Was D’Erlon’s attack in line formation?

Barry: The formation adopted by d’Erlon’s corps at Waterloo has long been one of the most controversial aspects of the battle. It was one that had never been used before throughout the wars of the First Empire and who ordered it, and why, long remained a mystery.

Their official designation was colonne de division par bataillon; a column made up of an entire division (averaging four to five thousand men in d’Erlon’s corps), with a battalion frontage. Each battalion deployed into a line three ranks deep, with each battalion formed one behind the other. As the average strength of a battalion in the I Corps was just over 510 men the frontage of the column was about 140 men when the light (voltigeur) company is subtracted (these were deployed as skirmishers). The depth of the column varied according to the strength of the division; in a division of eight battalions it would therefore be 24 ranks deep (eight battalions one behind the other, each in three ranks).

In fact, only two of the corps’ four divisions, those of Marcognet and Donzelot, formed up in this way. Quiot’s division, forming the left of the assault, operated in two separate brigades. Charlet’s brigade formed up in the familiar assault columns; colonne de bataillon par division, battalion columns with a two company frontage (rather confusingly, two companies operating together were also called a division), so that four such columns were formed. This brigade was given the mission of capturing the farm of La Haye Sainte. The other brigade (Bourgeois’) formed into a similar column to Marcognet and Donzelot, with a deployed battalion frontage, but with only a single brigade’s depth (twelve ranks).

In Durutte’s division Pégot’s brigade and the 95th de ligne (of Brue’s brigade) formed up in the same way as Bourgeios’ and formed the extreme right and rear echelon of d’Erlon’s attack. The other regiment of Brue’s brigade, the two battalions of the 85th de ligne, the weakest of the division’s regiments, remained in their starting position to protect an artillery battery and to provide an uncommitted reserve in case of the failure of Pégot’s attack. The 85th were formed into square.

As I have said, for many years there has been much debate as to who ordered the unusual formation used by d’Erlon’s corps. However, thanks to Stephen Beckett’s excellent work locating long lost French communication records and reports from the campaign, we now know the answer: the 1st Corps Campaign Diary states, ‘…he [Napoleon] ordered Count d’Erlon to make his deployment for the attack on the enemy’s left. To form to this end each of his divisions in Colonne par Bataillon and to have them march in echelon…’

This therefore confirms that it was Napoleon himself who ordered these much-criticised columns

The next question that we must ask ourselves is why such a formation was used if it was clumsy to control and manoeuvre, vulnerable to both musket and artillery fire, and to a charge of cavalry. This is the fundamental issue, but strangely one that is avoided by any commentator or historian I can find. The tragic consequences of the formation are well known and so, with the benefit of hindsight, it is universally condemned.

In the Peninsular War, the French habitually employed battalion attack columns. These columns had many advantages; with their narrow frontage they could move quickly about the battlefield, even over difficult terrain, allowing them to get a decisive force to the critical place at the critical time. Being more compact than line they were easier to keep in order, as the officers and NCOs could more easily maintain control. The flanks of the column were also more secure than those of a line, and by closing the intervals between the companies the column quickly became a viable square against cavalry. Finally, a flank attack by infantry could also be more effectively countered, as the column was so much deeper than a two- or three-deep line.

The major weakness of the column was, of course, its lack of firepower, as only a third of its strength, at most, could use their muskets effectively, as opposed to a hundred percent of a British two-deep line. The large columns employed at Waterloo could therefore be seen as a good compromise between the two types of formation. Having the frontage of a battalion deployed in line would go some way to making the firefight far more equal in the numbers of muskets that were able to be used. The depth of the column gave it momentum and solidity, and made it imposing in order to shake the morale of the enemy.

However, it was not British firepower that broke d’Erlon’s attack, but the charge of the British heavy cavalry. However, as they were used in relatively small numbers in the Peninsula, and were little used in the major battles, can we not forgive the French commanders for putting the priority on countering the British superiority in infantry firepower rather than anticipating a significant commitment of British cavalry so early in the battle?

For those who remain sceptical, it should be noted that columns were accepted as a perfectly adequate formation to resist cavalry. After all, they were just solid squares and all that was required was for the short intervals between the battalions to close up, the files on the flanks to turn outwards and the rear ranks to turn around and the firepower and hedge of bayonets was every bit as effective as any square.

This is a bigger subject than I have space to discuss here, but I am very happy to correspond privately if you wish; Zack has my private email address which I am happy for him to forward to you.