Drouet d'Erlon still going strong

Mr. John Franklin povided a list of french accounts on TMP in 2011,

some of them are already available on line, but not all of them.

also there is the map from De Bas 1st edition ...

Comte d'Erlon

Donzelot – 2nd Div

d'Arsonval – 3rd Div (Staff officer)

Durutte – 4th Div

Gordon (Staff officer)

Fleuret – 55th

Schmitz – 13th

Gastinieau – 13th

Noguès

Lavoye 29th

Bruno 1st Cavalry Brigade

Dupuy 7th Hussards

Marbot 7th Hussards

Duthilt – 2nd Brigade

Canler – 28th

Veillard – 6th Artillery

Martin – 45th

Brüe de Garoutier

Chapuis 85th

Jacqmin 85th

Bosse – 95th

Bro – 4th Lanciers

Flotard – Ditto

Vernier –

Thanks, yes this is what Koontz is basing his hypothesis about, but the eye witnesses from the other side seem to disagree on this.

additional note about Jomini,

"(..) on serait tenté de croire que les quatre divisions de Ney ne formaient que quatre colonnes, du moins dans leur marche offensive, pour aller à l'attaque de la Haie-Sainte et de la ligne entre cette ferme et Papelote (..) plusieurs officiers que j'ai interrogés m 'ont assuré qu'en effet on avait été un instant formé en colonnes par divisions de deux brigades, les bataillons déployés les uns derrière les autres, à six pas de distance."

I- du moins dans leur marche offensive, II-pour aller à l'attaque

III- on avait été un instant formé en ...

Jomini, instead of providing comments / analysis of those three elements suggesting a temporary character to the formation, prefer to write about confusion between division (two pelotons) vs Division (two brigades ...

colonnes par divisions (two brigades) simply do not exist.

his diagram page 11 looks like "serré en masse par regiment" or a line of contiguous closed columns in English. Lol.

Hans-Karl, i just look at the technical aspect :

from the Journal de campagne du Ier Corps, du 12 au 18 juin 1815

"(..) Vers 11 heures L’Empereur vint reconnaître la position (..) il ordonna au Comte d’Erlon de faire ses dispositions pour attaquer l’ennemi par la gauche, de former à cet effet chacune de ses divisions en Colonne par Bataillon et de les faire marcher en échelon, en dirigeant celui de droite de manière à attaquer la gauche de l’ennemi vers Smohain, en ayant soin de masquer aussi longtemps qu’il serait possible le mouvement(..)"

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"(..) Around 11 o'clock The Emperor came to recognize the position (..) he ordered the Count of Erlon to make his arrangements to attack the enemy from the left, to form each of his divisions in Column by Battalion for this purpose and to make them march in echelon, directing the one on the right so as to attack the enemy's left towards Smohain, taking care to mask the movement as long as possible (..) "

Hans-Karl, i just look at the technical aspect :

from the Journal de campagne du Ier Corps, du 12 au 18 juin 1815

"(..) Vers 11 heures L’Empereur vint reconnaître la position (..) il ordonna au Comte d’Erlon de faire ses dispositions pour attaquer l’ennemi par la gauche, de former à cet effet chacune de ses divisions en Colonne par Bataillon et de les faire marcher en échelon, en dirigeant celui de droite de manière à attaquer la gauche de l’ennemi vers Smohain, en ayant soin de masquer aussi longtemps qu’il serait possible le mouvement(..)"

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"(..) Around 11 o'clock The Emperor came to recognize the position (..) he ordered the Count of Erlon to make his arrangements to attack the enemy from the left, to form each of his divisions in Column by Battalion for this purpose and to make them march in echelon, directing the one on the right so as to attack the enemy's left towards Smohain, taking care to mask the movement as long as possible (..) "

just to be clear, the ref. to Jomini was just about exploring colonne par bataillon vs Ney/D'Erlon formation. answering on the phone is perhaps not a good idea ! Back to the two opposite formations : Napoleon's order vs what was done. What are your though on that point ? do you think N. ordered the historical formation through verbal precisions ? or with an ADC or whatever ? i checked a number of elements on that with no result.

my own summary is that it seems to be a difference between what was ordered and what was executed. The final formation looking like a Manoeuvre de principes, similar in concept to the one used by Mc Donald but with a very different realization and perhaps a different purpose (less protection from cavalry). Each of the 4 infantry Divisions were used as a single body of troops, with the apparent intent to execute an infantry assault (shock not musketry fire), in line, against the enemy line of battle with the brigades in front, and eventually they were in the process to execute a rompement par l' arriere for the battalions in the brigades in the rear, when they were hit by the cavalry in a grand tactical unexpected way...

Hence my question on what was discussed in the morning between Reille, Ney, D ' Erlon, etc. i searched for more regimental histories with no specific results. most of the books being in paper version not in pdf in google books unfortunately. Perhaps Vox could help us on that point ?! hi steve !!! ; )

keeping everything that was decided and acted upon, the only problem i can see is perhaps some sort of command failure in the estimated amount of action needed from skirmishers and the duration of that action before giving commandens to execute the main assault itself ( a second preparatory action of 30-40 minutes with several waves of tirailleurs, to add effects to the massed batteries fire).

that said were are talking of managing actions from 13500 soldiers or so. and there were various intent modifications at top level before "action" ..

histical formation

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colone par bataillon ?