Here's a fun question to kick off the discussion for #WaterlooRemembered. Was Waterloo actually a battle Napoleon could have won? As we deliberately have to indulge in counterfactuals here, we have to be careful, but it might be interesting for people to share their thoughts on what would have had to have been different for Napoleon to win the battle. I'll keep quiet with my thoughts initially, but remember to tune in to the Napoleonicist each day, as the turning points of the campaign is one of many topics I am discussing with experts over the course of the Waterloo Remembered series.
Given the requisite conditions for the battle to be fought, I don’t think Napoleon could have won the battle. But he need not have lost it. An indecisive action may well have been possible.
For a Battle to occur, Wellington would need the confirmation that the Prussians were going to support him.
The only other way I see a battle occurring is if both armies are united and Napoleon gives battle against both. And yes, I do think he could win a battle against Wellington and Blucher, but I don’t think he could win Waterloo. The most he could have done, is pull off a marginal success by getting Wellington to give up his ground.
One presumes thereafter he’d have tried again with Blucher.
Interesting. I agree with all you've said but the interesting one that I speculate about is what if Ney had found a way to turn the cavalry assault into a combined arms offensive? (ie just as the Prussians were starting to gather).
@Zack White Finding the way is the problem. Because wellington also had cavalry and guns. And at least one attempt to support the cavalry attacks was driven back by artillery fire.
Itd have been more damaging a loss at that point, but I don’t think i see an easy way to end the campaign even if the allied right was forced into the wood.
I'd absolutely agree that even if Napoleon drove the Anglo-Dutch army back at Waterloo, all he would have done is achieved another Ligny, and the next day would have had to turn on the Prussians. Then there's a question of troops being exhausted, and the Prussians being strung out, etc. Interesting what you say about attempts to support being driven back by artillery fire.
I guess that my views are well-known, but, in brief, I think that, even in the rather unfavourable circumstances of the morning of 18 June, Napoleon could have obtained a victory over Wellington at Waterloo - all that it would have taken was to send in the whole of the Old and Middle Guard at 1800, rather than bits and pieces of it at 1930 - but it would at best have been pretty marginal and could well have been reversed by the Prussians the next day.
Thanks Charles! Can I ask you to go to the members area of the site (members tab at the top of the page) and amend your profile so that it states your full name rather than just your email address. It's one of the transparency rules. Many thanks in advance.
How much of a gamble would that have been strategically with the Prussians closing in around Plancenoit? As you say, there was an opportunity there when Ney called for reinforcements, but would doing so have been reckless or bold?
@Zack White That it would have been a gamble there is no doubt, but at the time when the opportunity arose - around 1800 Mouton's men - were still fighting hard, while they had recently being reinforced by the Young Guard. In short, sending in the whole of the Middle and Old Guard would not have done any harm at Plancenoit whilst yet offering Napoleon his only chance of victory. That said, of course, such a decision would have stripped the emperor of his last reserve, but reserves are there to be used, especially in moments when it was all or nothing.
What about if (and this seems like a "What if at Waterloo?" Post if you'll forgive me...) Napoleon was 10 years younger and had his army of the summer of 1812 then possibly. But he wasn't and did not. He'd left that army to die, fleeing back to Paris to save himself. He didn't have the energy of his younger self. To win, despite many factors, weather, ill health, timing. I think that the most important part was the 17th June. Wellington choosing the ground and the reassurances that Blucher and Wellington made to each other to support. The plan worked well fortunately and Napoleon was defeated with near perfect timing.
I think Charles makes that point in Eagle rejected, doesn't he? Had the Prussians actually arrived sooner, there was much more scope for a controlled withdrawal.
Imagine if this had been the Napoleon of Austerlitz, with his finely tuned 1805 army. That really could have been a very different story.
A clash of titans would have been if Wellington’s 1813 army was facing that.
Absolutely. Wouldn't Napoleon have had the advantage of numbers, though? Love how this is turning in a Napoleonic Wars equivalent of a fantasy football team! 😂
@Zack White Indeed. But the British never fought without allies so I’m sort of assuming they aren’t there alone.
@Joshua Provan I love the idea of a "fantasy league" of Wellington's best regiments. The 68th still in America. Bah
I actually think the Prussians seemed to arrive at a good time. Seeing that they had to fight through Plancenoit. Too early and Napoleon would switch focus onto them. The perfect tactic unfolded. Slowly drawing in more and more French until a large force can hammer onto the east flank. If the battle carried on the the Guard didn't "recule" then the reinforcement of the Prussians would have been very telling in open battle.
It is too much speculation, most are based what if Boney did this or that, but then how would Wellington react to hold the French at bay?
He was a resourceful commander - so in case to speculate one has not just focus to Boney alone.
The battle itself did not look going too well - certainly for a certain amount of time for Wellington's army, for that reason the Prussians - after discussing the situation - struck (according to them) prematurely at about 16:00 - and just by that stalling maybe a possible decisive break through attack by Lobau.
It wasn't 1806 for the French nor 1813 for the Brits, it was 1815 and all armies participating had its severe flaws, Clinton is very critical about the quality of the British infantry.
Boney did just a frontal battle, and Wellington was quite disappointed mentioning that they just fought in the old way, Boney's operational art of war already failed when accepting the battle (which he didn't think to fight at the eve of the 17th June at all).
A lot can be said with hindsight of course, but in what position were the commanders on the spot at this time.
After the surprise attack of the Prussians at Plancenoit the battle was as good as lost for Boney, he didn't reckon with their interference and had by that no good plan to counter this thread.
I, too, used to think that Napoleon fought a very unimaginative battle at Waterloo. However, long discussions with the Belgian expert, Bernard Coppens, convinced me otherwise. What I rather accept now is the theory that Napoleon intended to deal with Wellington by means of a massive attack, initially delivered by Drouet's I Corps, that would roll up his army up from right to left, the role of Reille's corps being to pin down Wellington's right. This being the only possible way of breaking the Anglo-Dutch, one has to admit that the emperor actually fought a rather clever battle, as witness, too, his use of his cavalry to keep Wellington pinned down until such time as Drouet had got his battered command back in sufficient order to launch a second attack, this time supported by Mouton. His misfortune, of course, was that the Prussians (who he had no idea were coming) turned up at just the wrong moment.
@Charles Esdaile
It was a bataille aceptée - even worse - realized only when day broke at the 18th.
I cannot see any finesse, which maybe also Wellington couldn't see when remarking that they attacked in the old fashion.
It could have ended like Eylau - without the arrival of Davout, or another Borodino - Boney of course had experience to fight such battles.
What you describe is quite accepted, but I cannot share any enthusiasm for seeing an imaginative battle, I miss Grouchy coming up at Wellington's rear or left flank.
By accepting the battle on Wellington's terms - Boney still must have had a grand tactical perception to fight the battle with a good chance of winning.
I would have also to re read Dawson on this.
I’ve always found the Lobau argument is unlikely. That Corps wasn’t even deployed at the time I Corps went into the attack. The Prussians attacked prematurely because had they waited for full concentration they’d not have been able to enter the fray before 6 or 7.
I disagree please read this, that is what I base my hypothesis upon
« Un peu plus tard, le comte de Lobau, commandant la droite à Waterloo, fit dire à l’Empereur qu’il était attaqué par les Prussiens. Napoléon ne voulait pas d’abord admettre que la chose fût possible. Lobau dit à M. de Caronne, un de ses officiers : « Faites un prisonnier et portez-le-lui, peut-être sera-t-il convaincu (…) (Fußnote 2, Bourdon de Vatry, cité dans les Mémoires du maréchal Grouchy, tome 4, 1874, page 108) » Coppens – S. 238 « Le colonel Jamin, sous – chef d’état-major du 6e corps écrit : « Le 6e corps se porte en avant pour soutenir l’attaque du centre à peine est-il arrivé sur la crête de ravin qui sépare les deux armées que son chef d’état-major, le général Durieux, qui l’avait devancé, revient blessé et annonce que de tirailleurs ennemies s’étendant sur notre flanc droit. Le comte de Lobau s’avance avec le général Jacquinot et moi pour le reconnaître, et bientôt nous voyons déboucher deux colonnes d’environ dix milles hommes chacune : c`´était le corps prussiens de Bulow. La destination du 6e corps se trouve changé par cet incident : il ne s’agissait plus de continuer l’attaque contre les Anglais, mais bien de repousser celle des Prussiens : en un mot par la force de choses nous étions réduits à la défensive la plus défavorable et dont le résultat n’était plus douteux. ( …) (Fußnote 8, Janin, Campagne de Waterloo ou Remarques critiques et historiques sur l’ouvrage du général Gourgaud, Paris 18120, page 35.) » Coppens – S. 242 Quant au Colonel Combes-Brassard, l’autre sous-chef d’état-major du 6e corps, il écrit : « Le 6e corps, formant la réserve, marcha pour soutenir l’attaque à droite. Ce corps était composé entièrement d’infanterie. Il était trois heures et demie, un feu infernal s’étendait sur toute la ligne des deux armées. Le 6e corps achevait de se déployer en réserve sur toute la droite de l’armée, lorsque, me rendant à la extrémité de notre droite, je reconnus des têtes de colonnes qui débouchaient du côté de Vavres, par Ohain et Saint-Lambert. Ces colonnes étaient prussiennes. Leur arrivée se produisait sans que l’Empereur eût donné aucun ordre. Nous étions tournes. (Fußnote 9, Combes-Brassard. Notices sur la bataille de Mont-Saint-Jean (récit rédigé le 22 juin 1815, dans Souvenirs et Correspondance sur la bataille de Waterloo, Librairie historique Teissèdre, Paris 2000. ) » Coppens, S. 242 « Le Prince von Thurn und Taxis, attaché militaire bavarois au quartier général du maréchal Blücher, écrit : « Le chemin descendait de façon abrupte d’une hauteur dans la vallée du ruisseau de la Lasne, puis immédiatement après avoir passé celui-ci, il remontait de façon aussi abrupte, il faut ajouter à cela que le chemin était très étroit et en mauvais état. Ce défilé nous retint de façon extraordinaire et nous eûmes une peine incroyable à faire monter l’artillerie sur la hauteur en question. Un petit détachement ennemie aurait pu nous disputer ici le passage toute la journée. (Fußnote 15, Thurn und Taxis (Prinz August von) Aus den Feldzügen 1812 bis 1815, Leipzig 1912) « Coppens S. 245 «Où sont donc passées les divisions Domon et Subervie que Napoléon prétend avoir envoyées hors des lignes françaises, à trous mille toises ? » Coppens S. 245 Nr.3, Aus dem Tagebuch des Fürsten von Thurn und Taxis, Juni 15.-18. Zitat: „Endlich, es war ungefähr ½ 5 Uhr, entschloss sich der Feldmarschall und General Bülow, die durch den ungefähr eine habe Stunde tiefen Wald vorgegangen waren, von wo aus man die ganze Linie beobachten konnte, und denen es schien (wie es denn auch der Fall war), dass der Feind einiges Terrain gewonnen, den Angriff zu unternehmen, obschon nur zwei Brigaden heran waren. – Ich glaube, es war Zeit. Man fing sogleich an, eine Batterie durchfeuern zu lassen, damit der Herzog avisiert sein könnne, und unmittelbar darauf wurde vorgerückt. Das Terrain steigt jenseits des Waldes wieder terrassenförmig in das Tal hinab, in welchem das Dorf Planchenoit liegt. Eine feindliche Kavallerieabteilung von ca. 150 Pferden kam aus demselben gerade in diesem Moment die Höhe herauf, wahrscheinlich um, (wozu es freilich nun etwas spät war) eine Rekognoszierung zu machen. Selber mochte es etwas unerwartet sein, daß schon so viel Truppen von uns debouchiert hatten. Sie stutzte und kehrte um, wir folgten, und bald öffnete sich die Gegend noch mehr für uns, im Verhältnis, als wir vom Plateau herabstiegen. Wir hatten dicht vor uns Planchenoit, jenseits dieses Ortes erhebt sich das Terrain wieder bis zu der großen Strasse, die von Quatre-Bras nach Brüssel führt und deren Direktionslinie uns jetztschon ganz deutlich bemerkbar war. An dieser Chaussee befand sich ein fanalartiges Gerüst nahe bei einer Meierei, Belle Alliance genannt. Hier konnten wir die feindliche Reserve in dichten Massen aufgestellt erblicken, nämlich sämtliche Garden und das 6.Korps. Hier war es auch, von wo Napoleon bis dahin (und noch später, bis gegen 7 Uhr) die Schlacht beobachtet und geleitet hatte. Wir waren so nahe, daß wir den Moment bezeichnen konnten, in welchem das 6.Korps rechtsum machte und, um unserem Vorrücken Einhalt zu tun, sich auf Planchenoit in Bewegung setzte. Wir befanden uns also in der rechten Flanke der feindlichen Reserven und folglich im Rücken seiner engagierten Truppen, deren Feuerlinie zu unserer Rechten, freilich etwas weit, gut sichtbar war. Ich glaube, daß in diesem Augenblick noch keine feindliche Infanterie in Planchenoit war, und daß man die zunächststehenden 2 Bataillone hätte hineinwerfen können. Allein selbe würden wahrscheinlich wieder vom Feinde herausgedrängt worden sein, da wir sie noch nicht gehörig hätten soutenieren können. Man begnügte sich also für den Moment, ein starkes Geschützfeuer in das eben vom Feinde besetzt werdende Dorf zu etablieren. Kurz hierauf, es mochte nahe an 6 Uhr sein, als unsere Kolonnen eben anfingen, endlich in größerer Anzahl aus dem Walde hervorzukommen, traf eine wenig erfreuliche Meldung von General Thielmann ein, daß er im Moment, wo er sich angeschickt, unserer Direktion zu folgen, von einem bedeutenden feindlichen Korps heftig angegriffen worden, so zwar, daß man sich schon um den Besitz von Wavre schlage, und er demnach um Sukkurs bitte.“ Archivalische Beiträge zur Geschichte des Feldzuges 1815 von Julius Pflugk-Harttung Veröffentlicht in Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine, Berlin 1906I like to stress this
Wir waren so nahe, daß wir den Moment bezeichnen konnten, in welchem das 6.Korps rechtsum machte und, um unserem Vorrücken Einhalt zu tun, sich auf Planchenoit in Bewegung setzte. Wir befanden uns also in der rechten Flanke der feindlichen Reserven und folglich im Rücken seiner engagierten Truppen, deren Feuerlinie zu unserer Rechten, freilich etwas weit, gut sichtbar war.So the corps of Lobau re - eacted to the apprearing thread and it was poised originall to attack the left of Wellinton's army.
and again supported by this
Thurn und Taxis zitiert aus : Archivalische Beiträge zur Geschichte des Feldzugs 1815. (16. bis 24. Juni 1815) Von Julius von Pflugk - Harttung s. 608 bis 624 „Wenn man die Höhe erreicht hat, so befindet man sich am Eingang des Waldes von Frichermont, von dem Dorfe dieses Namens so genannt, das etwas weiter schon wieder abseits liegt, dessen Turm man durch ein Echappée de vue ganz deutlich sah, und welches wohl bemerkt, von feindlicher Infanterie besetzt war. Zu unserem Glücke war es der Wald aber nicht. Ja, es stand nicht einmal eine Vedette hier, und der Feldmarschall ließ denselben durch die zwei zuerst herangekommenen Bataillone ohne Schuß besetzen, so daß wir nun auch schon Meister der jenseitigen Débouchés waren. Allein auch mußten wir trachten in unserer verdeckten Aufstellung zu bleiben, da wir zu wenig Truppen hatten, um etwas zu unternehmen. Unsere ersten Plänkler fanden jenseits des Waldes eine Patrouille von 16 bis 20 Mann, die sich aber gleich nach dem Dorfe zurückzug, und unerklärlich genug, zeigte sich keine zweite.“ S. 618 (…) „Endlich, es war ungefähr 1/2 5 Uhr, entschloß sich der Feldmarschall und General Bülow, die durch den ungefähr eine kleine halbe Stunde tiefen Wald vorgegangen, von wo aus man die ganze feindliche Linie beobachten konnte, und denen es schien (wie es auch der Fall war), daß der Feind einiges Terrain gewonnen, den Angriff zu unternehmen, obschon nur zwei Brigaden heran waren. Ich glaube es war Zeit. Man fing sogleich an, eine Batterie durchfeuern zu lassen, damit der Herzog avisiert sein könne und unmittelbar darauf wurde vorgerückt. (…) Eine feindliche Kavallerieabteilung von zirka 150 Pferden kam aus demselben (Plancenoit, HKW) gerade in diesem Moment die Höhe herauf, wahrscheinlich um (wozu es freilich nun etwas spät war) eine Rekogneszierung zu machen. Selbe mochte es unerwartet sein, dass schon so viel Truppen von uns debouchiert hatten.“ S. 619So it was about between 16:00 to 17:00 when after a discussion of Blücher and Bülow (who did wanted to wait longer, and wait for other brigades (at this time a Prussian brigade was in fact an all arms division) - they decided to intervene due to for them precarious situation of Wellington's army.
This is confirmed by
Lippe – Weißenfeld, Ernst Graf von : Geschichte des Königich Preussischen 6. Husaren – Regiments (ehedem 2. Schlesisches). Berlin 1860 „Excerpte aus Privatbriefen eines Officiers des Regiments an einem nahen Verwandten, während des Druckes bearbeitet. (…) 29. Juli 1815 (…) Am Morgen des 18. Setzten wir uns in Marsch, beim II. A.C. in Wavres vorbei, nach den Höhen von St. Lambert. Ich erhielt mit 70 Pfde. die Avantgarde. Um 11 Uhr kam ich richtig in St. Lambert an. Kein Feind hatte mich bemerkt. Ich fing einige französische Cavalleristen, die meine Nähe nicht geahnt hatten. Links vorwärts auf der großen Straße Jemappe – Brüssel hörte man einzelne Kanonenschüsse. Vor uns ein Defilee, das schlechterdings passiert werden mußte, um auf die St. Lambert gegenüberliegende, stark bewaldeten Höhen von Ohain und Lasnes zu kommen. Es wurde mir befohlen, sogleich vorzugehen, das Defilee abzupatrouillieren und bei Lasnes zu passieren, um möglich zu erfahren, ob es von Lasnes links liegenden Wald und eine alte Abtei im Tahle vom Feind besetzt sei. Ich zog in Dorf Lasnes links gegen die Abtei und erfuhr, daß der rechte Flügel der französischen Reserve in Planchenois und zwischen diesen Dorfe und dem Walde jenseits des Defilees von Lasne stehe. Alle französischen in dieser Gegend aufgestellten Truppen kehrten mir den Rücken. Ich schloß daraus, daß man uns hier nicht erwartete. Daher zog ich still ab, passierte das Defilee von Lasnes und schlich mich nach dem Walde auf die Höhe. Dieser war bis zur Hälfte unbesetzt. Der unbesetzte Teil lag nach Ohain hin, was uns also günstig; denn von diesem Ort aus sollte das I. Corps die Verbindung zwischen dem linken Flügel und der Engländer und dem IV Corps machen. Behutsam ging ich in den Wald, bis an einem Punkt, von wo aus man freies Feld sehn konnte. Links vor mir zeigte sich die französische Armee auf der Höhe von Belle Alliance im Rücken, wie sie in völliger Action mit der englischen, die schon um 1 Uhr Nachmittag etwas Terrain verloren hatte. Ein Generalstabs – Officier, der mit nachgekommen war, theilte meine Wahrnehmungen mit mir. Da meine Patrouille unterdeß im Walde auf keinen Feind stießen, ließ ich einige Observationsposten zurück mit der Anweisung, sich nicht zu zeigen und jagte retour auf die Höhen von St. Lambert. Hier traf ich die ganze Generalität. Auf meinem und des Generalstabs – Officiers Rapport, setzte sich nun das IV. Corps in Marsch, passierte das Defilee bei Lasnes und versammelte sich, vom Feinde ungesehen, an und in dem Walde. Ehe noch zwei Brigaden vereinigt waren, wollte der Feldmarschall schon aus dem Walde (auf die Franzosen) losbrechen. General Bülow zögerte indeß absichtlich und mit Recht so lang bis wenigstens 12 bis 15,000 M. zusammen waren. Ein Adjutant brauchte nun unserem Regiment den Befehl, aus dem Walde hervorzubrechen und die feindliche Reserve – Cavallerie anzugreifen. Dies geschah. Eine feindliche Tirailleurlinie, welche sich und entgegenwarf, wurde verjagt (…) p. 257Without reading Bernard Coppens work, and I stay adamant on that, one won't hardly understand how the battle at Belle Alliance unfolded, and not taking into account non British and non French sources one will just remain in the "mensonges" Bernard Coppens so well explains and reveals.
Prussian out posts were watching Boney's army for a long time without being detected and the Prussians couldn't believe in their luck, that their approach was unmolested especially in favourable terrain for the defender.
@Hans - Karl Weiß I’m afraid my language skills prevent me from any but a fragmentary understanding of your argument.
From what I can glean, I see no reason to change my stance on the part of Lobau.
@Joshua Provan
Well in case you cannot read it I am not surprised that you are not changing your opinion.
In a nutshell both French sources (Lobau himself and his staff) as well as the Prussians (by observing) agree that Lobau was in the act to attack Wellington's left flank, and that Lobau was surprised by the appearance of the Prussians and had to change the direction of his units.
Sorry I don't have the time to translate all this.
For me, there are two "truisms" that come into play. The first is that no plan survives contact with the enemy and Wellington and Blucher were formidable enemies. So it not as simple as doing things a bit differently, the abilities of both the commanders and the armies need to be taken into account. What should also be accounted for is their commitment and resolution to cooperate, rather than act in their self interest, something that Napoleon seems to have been counting on.
The second is that you cannot make bricks without clay. Evidenced by the desertions and then the complete collapse and rout of the large bulk of his army, it was neither as loyal nor as resilient as some historians would have us believe. Whilst on the surface, the old Imperial 'magic' and adoration seemed to still be there, the bonds of trust and familiarity vital to unit cohesion appear not to have been. It was something of a glass hammer therefore.
When one starts to stack all the probabilities and handicaps up, a Napoleonic victory is starting to look remarkably dodgy. The inveterate gambler, I think he may just have wagered on a many-fold accumulator once too often. In my humble opinion, the campaign was probably lost before his carriage left Paris.
Interesting, thanks David. For me the morning of the 17th is the last moment that the campaign could have been won, but this is something that I will discuss with Gareth Glover and Andrew Field in the Mythbuster episode.
Yes: I agree 100%. To my mind, Napoleon only had a slim chance of securing anything other than a tactical victory in Belgium and no chance whatsoeverof defeating theAllied coalition as a whole.
As long as the Prussians were going to appear on the battlefield, I believe Napoleon had no chance of winning. But if he had been able to begin the battle at 9am as he had originally wanted, I believe he would have had a reasonable chance of beating Wellington before the Prussians arrived. We cannot speculate what the Prussians would have done when they knew Napoleon had won, and what might have happened the next day, but we must also remember Grouchy's force was in their rear.
But Boney couldn't start the battle at 09:00 because he did not reckon that Wellington did accept battle, he had no plan, nothing, he had to pull it out of his sleeve, therefore the delay.
The Prussians would have crushed Grouchy 😉 - maybe.
Hans-Karl, I believe he could not start before he did because his whole army was not in position. But as we are speaking hypothetically I feel that if he had been ready to attack at 9am he had the time and the troops to beat Wellington before the Prussians arrived. No doubt the Prussians would have beaten Grouchy if he was alone, but with a victorious, if exhausted, French army in front and Grouchy coming up behind, they would have been in a tricky situation.
I agree, in case he would have started at 09:00 - his chances to beat Wellington's army would have been greater, the later he starts the more his chances dwindle, still one would have to take into account Wellington's flexible responds.
I agree also that his army wasn't in position.
Hans-Karl; I agree that Wellington was a flexible commander, but his army did not have sufficient dependable troops to have won if Napoleon hadn't been forced to detach so many to confront the Prussians.
Andrew, I don't see Wellington's Army so badly, neither Boney's so heroically - we cannot know how Wellington would have reacted - moreover, Boney had at least 5 to 6 hours to achieve a brake through - which he didn't - before the Prussians interfered in force.
But I agree Lobau attacking Wellington instead of being stopped in his tracks by the Prussians would have caused a dire situation for Wellington.
Hans-Karl; Lobau, and the Young Guard, and Domon, and Subervie. If they had all been available to attack Wellington the result might well have been very different (and this from a Brit!) .
The French army certainly wasn't the Grande Armee of 1805-6, but I am still not sure that the Nassau, Brunswick or many of the Hanoverian, landwehr had the training or experience to stop the armee du nord. Given how long many of them had been in uniform, I do not mean any disrespect, but that is my belief.
Andrew, I am not denying that there would have been more units for an attack, but Napoleon wouldn't have thrown in all those units at once, he had to run a campaign, he had to keep intact units to preserve his potential for the offensive.
Boney would have tried to win the battles with minimum cost of engaging units. He was under the illusion to have all the time in the world - the Prussians were beaten and why should he haste and waste men for a certain victory, only to achieve it 2 hours earlier?
This was the crucial mistake - which of course he successfully covered up as being a master liar - for ages.
In case he had known the Prussians would appear in his rear and right flank - already at the morning of the 18th - and in case he would have known at the eve of the 17th that Wellington would made a stand, he would have managed the battle differently, but in what way?
So best for him would have been, being ignorant that the Prussians would arrive late on the 18th and Wellington would make a stand.
But Boney had lost his wits - it should have rung loud alarm bells - that Wellington made a stand with his motley army - at the 18th of June.
But let's speculate, Boney is pushing back Wellington's army, but then the Prussians would arrive even more in the rear and flank and could attack to devastating effect and roll up the whole French army, a lot more units would have been already used up against Wellington's army.
In case Boney attacks at 09:00 - Wellinton is concentrating all this army and calls in the not so small detachments - what then?
By the way Clinton was quite fond of the Hanoverians and regarded them as one of the best troops Wellington had at hand, his reports are quite revealing.
@Andrew Field but there wasn’t such a great disparity as it might appear on paper. Yes, the British were not all peninsular hands, and the Brunswick contingent was young and they had just lost their beloved Duke. Many of the Armée du Nord ‘veterans’ though had more years service on paper, but many of them had been in British hulks or holed up in besieged garrisons. Many of the Dutch-Belgian, Nassau and Brunswick officers had considerable experience. Many express concern that this was serving Napoleon, so was less valid in some way. I contend the opposite, they had served in the French army, and they knew that it’s invincibility was a myth. Most memoirs betray a great trust and affection between officers and men. It is worth noting the lack of any notable defections, they all came the other way. I think we underestimate the moral and morale components. Both in the Armée du Nord were fragile. I don’t think we should get too suckered in by the wargamer’s romanticism and dice modifiers. An elite veteran Guard unit (+4) in the presence of a General Officer (+2) was seen off, a company effectively captured en mass as well as said General. This feat was achieved by a fatigued (-2) Landwehr (-4) unit, namely the Osnabrückers. That’s why re-fights almost always end up in a French victory. I remember at the height of the Cold War how the professionals mocked the TA. Later, I also had an MC winner work with me, who was a bus driver from Glasgow. I don’t think the ambushers who ran in to him faired any better because he was “militia’. I really believe this elite/veteran guff is just that, peddled to bolster morale but marginal in effect. If it wasn’t, Isandlwana wouldn’t have been a massacre, Caen would have fallen on 6th June, Saigon would still be the capital of an independent South Vietnam and Operation Eagle Claw would have been a resounding success. They were all conducted by forces who were by most measures superior and extremely confident. I believe Wellington was right when he said most of Napoleon’s enemies were defeated before a shot was fired. Napoleon agreed, the moral is to the physical as three is to one. Hence the fragility when “La Garde recule!”. They got a rather nasty shock when they ran into an enemy that did not flee at the sound of “la Carousel” or the sight of some blue greatcoats and bearskins. I think ultimately the allies won because they thought they could. In an age where the entry level was marching shoulder to shoulder, loading and firing a musket and threatening the enemy with the pointy thing on the end, that counts for a lot. From the playground on up, my experience is that the winner is not necessarily the best fighter, but the one who believes that he can be.
I really like the wargamers analogy. Though I don't war game myself (not since teenage Warhammer games) I enjoy following games such as Waterloo Replayed &c. The Imperial Guards were against British Line & Dutch Milita who soundly saw them off, as you say.
I recall the fact the US Army (maybe West Point?) tried to war game Waterloo on a large scale and kept redoing it, as Napoleon won. But there were factors of what makes a good soldier/regiment/army outside of what is on paper. It's the men.
A quick note about the Nassauers, the Dutch and the Belgians: all the stuff about them being unreliable because they had previously served under Napoleon is complete nonsense. The reality is that they hated the emperor and had for the most part been very unwilling soldiers.
@Charles Esdaile I’m not sure that there is any proof that all those who had fought for Napoleon previously hated him, although I suspect you are right that fighting for their own country was probably good motivation. But what worries me about your argument is that if they all hated Napoleon and were dependable, why did Wellington clearly not agree. He broke up the Hanoverian ‘division’ which upset the Hanoverians, and attached their brigades to British Divisions; most were deployed in the second line, along with the Brunswickers and Nassau troops; the 2nd Netherlands Division was split and its brigades posted at different parts of the line; the 3rd Netherlands Division was posted off to the extreme right and Bijlandt’s brigade was clearly used as a sacrificial lamb against d’Erlon’s massive attack. It should go without saying that standard military procedure would baulk at splitting up divisions where the brigades were not mutually supporting and the divisional commander had effectively lost his command.
The Belgians may have hated Napoleon, but they had little love for the Netherlands; they had lost their independence to France and then lost it again to the Dutch. In justifying the Belgian performance during the campaign, one of their general’s later wrote; ‘Is it just to ask if the Belgians, at this time, fought for a cause that would excite their courage against a hated enemy? For the Belgians in 1815, for what cause were they going to shed their blood? Was it for the independence of their homeland? No, because their hopes on this subject had been disappointed; England itself had robbed them of this independence.’
I am not suggesting that any of these contingents were cowards or of no use, but my own mantra is to try and be as objective as possible and try and base my views on evidence. I quite accept that I may be wrong, but equally, there is probably no room for political correctness in studying history. My belief is that none of the contingents were of no value, (though the 1st Nassau Regiment did not cover itself in glory) and performed bravely and as well as Wellington could have hoped or expected.
Wellington’s army was a very mixed bag and he had to make the most of it; luckily, he had long experience in getting the best out of such in the Peninsula.
Hans-Karl: I agree with much you say, and your previous point about Napoleon, and hence Lobau, not expecting the arrival of the Prussians is an important one. You are also right that Napoleon’s halo and laurels had certainly slipped!! Without going back to re-read Clinton, my impression was that he said the Hanoverians were ‘fine looking men’, but they lacked instruction and important equipment. He was also unimpressed (I believe) with some of the commanding officers and one brigade commander in particular, so it is difficult to be able to measure their potential performance on the battlefield. Not many of the Hanoverian landwehr were involved in the heavy, close fight, so we will never know. And of course, the performance of Wellington’s allies is a different subject and could be discussed for many hours!
Andrew, I would have to re read Clinton again, which I should do, there his two volumes edited by Gareth Glover give such an insight into some units of Wellington's army. Clinton describes very well the initial lack of them but how they morphed into one of the best units Wellington had - in case the Landwehr came to close quarters - they showed their nettle, wasn't Cambrone captured by soldiers from the Osnabrück Landwehr??
Let's see what the other podcast bring up - so far enjoyable discussions.
@Hans - Karl Weiß I don't want to begrudge any unit their share of the glory or belittle their achievements. However, Cambronne had had his horse killed underneath him, had a serious wound to his head (he also claims he was unconscious) and had been abandoned by his men who thought he was dead; not a glorious capture. And although accounts of his capture vary, Halkett himself is generally credited with it by riding ahead of the Osnabruckers. By this time the French army had collapsed and was running to the rear as a mob; for me, an advance with a line of victorious infantry and a wave of cavalry against a beaten and routing enemy is not the same thing as close combat against an organised and determined enemy. Having said that, there was generally a lack of opportunity for the Hanoverian landwehr to show their true capabilities and that is not their fault; unless I may have missed one?
@Andrew Field
Try again, my last reply collapsed in the net. I am not such a specialist to be able to narrate the minutiae of the battle - so much is claimed - especially who routed the Imperial Guard.
There is a very interesting article in the Beiheft zum Militärwochenblatt 1912 (transmitted thanks to my good friend Steve Smith)
Gefangennahme des Generals Cambronnes durch den Oberst Halkett in der Schlacht von Waterloo by Frhr. von Halkett, Major im Königlich Sächsischen 10. Infanterieregiment Nr. 134
pp 198 - 217
He discusses quite well how Cambronne was captured, examining critically different sources, among else you can read in the report of the Hannoverian Generalstaff that the battalion Osnabrück dispersed a square of the Imperial Guard by an bayonet attack - p. 210
Is it true? I cannot say.
Actually does anybody here have a download link for the whole Beiheft of 1912 (I cannot access Hathi being an alien) - there a lot of interesting essays are published there.
David: your points are interesting and could provoke hours of discussion; there is also the prospect that we are moving away from the question.
I have been taking a more detailed look at Wellington’s allies recently; a fascinating subject. After Waterloo many British eye-witnesses damned them as cowards; the Belgians came in for more than their share of abuse. More recently, attitudes seem to have swung to the other extreme and many are extolling their virtues. The truth probably falls somewhere in between.
As you point out, many of the cadres were good and experienced, but the soldiers were young and very inexperienced. I read somewhere that most of the Nassau soldiers had only been in uniform for five weeks; the 1st Regiment were unable to deploy into line or square and stood most of the day in closed column and were shot down by French artillery. They stood against the French cavalry charges in closed column. Their attempt to advance to silence some French guns resulted in two companies being slaughtered by cuirassiers. As far as the fighting was concerned, they contributed virtually nothing.
There is a difference between courage and military effectiveness as I know you are aware; I’m sure every unit on the battlefield saw examples of individual bravery, but that does not reflect the effectiveness of the unit.
That the French army was brittle was proven on the day, but don’t forget their performance at Ligny against a much larger Prussian army if you doubt their fighting ability. I think Paul Dawson has pretty much concluded that three quarters of the infantry had only been in the army since 1813, but at least they had fought in that campaign and through the terrible conditions of 1814.
I’m surprised at your dismissal of élite troops; the Guard of 1815 was not the Guard of many previous years and its performance at Waterloo reflected this. However, there are too many examples when the Guard of previous years performed marvels against very experienced troops, even in 1814. The brittleness of the 3rd and 4th Regiments at Waterloo merely reflected the problems of the whole army and the most senior regiments generally held well as the army collapsed around them and they faced a wall of advancing victorious infantry and cavalry.
@Andrew Field I think you are right, the pendulum swings left and right on each contingent through the ages. The issue of national bias though is very germain to the question of whether Napoleon could have won. It depends to some extent on your opinion of the ability of the armies to react to an energised Napoleon. Of course, there are differences in unit training, experience and cohesiveness. But so are morale and material. Some of these are attributed to being an ‘elite’ and are seen as being almost permanent. I’m less convinced, but perhaps I have a less romantic soul. In this period training on the march was the norm. Veteran/Elite units could often do lots of things well. They often have more stable orbat. Being a less experienced militia does not mean that you necessarily do everything badly. The Anglo-Allied army was required at Waterloo to fix, and at best limited counter-strike. It therefore needed a limited repertoire, most of which was within the grasp of a landwehr. The French however had the more challenging role, to launch a combined arms attack, and simultaneously block. As to the Nassauers it should be remembered that they had been the ones on point on the 15th. They were required early on the 16th to stand alone. Casualties and fatigue must have had an effect, and they went on to be victims of friendly fire. Yes, the Guard could fight hard, but so could most units. There is some value in the view though that stripping out the cadre of line units did them considerable damage.
In my view, the performance of the Guard was pretty mixed at Waterloo: the Young Guard did very well at Plancenoit while the last attack was clearly pressed home with enormous courage. However, the last stand of the Old Guard was a non-event: the three battalions concerned stood firm for only a short time before retiring from the field.
Charles, you are right; a decidedly patchy performance! The quality of the Guard in 1815 has been debated almost to death, but it is an interesting topic. The 3rd and 4th regiments were hastily raised, the standards of entry were repeatedly lowered and there was insufficient time to generate any esprit de corps, especially between the officers and their men. As you say, the ’last stand’ did not last long, but they gave some of the British light cavalry a lesson before they left and if they had stuck around they would have been quickly destroyed or taken prisoner; there was nothing left for them to save!
@Andrew Field
As you say, the ’last stand’ did not last long, but they gave some of the British light cavalry a lesson before they left and if they had stuck around they would have been quickly destroyed or taken prisoner;But this is what happened, I see only one battlion, 1er Bat. 1er Chasseurs à pied to maintain any sort of coherence, they even had to take later in the eagle of the grenadiers - they were lucky to escape to the high wheat which made them invisible in the dawning light.
Note du commandant Duuring, chef de bataillon au 1er chasseur de la garde. « (…) je fis rassembler le bataillon en colonne par division à distance de peloton(…) »p. 118 « Je mis le bataillon en route, il marcha dans le bled qui était d’une hauteur au-dessus de la tête des hommes »p.118 « La nuit s’avança (…) je fuis appuyer de ce côté, rencontrai quelques détachements de la Garde, en outre l’aigle des grenadiers, que je fis rester avec moi »p. 118 « Je continuai la route de Charleroy que j’ai traversée avec environs 300 hommes dont quelques grenadiers ainsi que l’agile »p 119Source Carnets de La Sabretache 1905 L’infanterie de la Garde à Waterloo Two part artice by D’Avout, p 33 ff and p. 107 ff Available for download on the internetNow what lessons should they have taught to any Prussian or British cavalry?
Hopefully you are not basing this on the fair teller Manduit?
Now the next source, which is used a lot – but in my view most uncritically, is that of Mauduit Mauduit, Hippolyte de, Capitaine : Les Dernier Jours de la Grande Armée ou Souvenirs, Documents et Correspondance Inédite de Napoléon en 1814 et 1815, tome 1er Paris 1847, tome 2nd Paris 1848 Both volumes can be downloaded on the internet, for example google books. Mauduit was in 1815 sergent in the 2nd battalion of the 1st grenadiers and by such must have had a limited experience what went on in the battle. In 1835 he founded the periodical “La Sentinelle de l’Armée” and did consult a lot of published works – including Prussian ones, like that of Wagner to make his write up. It includes without any doubt his own experience but also a lot he learned from personal correspondence, using other sources and hearsay. In my view a very bad book which is seemingly intended to glorify Napoléon and his Guard and blaming the marshals and generals for the loss of the 1815 campaign, so it has to be used very critically. “Notre bataillon, ainsi que le 1er de notre régiment, les seuls qui fussent en état de soutenir un choc, ne tardèrent pas à se ressentir de l’affreuse confusion de champ de bataille. Chacun de nos faces était masquée par des centaines de militaires de tous grades et de toutes armes. »2nd tome, p. 459 / 460 Then his battalion itself comes under cavalry attacks. « Les tambours de nos deux bataillons reçurent l’ordre de battre « la grenadiere », afin d’offrir à l’armée un point de ralliement. A ce signal ami et protecteur, surgirent de tous côtés, nos malheureux camarades, soit de Plancenois, soit de la Belle – Alliance, presque tous tombaient haletants de fatigue, devant notre premier rang, ils étaient suivis de si près par les innombrables escadrons anglais et prussien, qu’un grand nombre ne purent même arriver jusqu’à nous et furent massacres à quelques toises de notre carré !! p. 560 « Arrêtés court par un feu de plus nourris, ces escadrons bientôt tourbillonnent et, en moins de dix minutes, tout fut balayé devant nous. Ainsi dégagées, nous pûmes, au milieu de désordre général, et bien que mitraillés à portée de pistolet sur trois de nos faces, commencer notre retraite avec autant de calme (…) » p. 462 « Notre retraite s’opéra à travers champs, en passant sous le feu de plusieurs bataillons prussiens, embusqués derrière des haies qu’il nous fallut franchir, là, ils tueront ou blessèrent un grande nombre d’entre nous, mais sans qu’il fut possible de leur riposter, car on ne les voyait pas, et l’on tombait sans savoir d’où les coups étaient partis. Ils ne purent néanmoins arrêter notre mouvement, (….) Ce ne fut que plus tard que notre carré se trouva désorganisé par l’encombrement général de notre base de d’opération. »P. 462/ 463 Il en fut ainsi de notre 1er bataillon, marchant parallèlement à nous, sur l’autre côté de la chaussée. Nous sauvâmes aussi l’aigle des grenadiers. »p. 463 « Pendant que nous étions assailles par la cavalerie anglaise, le carré de notre 1er bataillon, placé à peu de distance de nous, et près de la ferme de Rossome, soutenait également le choc d’une cavalerie nombreuse. »p. 463 Quelques minutes après l’Empereur appela le général Petit, notre colonel, et lui dit « BATTEZ EN RETRAITE ».p.464please compare those heroics to the letter of the comanding officer
Here the answer of Petit – commanding the 1er grenadiers de la Garde Impériale “Lettre du général Petit, commandant en 1815 le 1er grenadiers de la Garde, à M. le lieutentant général Pelet, directeur di Dépôt de la Guerre. (…) mais je puis vous assurer que ce régiment, assez fort à son effectif, n’avait plus que quinze cents bayonnettes ( I will come back later to that surprising high number of combatants) lorsque nous avons passé la Sambre » p. 107 « Ligny : Le 1er de grenadiers n’éprouva la perte que de quelques hommes. » p. 107 So suffering minimal losses at Ligny. “Ce mouvement avait lieu vers six heures. A cette même heure, le 1er régiment de grenadiers se forma en deux colonnes par division, puis plus tard en deux carrées, un pour bataillon, qui furent placés, le second bataillon à la droite de la chaussée(…) p. 108 « Le carré du 1er bataillon se forma à la gauche de la grande route. »p. 108 « L’Empereur arriva alors au carré de 1er bataillon du 1er régiment de grenadiers. » p. 109 So – the 1st grenadiers did not see very much action so far during the battle and along with the 1st battalion of 1st Chasseurs were kept more or less in reserve and escaped casualties, certainly not surprisingly units in tactical formations, Napoléon searches shelter when the retreat and later rout commences. The 1st grenadiers along with the 1st Chasseurs were the only Guard Infantry units which did carry an eagle at this campaign. “Dans ce fatal moment, il ne retraite plus en ordre que les deux carrées de ce régiment, placés, comme il a été dit plus haute, à droite et a gauche de la route. Tout fuyait de toutes parts. » p. 110 « L’Empereur ordonna alors le mouvement de retraite qui eut lieu dans le meilleur ordre »p.110 So Napoléon is still with the regiment and orders the retreat which was conducted in the best order. “Puis loin, les deux carrées s’étant réunis sur la route, furent rompus et formés en colonne. L’ennemi suivait, mais sans beaucoup nous inquiètes. » p. 110 Later then the squares were changed into column, the enemy followed but did not molest them too much. “La perte du 1er régiment sur le champ de bataille ne fut pas considérable, il ne perdit du monde que le soir : » p. 110 So the regiment did not loose did not sustain considerable losses at the battle only at the evening. All in all, not that much action did happen with this unitand from another discussion
In the words of Paul Dawson. Charge the Guns! ISBN:978-1-907212-11-6 link "The Imperial Guard contrary to the myth of the battle, and some eye-witness accounts written decades after the battle, did not make a glorious last stand on the field of battle. The 3rd Regiment of Chasseurs, shattered by the counter attack of the allied light cavalry and musketry of David Chasse's troops, broke and fled and were rounded up like sheep by the cavalry, the entire regiment being virtually captured on the field of battle 437. …The regiments two battalions seem to have been shattered by the 1st Foot Guards and the men rounded up by cavalry. Neither the 3rd or 4th Chasseurs had been under fire as a military formation before the attack at Waterloo, which may explain why when fired upon by the allies the regiments never made contact with the allied lines before breaking and fleeing, the men being herded up by the cavalry. Allied reports of the 1st Foot Guards all make the comment that the Imperial Guard was there one minute and then it disappeared – the striking sudden appearance and routing of the regiment is born out by archive paperwork from the regiments. 437 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 44, 45, 46 Chasseurs a' pied de la garde, divers corps, 1814-1815 *********************** The 2nd Battalion of the 1st Chasseurs….Was nearly entirely captured. Only nine men from the 1st company escaped being made prisoner of war. The battalion lost 446 other ranks out of 635 men, or 70 per cent of the total, of which 419 were prisoners of war, 65 per cent of the losses the battalion sustained being men captured by the allied cavalry during the rout of the French army when clearly the square collapsed.438 The 2nd Battalion 2nd Chasseurs, compared to the huge losses of the 2nd Battalion 1st Chasseurs or the 3rd Chasseurs, seem to have suffered far fewer casualties, having three men wounded, twenty deserted and 112 taken prisoner. The battalion seems to have held together against the attack of Adam's brigade and the allied light cavalry, unlike the 2nd Battalion 1st Chasseurs which was stand next to the 2nd Battalion 2nd Chasseurs.439 The 1st Battalion 3rd Grenadiers, shattered by the allied musketry and artillery according to battalion commander Guilleman, broke and fled to seek safety in the square of the 2nd Battalion 1st Chasseurs, and it may well be the breaking of this square that resulted in large numbers of men from the 3rd Grenadiers being captured at the same time. The 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers, contrary to Hippolyte de Mauduit's myth myth making that the battalion was virtually annihilated, suffered the fewest men captured as prisoners of war and appears to have made its way relatively unscathed to Genappe. Here the 4th company of the 2nd Battalion suffered 27 men wounded and 15 taken prisoner. The wounded men were subsequently captured. At Waterloo and Genappe, the 2nd Battalion 3rd Grenadiers lost combined 154 men out of 520 in the battalion or losses of 29 per cent. The 1st Battalion lost 207 men out of 518 or 39 per cent losses. The regiment lost overall 34 per cent of its manpower at Waterloo, but of greater note it lost a further 62 per cent after the 20th June, more men were lost after Waterloo than during the battle, due to desertion, men being made prisoners of war or being killed in various rearguard actions.440 The 4th Grenadiers, said by Mark Adkin to have been annihilated at Waterloo, retreated in good order and took part in the stand of the Guard at Genappe against the Prussians. At Waterloo the regiment lost 346 men, but between 20th and 23rd June a further 736 were classed as deserted or prisoners of war. Clearly the regiment was not killed to a man at Waterloo, fought well at Genappe, and only disintegrated from the 20th June onward, spurred on we are told, by the men desiring to be with Napoleon as opposed to remaining with the army.441 The 1st Grenadiers appear to have done very little in the battle. The 1st Battalion sent to Plancenoit lost two men made prisoners of war, one deserted, one killed and one wounded, whereas the remainder of the regiment in total lost 9 men overall at Waterloo, but lost a staggering 600 men between 19th and 32rd June. These men quit the regiment and headed off to Paris en masse. Mark Adkin in Waterloo Companion, lists theses men as dead, wounded or prisoners on the 18th June which is simply not true.442 438 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 44, 45, 46 Chasseurs a' pied de la garde, divers corps, 1814-1815 439 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 44, 45, 46 Chasseurs a' pied de la garde, divers corps, 1814-1815 440 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 13, 14 Corps royal de Grenadiers de France redevenu corps des grenadiers a pied de la garde imperiale lors des cent-jours, 1813-1814 441 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 13, 14 Corps royal de Grenadiers de France redevenu corps des grenadiers a pied de la garde imperiale lors des cent-jours, 1813-1814 442 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 13, 14 Corps royal de Grenadiers de France redevenu corps des grenadiers a pied de la garde imperiale lors des cent-jours, 1813-1814 ************************* Overall the Old Guard at Waterloo suffered heavy losses, not in men dead or wounded but in deserters or made prisoners. Five battalions were rounded up and captured once the squares had broken, and the larger proportion of the 1st Battalion 3rd Grenadiers was also captured. The imperial Guard certainly in the case of the 3rd and 4th Chasseurs and 1st Battalion 3rd Grenadiers, never made contact with the allied lines, came under intense musket fire, and the regiments then broke and fled when pressed by allied cavalry. Contrary to the myth of the battle, neither the 1st Foot Guards nor the 52nd Regiment of Foot defeated the Imperial Guard; it was the allied light cavalry that did so." The last part I don't agree with. It was the infantry that shot them up and the light cavalry that destroyed them. So both defeated the Guard. Paul :)@Hans - Karl Weiß I apologise, I do seem to have made myself clear; I meant that one of the squares of the Old Guard was charged by British cavalry (18th Hussars) during the ‘last stand’ and the cavalry were given a bloody repulse; I believe one of their squadron commanders was killed. The lesson was, not everyone had given up the fight.
I have all the references you supply. Not many people know that Mauduit, although a sergeant in the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment of Grenadiers, was only 21 at Waterloo. He had joined the Gardes d’Honneur (cavalry) in 1813 and only transferred into the Guard after Napoleon’s first abdication. He had had no campaign experience in the infantry, let alone the Guard, before the Waterloo campaign.
I applaud the excellent work that Paul Dawson has done in the French archives, but I don’t agree with all his interpretations of the data he has amassed. I would love to know when the casualty returns that he presents in ‘The Truth at Last’ were taken. This is a fundamental requirement for interpreting them and even without this information it is clear that there are some fundamental issues with what they tell us. Sometimes the officer casualties from Martinien (a list of officer casualties of the French army across the whole of the Napoleonic wars) exceed the unit returns presented by Paul and some of the returns for killed are frankly unbelievable. Now I’m not suggesting that large numbers of the Guard were not captured or did not surrender (a less than subtle difference between the two), just that we should be wary of how we interpret them.