
Correspondence VI. Number 4552, 107; Napoleon to Berthier 25 January 1800.
Further, the following regarding the formation of the Armee de la Reserve, might be helpful:
‘…To execute such a plan required speed, profound secrecy, and great audacity. The secret was the most difficult to keep, for how is it possible to conceal their movement from numerous English and Austrian spies?’
‘The most suitable way…was to reveal it myself by making such a demonstration that it would become an object of ridicule to the enemy, and to act in such a way that the enemy considered all of these declarations as a way to create a diversion to the operations of the Austrian army, which blocked Genoa. It was necessary to give a specific objective to the observers and spies.’
‘Therefore it was decided in messages to the Legislative Corps, the Senate, and by decrees and publication in the papers, and finally by insinuation of ever kind, that the place where the army of the reserve would assemble was Dijon, that I would review it there, etc. Immediately all the spies and observers gravitated to this city. They saw there, during the first days of April, a large officer establishment without an army, and in the course of this month, some 5,000 or 6,000 conscripts and retired soldiers, many of them disabled and moved by their zeal rather than their physical strength.’
‘Soon this army became an object of ridicule, and when I held the review on 6 May, people were astonished to see only 7,000 or 8,000 men, most of them not even in uniform…These misleading reports circulated through Brittany, Geneva, Basle, London, Vienna, and Italy. Europe was filled with caricatures…with the caption that read ‘Bonaparte’s Army of Reserve.’
‘…the real army was formed en route. The divisions were organized at different points of rendezvous. These places were isolated and had no connection with each other…the most difficult thing to conceal was the movement of needed provisions through the mountains where nothing could be found…’
‘The combination of all these means of putting the spies on the wrong scent was crowded with the most fortunate success. It was said in Paris, as in Dijon and Vienna: ‘There is no army of the reserve.’ At Melas’ headquarters it was added, ‘The army of reserve, which threatens us so much, is a band of 7,000 or 8,000 conscripts or invalids, with which they hope to deceive us into abandoning the siege of Genoa. The French count too much on our naivete; they would have us read like the fabled dog who leaves his prey for a mere shadow.’-Correspondence XXXI, 366.
Let's take a step back and let's look at a general, who waged an excellent campaign - followed by an utter disaster, then a successful side show, followed by two years of glory, tarnished in the following years - and ending his career in a succession of 4 defeats (one of apocalyptic size) in a row.
How does such a general earn to be a genius in war - who is only as good when the army has the size he can cope with and the army is able to life off the land?
The outcome - a ruined country which was occupied for years.
there is a series of Vachée in Revue Militaire Générale,
Étude du Charactère Militaire du Maréchale Davout starting in Tome 1, Janvier à Juin 1907, in a series of articles - thanks to my friend Steve Smith, this was made available for me, for a comfortable read, evidently the Davout / Berthier feud is confirmed, so I cannot share that there is no evidence, on the contrary there is plenty.
Davout, qui était peut-être l’un des maréchaux les plus impopulaires parmi ses pairs, semble avoir eu un talent particulier pour se faire des ennemis dans les hautes sphères. En 1809, il se fait ainsi un ennemi, et pour longtemps, du maréchal Berthier, le chef d’état-major le plusHoutroulle : Davout le Terrible, pages 172 and 173, another author confirming the Davout / Berthier feud originating in 1809, won't waste my time citing - there I guess the author is also not trustworthy.
also
31.) Thirty-fourth paragraph, lines one and two: - ‘Napoleon required above all else in his subordinates obedience rather than military flair.’ This is an inaccurate assessment of what Napoleon ‘required’ from his subordinates. It is more a description of Wellington than Napoleon.I disagree - the command style of Boney required blind obedience.
Tenez-vous-en strictement aux ordres que je vous donne ; exécutez ponctuellement vos instructions ; que tout le monde se tienne sur ses gardes et reste à son poste; mois seule sais ce que je dois faire." Correspondance militaires de Napoléon, Paris 1893, tome IV, Nr. 739More examples can be found in Vachée, Colin or Béraud
Or cette activité est strictement délimitée par Napoléon dans une lettre du 14 février 1806 : « Tenez-vous en strictement aux ordres que je vous donne ; exécutez ponctuellement vos instructions ; que tout le monde se tienne sur ses grades et reste à son poste ; moi seul je sais ce que je dois faire ». (…) Les états-majors des corps d’armée n’ont aucun pouvoir de décisions opératique. En cas de dysfonctionnement de circuits de transmission, les états-majors de corps deviennent alors incapable de prendre les initiatives nécessaires. Les limites de ce modèle apparaîtront dès 1812 et seront les principales causes de l’échec de la campagne de 1813. p.234 Béraud, Stéphane : La révolution militaire napoléonienne 1 Les Manœuvres, Bernard Gionvanangeli Éditeur, 2007, 2013But I guess that those authors are also not trustworthy - and all what they say is counterfactual and a historical.
I won't go on the respond to the so called mistakes and outpointing them - as I see again a scourge of repetition allover.
Looking at those replies, I cannot agree with some of them, like
33.) Thirty-fourth paragraph, line eight: - ‘Berthier despised Davout…’ This is an inaccurate assessment and I have seen no evidence of it being accurate.I could list Segur who well explains the Davout / Berthier feud, but - most likely Segur is deemed a historical and not reliable.
In short, the idea is nonsense and ahistorical.words like this stifle discussion - only because you say it is a historical, it isn't by default. You seem to believe to be chief judge about this topic, which you aren't.
I am sorry that you cannot see it but is is well explained in the article, of course you shouldn't use one article as reference alone, neither cherry picked memoires - those won't do as well. In case you trouble yourself to read it closely you will see that the author makes direct references in his arguments and stays transparent - so it is easy to follow up his arguments - and nobody is forced to agree with those, nor with mine, nor with yours.
The author of the article correctly points out the the character - and his deficiencies of Boney played an important role in the limits of his style of war and his final catastrophic ending.
His narcissist behaviour prevented him to educate and train other of his captains to become a leader capable of independent command - nor to listen to any other opinion than his own, again the decisions to wage the Russian campaign of 1812 is a prime example on this. Again this can be seen how he ridiculed persons like Caulaincourt, who knew of course better than megalomaniac Boney when commenting about the Russian winter and how sudden the weather could change for the worst.
The evidence is there - and I am sorry if there are problems to see those.
Napoleon developed an insatiable lust for power that caused ceaseless demands on the resources of France. His belief in his own destiny, and that he was set apart form ordinary man warped his judgment. Combined with this was the growing deterioration of his physical health. He suffered from piles and bladder trouble and his physical abilities hindered him on at least two battle fields, Borodino and Waterloo. The demands that he retain absolute centralized power over both the military and civil administrations of France during the later period pushed him way beyond the bounds of proper control. The development of his personality during these last years had an everlasting impact on the course of events and his abilities as a military commander.I can subscribe to that.
His narcissistic behaviour disorder was bad enough - but in combination with megalomania - a receipt for disaster, as the catastrophic losses of the campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 prove.
Napoleon required above all else in his subordinates obedience rather than military flair.true
This traditional reputation must be viewed not only in regards to his victories, but also his failings as a military commander. It is in this light that judgments must made on Napoleon's military capabilities.I agree, but this isn't usually done, he was shaping the operational art of war till maybe 1809 but then his limitations on warfare became pretty evident.
There are some outstanding errors in that paper and if anyone is interested, I'll post at least some of them.