Édouard Mortier, duc de Trévise, maréchal de Napoléon Ier
NAPOLEON 1ER, 19/05/2021
Sur les vingt-six maréchaux de Napoléon, certains ont la chance d'avoir des historiens qui écrivirent leur biographie ; c'est le cas pour Davout, Lannes, Masséna, Murat et Ney notamment. Ce n'est pas le cas pour Mortier, malgré Frignet-Despréaux qui a publié un remarquable travail mais qui s'arrête, hélas, en mars 1807. Une biographie complète et moderne s'imposait après celle de Moreel. Le lecteur découvrira dans ces pages un personnage brave, discret, intègre, serviable et l'on cherche vainement les défauts qu'il pouvait avoir ! Un maréchal de Napoléon Ier, de la première promotion de 1804, sorti de l'oubli et à découvrir.
Is it just me, or do I detect a post 1815 campaign to not only make Ney a scapegoat but almost systematically and retrospectively discrediting his career? One that continues to this day? Which sort of begs the question, if he were so poor, what was Napoleon thinking of? Giving him command of the left wing and supposedly battlefield control at Waterloo, wasn’t that therefore exceedingly dumb? Isn’t it a better assessment that it was the grand strategy of 1814 that was at fault? Hadn’t Napoleon’s continued narcissism precluded a settlement so wagers were doubled down on and the dice continued to be rolled long after the chances of success had disappeared? Rather than Marshals being lacklustre, weren’t they merely unable to successfully play the poor hands they had been dealt? There was a guiding mind behind 1813 and 1814. It is to him, and him alone, that the outcome should be attributed, should it not?