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Fear & British press during the Napoleonic Wars

The long shadow of the emperor: fear and British press during the Napoleonic Wars (1795 - 1815): A quantitative study on the history of the emotions Ruiz-Tapiador Bartolomé, Juan


"The long shadow of the emperor: fear and British press during the Napoleonic Wars (1795 –1815)” was a master thesis that combined the history of emotions with the use of quantitative computational techniques. The main objectives of the project were to detect and analyse the fear around the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte in the British press, between 1795 and 1815, and to check the feasibility of the proposed quantitative techniques for the history of emotions. The methodology consisted of the bibliographic collection of terms, web scrapping techniques, the creation of a database of mentions, and the emotional analysis of the subsequent information. The results showed how the emotion of fear was experienced in the British press, and the great explanatory potential of the methodology proposed by the study. The findings have revealed valuable information about international politics, public opinion, and erroneous assumptions in our current understandings of the Napoleonic Wars.




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terrydoherty
Sep 27, 2023

That's a good question. I think the Great Fear had several significant impacts on the British Army.

1. The great expansion of the militiat system, including the fencibles, created a ready pool of, at least partially trained, recruits for the army during the key years of the Peninsular War.


2. It increased the emphasis on the need for a much larger force of light infantry, becaues of the enclosed nature of the country in along the English coast. Many officers of the period comment on this inlcuding Money, MacDonald, Cornwallis and others.


3. With the expansion of the militia came the need to arm them, which led to the expansion of the British aramements industry. This eventually led to a great surplus of arms which were sent to other belligerents in the coalition.


In my opinion the Great Fear was overblown and Pitt himself thought so as well, at least according to MacDonald, but the impacts were far reaching. According to MacDonald in his relatively obscure work "Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry on Actual Service" relates Pitt's statement at a dinner party in a rather lengthy footnote that runs over the course of several pages (p. xxviii in the preface of the edition I have):


"On the subject of invasion he spoke with a rather guarded caution; and his sentiments were elicited rather than volunteered. He deemed the attempt more possible, than probable, though in a public capacity, he supported other opinions, with a view of animating the Nation to make the requisite preparations for meeting the contenst."


Sir Sidney Smith and General Dundas were also present at the dinner.


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