New Work & Research

In my view we ignore the 7YW in Europe, and then keep on trailing the well trodden path of mythology - as can be seen even or dare I say well entrenched in the ivory tower of the professors of history. Here some tid bits of a discussion I initiated on a 7YW forum, the problem, lack of knowledge and lack of people researching such esoteric questions of how the French Army did fight in the 7YW.

At Kloster Kamp the French employed chasseurs and grenadiers as skirmishers to slow down the Allied attack.


At Kamperbruch, the chasseurs de Fischer and grenadiers of the brigade Auvergne - where they occupied farms, farm courts, shrubs, to delay the attack of the enemy - for more see:


Die Kriege Friedrichs des Großen, Herausgegeben vom Großen Generalstabe, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abtheilung II, 3. Teil, Der Siebenjährige Krieg, 1756 - 1763, Dreizehnter Band, Torgau, Berlin, Mittler und Sohn, 1914, p. 337


So this seems to be, what would be called in the French Revolutionary Wars skirmishers acting as grande bande.

Durant la bataille de Bergen du 13 avril 1759 contre l'armée prussienee commandée par le duc Ferdinand de Brunswick, Broglie a disposé près de 2000 tirailleurs en avant de sa ligne de bataille.

p. 53


Béraud : La révolution militaire napolèonienne - Les Batailles


Béraud give a good discussion of the development of tactics from the Ancien Regime - Revolution to Napoleonic period.


So do your wargame rules allow such rather modern style of tactics for your French Army?


Sorry forgot the translation, during the battle at Bergen 13th April of 1759 against the Prussian Army commanded by the duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, Broglie deployed 2000 skirmishers in front of this battle line.

Lors de la victoire de Corbach du 18 Juillet 1760, le duc de Broglie lance ses tirailleurs, qui précèdent huit battaillons en colonnes, contre le flanc droit de la ligne prussienne du duc de Brunswicksome source as above  pp. 53 - 54


At the victory of Corbach, 18th of July 1760, the Duke of Broglie throws his skirmishers, who advance in front of eight battalions in column, against the right flans of the Prussian line of the Duke of Brunswick.

À la bataille de Clostercamp du 16 octobre 1760, le comte de Castries qui a été détache par le duc de Broglie emploie différents typs de colonnes : la colonne d'attaque, la colonne d'attente et la colonne de manoeuvre précédant un déploiement en ligne

At the battle of Clostercamp at the 16th of October 1760, the Earl of Castries, who was detached by the Duke of Broglie used different types of columns : The attacking column, la colonne d'attente [don't know how to translate this] and the column of manoeuvre before deploying into line. Béraud, p. 54

The discussion focuses on French infantry tactic, one may distinguish three periods: the campaigns of 1757-1758, the campaign of 1759 and the campaigns of 1760-1762.

«  there was almost a permanent struggle between the linear/firepower school, and the columnar/bayonet school »

During the first period it was a classical tactic of a thin order with infantry on center, cavalry on wings. Deep order or column was used to attack a village, redoubts .. as the left wing along the Obersberg at Hastembeck. Skirmishes was an opportunity of battlefields, as at Bergen, where the battlefield was partly cut off with with orchards, coppices, hedges… It was not a tactical usage.

A short period of deep order in 1759 after an injonction of the marshal of Belles Isles in april 1759 to present infantry in columns with the aim breaking through the enemy lines with a consequence: the strange order of battle of Minden.

And a third period with innovations introduced by marshal of Broglie.
Broglie was a very good chief of staff (organisation of the army), a good tactician (good vision of a battle field) but probably not a great strategist (global vision of a campaign, a war. And not sure that the ministry , la cour ever authorised him to have such a global vision). He creates a first version of a division, even if it was without cavalry. He created companies of chasseurs coupled with the grenadiers companies and used them systematically for skirmishes.

Usually first line was a continuous line, with only small intervals between battalions and the second line 300 meters back with wide intervals.

Rossbach was a real defeat not a conventional battle, it could not be examined as a battlefield.

JL

Spencer Wilkinson on the Duc de Broglie:


Early in 1760 he issued standing orders or regulations for his army during the coming campaign. He laid down that the infantry of the line be divided into four divisions, each to be commanded throughout the campaign by a Lieutenant General, who would have charge of all that concerned it, to whom it's brigadiers and colonels would report and through whom all orders would reach them.

Each wing of cavalry was also to form a division and to have a brigade of infantry associated with it. On the march each division was to form a separate column somthatbthe army would normally march in six columns. Whenever the enemy was approached each Lieutenant General was to form his division into two or more columns, in each of which the platoons were to close up to three paces one behind the other, so that each column would have a depth of not more than 500 paces and could deploy in a few minutes.

By thes arrangements the army was rendered capable of marching through a difficult country, always retaining the power of forming quickly into two lines which were the normal order of battle.

The grenadiers and chasseurs of each brigade were to be formed into a separate battalion, and in this way the army was provided with a number of battalions of light troops, employed as outposts or skirmishers. Similarly, strong bodies of light cavalry were formed of brigades of Dragoons and Hussars.

Broglie' chief innovation was his method of moving his army in the theater of war. He keeps his principal force together, subdividing it as has been explained for ease of movement, but he surrounds it with strong detachments which form a great screen between it and the enemy and occupy, at varying distances from the main body, the principal routes by which the enemy could approach either its front or its flanks. He also throws out similar strong parties to hold or protect in advance important points on the line of march which he is about to take his army.

In the same way in the presence of the enemy he throws forward strong detachments on both wings, so that the enemy must make up his mind either to accept battle at the risk of being enveloped or retire before that can happen.

Colin writes in his tactiques of 18e siecle – L'infanterie au XVIIIe siècle :

la tactique / par le

commandant d'artillerie Colin:


Enfin, l'emploi de tirailleurs ou de petits détachements faisant le feu de billebaude en avant ou sur les ailes c'est généralisé depuis la guerre de la succession d'Autriche ; dans les camps d'instruction de 1754 il n'y a pas de manœuvres sans tirailleurs.

p.56