The thread is still running with a lot of highly interesting contributions. Seemingly due to the unhappy construction of thread presentation, a lot of readers may not be aware of it, I cannot believe they lost interest.
Also the notification by bell or like or following is not working.
Here the link
https://www.thenapoleonicwars.net/forum/general-discussions/was-d-erlon-s-attack-in-line-formation
Thanks H.K, it has become quite difficult to follow î the rigth order of contributions ...
H.K, a sum up of the relevant elements from Beckett publishzd diary for 1st corps il ordonna au Comte d’Erlon de faire ses dispositions pour attaquer l’ennemi par la gauche (2) Comprendre «par sa gauche... vers Smohain» ), de former à cet effet chacune de ses divisions en Colonne par Bataillon (3) et de les faire marcher en échelon, en dirigeant celui de droite de manière à attaquer la gauche de l’ennemi vers Smohain, en ayant soin de masquer aussi longtemps qu’il serait possible le mouvement D’après cette disposition primitive pendant que tout le 1er Corps se portait sur la gauche de l’ennemi, le 2e Corps devait se former sur la grande route afin de l’attaquer sur son centre aussitôt que les troupes du 1er Corps seraient parvenues à enlever la position de sa droite (5 Comprendre «sa gauche», ou bien alors «la droite»). Toutes les dispositions étaient faites et le mouvement allait commencer quand le Maréchal NEY vint dire au Comte d’Erlon que d’après de nouvelles dispositions (?), son attaque au lieu de s’exécuter sur la gauche de l’ennemi devait s’opérer sur son centre (6) ; que les divisions marcheraient dans l’ordre de colonne (?) déjà indiqué, mais que l’échelon de gauche qui serait celui de direction se porterait sur la ferme de la Haye Sainte, située sur la grande route, que 80 bouches à feu soutiendraient notre attaque (7) et que celle du 2e Corps aurait lieu sur la droite de l’ennemi. Le Comte d’Erlon s’empressa d’exécuter les changements (?) qu’apportaient ces nouvelles dispositions dans celles déjà prises ; il forma les colonnes sur le versant du mamelon à droite de la Bonne Alliance (8). La colonne de gauche formant le premier échelon était composée de la 1° Division, venaient ensuite la 3° Division, la 2° et la 4° --- general Durutte wrote: “On lui [Durutte] annonça aussitôt qu’il fallait que toutes les Divisions se formassent en colonnes par bataillon, et qu’on devait attaquer de vive force l’ennemi dans cet ordre en échelon, en commençant par la gauche. general Noguès (of Marcognet’s division) clearly puts the cause of the failure of the attack in d’Erlon’s hands, by blaming him not having established a square in support in case things would go wrong. In fact, this is the first criticism of an eye-witness to the formation chosen, even though he describes it as formed by bataillons échelonnés and not as colonnes de division par bataillon. 8 Rullière took part in the campaign in the 95th regiment of infantry (division Durutte). About the formation of the division he is quite clear in writing: “Nous avons déjà dit que les quatre divisions du 1er corps avaient chacune 4 régiments ou 8 bataillons. Le général d’Erlon ordonna de former une seule colonne par division. Le 1er bataillon déployé et les 7 autres également déployés et serrés en masse sur le 1er seulement à 5 pas de distance d’une guide à l’autre –
“Nous avons déjà dit que les quatre divisions du 1er corps avaient chacune 4 régiments ou 8 bataillons. Le général d’Erlon ordonna de former une seule colonne par division. Le 1er bataillon déployé et les 7 autres également déployés et serrés en masse sur le 1er seulement à 5 pas de distance d’une guide à l’autre –but as we know this is not the case, Bourgois did attack in a different formation - and the division of Quiot / Allix, did split in two different columns, also Durutte employs his division in a different fashion by at least forming 85e de ligne in squares.
Seemingly only Donzelot and Marcognet were in this phalanx formation, doubted however by Koontz, who thinks that they were in brigade columns.
I disagree with Siborne that the 2nd Division was the the left of the 1st.
Those French eye witnesses confirm 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 corps apporach.
But please also consult the old thread, link provided to see the contribution by Andrew and me.
The divisions seemingly were formed in reverse order - or to the left in case one can say so for that phalanx formations.
Eric,
I don't know if you have seen the latest posts on the other d'Erlon discussion!? As our column expert could you please give me your opinion on the following.
In most histories of the battle, Bourgeois' brigade (the 2nd of the 1st Division (Quiot)), is described as being in a similar column to the divisions of Donzelot and Marcognet. These divisions formed up with each battalion deployed in a line of three ranks, one behind the other; so a battalion's frontage and 24 ranks deep if there was eight battalions in the division. By this reasoning, Bourgeois' brigade would have a battalion's frontage but only 12 ranks deep (having four battalions).
However, Duthilt (chief of staff to Bourgeois) describes the formation of the brigade as colonne d'attaque par bataillon. This suggests to me battalion columns with a division (two peloton/company) frontage; the classic attack column. Other than Duthilt, our only other eyewitness from Bourgeois' brigade is Canler who describes the formation as colonne serrée par bataillon which is similar to Duthilt's description if I am understand correctly, but with all ranks closed up. Are these two, more or less, describing the same formation? Thank you for your thoughts (all these columns are messing up my head!!)
Eric, I think it's because it was originally posed as a question. Replies get re-ordered based on the 'best' answer, and does not represent a debate in chronological order. This thread is a discussion, so should be easier to follow?
Well that could be the case, maybe Zack White can change the old thread into a discussion thread, there lot of material, maps, articels, pdf files are hidden there, in short very worthwhile to read front to cover.
Good Day David (T),
yes you are right and a big thank you for providing that info, i was aware of the "reply/answer" thing (inside thread), but not forcedly of the overall "thread Question" aspect. that make sense to understand why it's difficult ! so again thanks for pointing that element : )
Hello Andrew,
well, the real expert on French columns has still a lot of sand in his gear ! perhaps in the next days ... in the meantime i can try to provide some limited info.
Marasin on the Battle of ALBUERA :
"Arrivé au point d’attaque, le 5éme corps change de direction par un mouvement de tête de colonne à droite ; la division Girard marche a l'ennemi en colonnes d’attaque, la 2eme division derrière a 150 pas de distance en colonne d’attaque par bataillon."
In short, you are ploying the sub units of a great body of troops in column of attack by battalion, in principle 2-3 battalions, so a regiment ...
That means the battalions are organized one behind the other ... each battalion being formed as column of attack, on the center pelotons..
then you are going to "deploy" those sub units in a LINE of "bataillons d'attaque", ready for *action* when you reach your point of deployment !
so it's a "ploy" then "deploy" thing, but with the units aleady formed on the center, something hard to improvise in the last few hundred yards. Given the overall comments in the various studies / articles referenced in the other thread, it seems rather unlikely that they adopted such a disposition.
i plan to post various home made plates with various formations in order to give a visual approach. For example, a colonne par bataillon vs D 'Erlon formation for the two center infantry Divisions is rather ... problematic.
for me it suggest a stage one, followed by a stage two for whatever reason.
and the discovery, the 1st Corps Diary is not using the terms of colonne d' attaque or colonne d' attaque par bataillon.
as i said, i try to provide some elements, but with columns, it's like trying to, look at the end of a dark abyss ... very dark
sound clear ?! : )
i have edited my post because formating and text in bold was lost ( i was on the iphone, not the computer)
for Duthilt, i must check the original text in french, a direct link to ease things ?
Hans-Karl provided the best comments in the other thread on several aspects, especially on command.. I agree with him on the questions he shared :
I feel we must get back to the basics as much as possible.
What was the original order of Boney?
> attack to size the village of mont saint jean.
In case Ney did change it - why, when and how?
> (?) te right / left thing ?
Why did the columns bunch up so much ?
> the troops were organized as a (great) tactical mass (grande masse tactique) looking at the repertoire it *could be* a colonne compacte or simply a colonne serrée. more or less colonne meaning a great body of troops and not a tactical column. it suggest the intent to execute an attack by shock, and given the specifics of it, it also suggest anti cavalry properties. like in disposition contre la cavalerie. in theory those masses should not have been broken by the adverse cavalry.
but the hedges - chemin creux impact was perhaps overlooked from the start.
i must check ancien regime ordonnances to see how you execute a rompement par la queue (de la colonne). perhaps those of 1776.
Why did the Brits believe - Siborne - that the 1st division was the the right of the 2nd (from French side perspective?
(?)
Also I am puzzled by the description of the terrain, those brigades close to LHS - encountering a ravine which forces them to deviate, first 2nd brigade and then 1st brigade as well, I fail to see it on the map, or when on the spot I failed to see it.
> you mean maps error ? Pelet has drawn a fair number of maps (134 available on gallica, and stresses the importance of terrain in his article on corps operations (le spectateur).
Drouet d'Erlon had clear orders, as far as I see it to capture Mont St. Jean and not LHS or La Papelotte, why did he divert some of his units to either attack or mask those places ?
> playing with the maps and correct units frontage, depth,
he could have done it differently, eventually storming LHS from the start with a larger effort with tirailleurs supported closely with artillery.
you can always estimate a 200 meters area from both farm complexes and execute the attack "in the middle", more or less out of musket range.
the one thing to check closely also is the attack by echelon and all its implications. i lokked at jomini, but it's too vague.
it goes along with the part of N order asking to mask as much as possible the "movement" / attack.
Siborne's confusion is understandable. He was writing based on own topographical study and the testimony of mostly British officers. French line infantry don't have distinctive facings, and they were unlikely to read the number on their drapeaux or buttons! Not surprisingly, his overtures to the French for their side of the story was either rebuffed or ignored.
Presumably, he just assumed they were laid out in customery fashion, with senior on the right. Quite how he squared that with his smaller diorama showing the Allied cavalry charge, I'm not sure. It's on display here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n5nisyQjsfw
The attack by the Scots greys on the 45eme is shown here
I can't find an image of how he portrays the contest for the 105eme eagle, but the next time I'm in Leeds I'll take a look. It might answer whether he thought the 28eme was in front of them.
However, if they were arrayed by battalions in line one behind the other, the 105eme's eagle would not have been that far back even if they were behind. In the kind of loose melee that ensued I suppose either interpretation would fit.
looking at this, i ask myself how the cavalry got through the infantry, I recorded in my memory, that the infantry in front of them, the platoons wheeled to the left to create openings, which I find quite impressive to do so, under pressure of the enemy to keep such a control and execute that manoeuvre on the spot.
I think it's one of those paradeground vs battleground conundrums. When you've got six hundred horses bearing down on you and the alternative was to get trampled, I'm sure you would find a way!
Famous films aside, some accounts talk about the impact being at walking pace
@Hans - Karl Weiß
Hans Karl,
did you checked the frontage of the 4 infantry Divisions, in line on two Lines of Battle( before action/attack) versus the lateral space available between LHS and Papelotte ? it *looks like* there is a reduction of 50 % or so between the two .. at least on this map .. i shall try to make a diagram of all the battalions with known manpower and use a 55cm + intervals to see how much space is needed when on two LINES of battle and check what id give when applied on the objective area
i wonder what's the most accurate map of the battlefield in that regard (terrain /scale) for that area
As to inclining to the left, might that be because of the position of one of the batteries and it's fire? Also, next time I look at the small Siborne model I'll see if there was anything in the topography which he recorded and portrayed, which might not be there now or might not appear on our maps. One last chance would be to walk the field and see if there is anything about the suble shape of the slope?
In case looking at the Siborne map - thanks to Markus Stein - I see two sort of small depressions in the valley, creating a sort of wave, this might have caused the deviation, but they couldn't be so bad as to fore a deviation?
Having walked the ground many times, I recall nothing in the lay of the ground that would cause any sort of deviation for d'Erlon's divisions before reaching the sandpit; unless there was fire from la Haye-Sainte?
Bugeaud notes from le spectateur Militaire , see page 404, specific comments on D' Erlon's dispositif and how to adopt a better formation (different from the letter referenced by Coppens or De Wit)
---
Canler's memoires : tome 1, see page 19-23
the relevant passage : "colonne serrée par bataillon" je remarquai que l'adjudant-major Hubaut, chargé de former "les divisions"
I- "Vers midi, nous allâmes prendre position sur le plateau de la Sainte-Alliance, où avait été établie une batterie de 80 canons, puis on nous fit descendre dans le ravin (...) Après une demi-heure d'attente, le maréchal Ney donna l'ordre d'attaquer et d'emporter d'assaut la batterie anglaise; (...) on nous forma en colonne serrée par bataillon; je remarquai que l'adjudant-major Hubaut, chargé de former les divisions, (...) Enfin, les colonnes étant formées, le général Drouet d'Erlon se mit au milieu de son corps d'armée,
l'arme au bras (...) les colonnes s'ébranlèrent et se dirigèrent
vers les canons anglais (..) Alors les batteries ennemies (..) furent braquées sur nos colonnes qu'elles décimèrent par la mitraille.
La troisième décharge réduisit le front de notre bataillon au front de compagnie (..) Après une course de vingt minutes, nous arrivâmes près de l'ouvrage en terre où se trouvaient (..) les canons anglais, et nous commençâmes a le gravir. l'arme au bras, nous montâmes ainsi jusqu'aux canons (..)
II- A peine atteignons-nous le sommet du plateau que nous y sommes reçus par les dragons de la reine (..) La première division (?) qui n'a pas eu le temps de former le carré (..) se trouve enfoncée (..)
alors commence un véritable carnage (..) on est trop rapproché les uns des autres pour faire usage des armes à feu. Mais la position n'était pas tenable pour des fantassins combattant isolément et entourés par des cavaliers (...)
III-
Tout à coup (..) ce sont les lanciers et les cuirassiers français qui arrivent à notre secours (..) les dragons anglais (..) finissent par battre en retraite
---
I-
"Around noon, we went to take up position on the Sainte-Alliance plateau, where a battery of 80 guns had been established, then we were made to descend into the ravine (...) After half an hour of waiting, the Marshal Ney gave the order to attack and assault the English battery; (...) we were formed into a close column by battalion (colonne serrée par bataillon) I noticed that Adjutant-Major Hubaut, in charge of forming the divisions (..) Finally, the columns being formed, General Drouet d'Erlon placed himself in the middle of his army corps,
weapon in arm (...) the columns shook and headed
towards the English guns (..) Then the enemy batteries (..) were aimed at our columns which they decimated by grape-shot.
The third discharge reduced the front of our battalion to the company front (..) After a race of twenty minutes, we arrived near the earthen work where were (..) the English guns, and we began to climb it. . weapon in hand, we climbed up to the guns (..)
II-
No sooner do we reach the top of the plateau when we are received there by the queen's dragons (..) The first division which has not had time to form the square (..) is found sunk (..) then begins a real carnage (..) we are too close to each other to use firearms. But the position was not tenable for infantrymen fighting in isolation and surrounded by cavaliers (...)
III-
Suddenly (..) it is the French lancers and cuirassiers who come to our aid (..) the English dragons (..) end up retreating
Thanks Eric - the article by Bugeaud - however is a bit confusing, I have to admit.
Good Day Hans-Karl, yes Bugeaud notes are rather unclear, beside general comments on D' Erlon dispositif as a dangerous one, the main intent is to provide an alternate way to organize the columns in order to react to cavalry charges. there is one plate latter in the book with 2 figures-diagrams. (google page 470 a copy at the end of this post)
"Je veux parler de la formation d'une colonne d'attaque, composée de bataillons déployés les uns derrière les autres, à distances entières.
(..) Je tiens d'un officier général qui faisait partie de cette bizarre colonne , que la cavalerie anglaise s'étant inopinément présentée, on ne sut faire prendre aucune disposition à ces bataillons déployés l'un derrière l'autre."
Bugeaud is also mixing terms he is using : use of *distance de deploiement* (instead of intervalle de deploiement - or distance d' evolution), also he seems not aware of the colonne vuide when he talks about Wagram & General Lamarque,
and the why of lignes doublées par bataillon (6 ranks) to resist cavalry.
---
Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon, racontée par lui-même, au tribunal de César, d'Alexandre et de Frédéric.
see page 633-635 for some infos on the why and how of the 1st Corps attack as explained by Napoleon. i put in red some relevant worsd used by N. and he is writing about "Masses" (not columns) and by the left flank. It seems that Ney considered the way toward Papelotte was impossible for the infantry (too muddy).
J'avais reconnu la position que l'ennemi occupait en avant du village de Mont-Saint-Jean, (...) c'est un glacis très-favorable à l'artillerie (..) Je crus d'abord (..) ordonner l'attaque par la droite sur Papelotte (..) mais Ney, (..) trouva que le ruisseau (..) formait un bas-fond bourbeux, où il lui serait impossible de passer avec de l'infanterie, et qu'il serait réduit à défiler du village par files. (NEY) proposa de remonter à la naissance du ravin , ce qui le conduisait au centre vers la Haie-Sainte. J'y consentis par plusieurs raisons: la première :j'ai toujours été partisan des attaques sur le centre la seconde : il faut éviter une difficulté locale la troisième, c'est que la position ennemie (..) n'avait pas d'autre voie de retraite que la chaussée de Bruxelles (..) Si cette attaque réussissait (..) les deux ailes ennemies, séparées (..) se seraient trouvées (..) compromises.
Le combat s'engagea vers onze heures, par une attaque (..) contre la droite de l'ennemi (..) pour lui donner le change sur mes intentions. (..) Dans cet intervalle, un événement fâcheux arrivait à ma droite. Ney, déjà formé vis-à-vis Papelotte, mit ses divisions en marche par masses et par le flanc gauche pour opérer l'attaque convenue sur le centre. L'artillerie, embourbée (..) ne pouvait suivre ses colonnes : la cavalerie anglaise (..) s'élança, partie sur la division Marcognet, partie sur les pièces (..) l'infanterie trop serrée se mit en désordre ; quelques bataillons furent entamés; les 80 pièces de Ney furent (..) hors de service. Les cuirassiers de Milhaud (..) anéantissent cette brigade anglaise; mais Ney est forcé de continuer, sans artillerie, sa marche sur la Haie Sainte. Je le fais soutenir par mes batteries du centre , et il marche à l' ennemi avec audace (..) ma cavalerie exécute une charge (..) sur la ligne anglaise et perce jusqu'aux réserves; mais, faute de soutien, elle est forcée à revenir. Ney continue à s'avancer; les Anglais, à la faveur d'une artillerie supérieure (..) arrêtent l'élan de nos colonnes. Ney redouble d'efforts pour enlever la position (..) quand on vient m 'avertir qu'on aperçoit des troupes (..) du côté de St.-Lambert (..)
---
Bugeaud's Diagrams, fig n° 2, on the right, for the column with deployed Bns, except that they are at full distance !!! (distance entiere in the text)
not closed in mass, with 6 paces between each fraction.
Eric
Thanks a lot again to bring up all those details.
As for Bugaud, either each of the battalion (in my interpretation) has a full distance to each other, they themselves are closed columns.
Seemingly he doesn't use 6 but 8 subdivions - or the whole column would be just one subdivision, in this case, peloton front, each behind each other, to be formed either as mass, open square or line.
I cannot see any benefit of this formation at all, a classic attack column, formed to the middle, would do all this better, easier and quicker, so why not in that formation?
But this would make a brigade or division as long as it would be wide when deployed in a battalion.
Re - reading all those eye witnesses - it all seems to be much more complex than just those 4 phalanxes, when attacked by cavalry - one can read, that sort of circles formed to resist, or indeed square, but due to their distruction all those makeshift formations didn't seem to have much resilience - in contrast to the well formed squares of 85e de ligne.
Dawson provides interesting comments on the wounds of the officers to see where gun shot wounds or saber wounds caused the most casualties.
Reading Dawson, he cites Dominique Fleuret of 54e de ligne, he states that
We were engaged against English light infantry sharphooters (I gues in the original text tirailleurs, wouldn't translate that as sharp shooters, HKW) and sixteen pieces of cannot formed in battery fired at us. (Rogers, Bijleveld?, HKW) (...) It was our Voltigeurs who burnt their cartridges.They drive in the enemies skirmishers and take the guns but then were charged by the British cavalry.
He states that they were saved by two regiments of French lancers.
With the cavalry passed, we crawled at out stomachs to join our square, which fired from their four faces into the English dragoons. (Could this be the squares of 85e de ligne, the routing soldiers driven back across the field direction of Durutte? Interesting to note that those squares fired from their four sides, so the cavalry must have them surrounded, HKW)Then they rallied but did form only one battalions, and suprising to me
We were deployed as sharpshooters along with the Young Guard. We marched against the Prussians, who moved against out right wing to cut off the army's line of retreat.Dawson pp 83/84
At first I thought that they were engaged against Zieten's corps but there he states they fought with the Young Guard it must be the Plancenoit area.
Though he describes that the cavalry charge broke his regiment - among the wounded officers Dawson is listing - only few have sabre cuts but a lot guns shot wounds. (One cannot however identify at what stage of the battle those wounds occurred).
I don’t really want to get into a debate about the veracity of first-hand accounts, but I think it is important to make a point as we get down into the fine detail about what happened.
Like any description of the battle from someone who was there, Fleuret’s account is fascinating, but unfortunately illustrates the frustrations we face when using eye-witness accounts. As professional or amateur historians we desperately want to read and trust first-hand accounts to help us understand what really happened at battles such as Waterloo. However, we all know the many reasons why accounts such as these embellish/exaggerate/twist/ignore/downplay the truth for well-intentioned reasons or otherwise. Fleuret’s book appears to have been written many years after his service and his account of the battle is only a few paragraphs long; his book contains a number of verifiable errors (he has Waterloo in July!). Especially when we look for very low-level tactical detail, we must be very careful not to put too much emphasis on accounts such as his.
Having said that, who am I to say he is not telling the absolute truth!? But we do have to be careful and balance these narratives against each other and take into account when they were written and what agenda the writer may have had. I suspect Fleuret had no personal agenda, but his book seems to have been written in his dotage with a somewhat hazy recollection of detail, hence he writes so little on what must have been a momentous event in his life when compared to others in d’Erlon’s corps such as Canler, Duthilt and Martin.
@Andrew Field
I am not disagreeing - for that reason such discussions are paramount to understand more - still he mentions square, we know that there were squares, it could well be that they were driven in their flight more into direction of Durutte.
@Hans - Karl Weiß Indeed; it was not meant as a criticism, more a frustration that eye-witness accounts confuse us as much as help us.
It is generally accepted that the rear ranks of a column turn and run first. This might suggest that the rear battalions of d'Erlon's corps got back towards their own lines without much loss and may have been able to form a 'rallying square', or, because they had the space behind, were able to form a square as chef de bataillon Rulliere of Durutte's division suggests;
'Only that [the commander] of the eighth [rear] battalion had the possibility of manoeuvring: he thus formed his battalion in square in the rear of the first Division from where he noticed the English cavalry fall on the divisions of I Corps which were to the left of Durutte’s division.'
Thus, as Durutte's division was the rear echelon, his troops had more time to react to the British and Dutch-Belgian cavalry charges and was presumably further forward than the square of the 85th de ligne.
Good day Andrew,
for your book, did you make a separate file for each division formation in D' Erlon corps, with a synthetic approach for each division ? ie that compile "official records" and personal accounts ? and which look after technical terms ?
ie, an excel file with all the accounts for each "column" involved in the 1st Corps attack. and focusing on the technical terms used (or not) by the various eyewitness .. eventually the "generals" appart from lower ranks ... ?! see a sample at the end of this post.
reading again various elements available online this week end, i come to the impression that the overall action from 1st corps could be seen as each Division organized as a single body of troops and obeying rules, system and principles regulating a small body of troops (like a Bn). In a similar fashion as what McDonald has done at Wagram, except that the two overall formations do not match at all of course in their shapes and organizations (colonne vuide vs ??? colonne compacte ? colonne serrée ?). But they are following the same rules and principles as opposed to what you have with two LINES of Battle, following the system of a "battalion directeur" and all that. nevertheless, each of D' Erlon's infantry Divisions can be seen as organized as a single battalion, each subdivision of column acting as a peloton, even if it's a battalion.
so if we are to follow Canler account as plausible, the key words are *perhaps* > "colonne serrée par bataillon" and "divisions"
("on nous forma en colonne serrée par bataillon; je remarquai que l'adjudant-major Hubaut, chargé de former les divisions..)
which are not unknown at all, and has been used at least since 1796 by Bonaparte (see samples hereafter) something pertaining to the french military repertoire, previous systems, military "patrimoine".
"il ordonna au Comte d’Erlon de faire ses dispositions pour attaquer l’ennemi par la gauche (2), de former à cet effet chacune de ses divisions en Colonne par Bataillon et de les faire marcher en échelon"
some examples from Abel HUGO's book ... see pages 102 - 107 - 111 for colonne serrée par bataillon .. France militaire
France militaire
France militaire: Histoire des armées françaises de terre et de ..., Volume 2 https://books.google.fr/books?id=pc78q5HwDXEC&pg=PA107&lpg=PA107&dq=%22colonne+serrée+par+bataillon%22&source=bl&ots=BqwGECNnic&sig=ACfU3U1Uz7ZK-ndUF9xDCy4w2e3nFIKgLQ&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2itW5xP7qAhUL6OAKHb_zD_U4ChDoATAGegQIBxAB#v=onepage&q=%22colonne%20serrée%20par%20bataillon%22&f=false
---
technical military terms (or not)
Corporal Canler > his brigade was formed en colonne serrée par bataillon. Captain Duthilt > en colonne d’attaque par bataillon. Durutte > all divisions were formed en colonnes par bataillon. Adjudant Gastinieau > his division was formed “tous les bataillons déployés, rangés à 5 pas les uns des autres.” Rullière > each division of the corps formed one column: the 1st battalion was deployed and the seven others were placed serrés en masse sur le premier seulement à 5 pas de distance d’un guide à l’autre.
Schmitz >his division (the 2nd) being en colonnes par bataillon. Noguès > his brigade was formed in bataillons échelonnés.
Best Regards
Eric, I'm afraid the answer to your first question is 'no'. My research for my Waterloo the French Perspective was carried out over ten years ago and was based mainly on the available, published French eye-witness accounts (I have learnt much since then). My tactical knowledge was based mainly on secondary sources that I had been reading for many years. Thanks to you and H-K I now realise my knowledge was sadly inadequate! Indeed, despite all your good work on this thread (and 'French Columns'), I sometimes feel I am more confused than before. Little did I realise how complex the problem is beyond the regulations which fail to regulate!!
I agree with your reasoning in your third paragraph, even if this does not entirely clarify the situation! I have no doubt that the columns of Donzelot and Marcognet contained all their battalions in line, one behind the other. I am still convinced (although some primary accounts contradict me) that Quiot's division (1st) had the 1st Brigade in battalion assault columns (probably division (two peloton) frontage) for the assault on la Haye-Sainte (the allied accounts are more convincing than the French on this!), with the second brigade formed as Donzelot and Marcognet, but only four battalions deep. I think Durutte's formation is more problematic: I think we can be confident the two weak battalions of the 85th de ligne were in a single square, but hard to be sure if all the other battalions of the division were in a single column like the others, or if some units were sent to mask/assault Papelotte. Once again, this latter action comes from allied sources rather than French: The Nassauers and Hanoverians of Best and Saxe-Weimar claim to have been in action during d'Erlon's assault, though it is not clear who this could have been against.
That is my thinking, but as your list above clearly illustrates, the French descriptions of the columns are very different and can be interpreted in different ways! I think that due to their rank/responsibilities, Rulliere and Gastinieu are probably the most dependable (incidentally, where is Gatinieu's account published please? I have read it, but don't know where it originally came from).
Thank you for the very helpful links you keep including (and your English; MUCH better than my French!!); I now have ten years of reading lined up!
Andrew
reading again various elements available online this week end, i come to the impression that the overall action from 1st corps could be seen as each Division organized as a single body of troops and obeying rules, system and principles regulating a small body of troops (like a Bn).I agree - this was my initial understanding, you had a division where the subunit is a battalion instead of a peloton, however a huge problem of command is created by that, or better how to command.
In a similar fashion as what McDonald has done at Wagram, except that the two overall formations do not match at all of course in their shapes and organizations (colonne vuide vs ??? colonne compacte ? colonne serrée ?). But they are following the same rules and principles as opposed to what you have with two LINES of Battle, following the system of a "battalion directeur" and all that. nevertheless, each of D' Erlon's infantry Divisions can be seen as organized as a single battalion, each subdivision of column acting as a peloton, even if it's a battalion.Not so in my view, McDonald's columen respected the tatctical entity of each battalion employed in it, while I cannot see this for d'Erlon - neither the principles of two lines.
@Hans - Karl Weiß
"however a huge problem of command is created by that, or better how to command"
> easy, you follow the rules and principles applicable to a small body of troops (battalion). how do you command a battalion ?
( La formation des Colonnes serrées occasionne certaines modifications dans la transmission des COMMANDEMENTS D'EXÉCUTION)
if you remember there are two possibilities for command and direction :
1 - the great body of troops is led & directed using a bataillon directeur (reputé infallible) the position of is at the head, the tail or in the middle of the said body. this imply several sub units like battalions or regimernts,or brigade, which keep some "lattitude" towards evolving circumtances, for example a regiment able to detach to a flank, or the second line to execute an offensive passage of line, two LINES of Battle, brigades accolées side by side) or each brigades in line, one behind the other.
2- the great body of troops is organized and used as a single small body of troops, and it is using rules and principles for a small body of troops. it is acting as one single entity, with the sub units are not meant to detach or act by themselves. this is the case with McDonald colonne vuide. a moving fortification to execute an attack under cavalry threat. you won't break your own fortress by allowing the units to detach !
beyond that we are in the subject of Fraction Tactique, Subdivision and Subdivision de colonne.
for the rest, i do apologize, but i do not understand very well what you mean with : "McDonald's columen respected the tactical entity of each battalion employed in it" (?) and while I cannot see this for d'Erlon (?) - neither the principles of two lines (?) > perhaps you can try to express it differently ?
looking at first Corps diary, which state "colonne par bataillon" as ordered by Napoleon. then we have accounts stating different things like "colonne serrée par bataillon". then we have the 8 Bns en bataille acting as subdivision of a colonne serrée .. in a stage 1 .. stage 2 (Ney modification?) .. stage 3 fashion/evolution for the attack. or different formations over time.
but i have not finished to compil all the accounts.
a description of that (pesky) colonne par bataillon by Turpin de Crissé, see plate n° XX and page 416 tome 1 for the text (1754 ... ) looks like perpendicular order before 1796 !
Pesky column indeed!!! I recently read this in J. Colin, La Tactique et la Discipline dans les Armées de la Révolution:
'General Friant to Marshal Davout, Freyburg, 17 October 1806.
…Arriving at on the plateau eight o’clock, half a league in front of Neu-Kösen, I formed in accordance with your intention in colonne serrée par bataillon, my left anchored on the main road, at a distance of 300 to 400 toises. We marched in this order until we arrived level with the right of Gudin’s division which was already in contact [with the enemy].'
Is this not the same as d'Erlon's columns or am I losing my sanity!?
@Andrew Field
It is not the same of d'Erlong columns, Friant, despite forming a colonne serrée kept the tactical entity of the battalions whereas it was destroyed by the phalanx of d'Erlon.
Good day Andrew,
well, i do hope you keep your SAN at 100 % !
thank you very much for the answer. much appreciated. you can also include our friend H-K who provided the right questions/comments on higher command & all that. a big thanks to him also. : )
that said it might be not that easy to keep SAN at a good level, and i can feel like you ... just check the examples from Abel HUGO... Bonaparte is writing about : "colonne serrée, par bataillon" ( with a "," between serrée and par ..)
colonne serrée par bataillon
colonne serrée, par bataillon (Bonaparte 1796)
colonne serrée par bataillons
colonnes serrées par bataillon
colonnes serrées par bataillons
colonnes serrées, par bataillon
colonnes serrées, par bataillons
You also have Schérer instructions (1795) sounds familiar with D' Erlon ??!! with his description on how to mount an attack ..
1795, Barthélémy Louis Joseph Schérer, général en chef de l'Armée d'Italie, publia une instruction pour son armée (in COLIN)
La plupart des troupes d'Italie n'ayant jamais combattu en plaine, et n'ayant jamais été dans le cas de soutenir une charge de cavalerie, il convient au génie de la nation et à la bravoure des troupes de leur prescrire une manière d'attaquer qui favorise leur courage et leur impétuosité, qui les débarrasse des difficultés d'une marche en avant en observant un alignement très difficile à conserver quand le front est très étendu, et qui leur ôte toute crainte d'être renversées par une charge de cavalerie.
Je supposerai qu'une divison composée de 4 demi-brigades de ligne et une légère soit chargée d'attaquer de front une partie de la ligne ennemie; voici l'ordre d'attaque que je lui prescrirais: les 3 bataillons d'infanterie légère se porteraient en avant, formés sur deux rangs, les files éloignées l'une de l'autre à deux ou trois pas de distance [1,3 ou 1,9 m], de manière à ce que ces trois bataillons couvrent le front des 12 bataillons de la division et masquent ses mouvements. Au moment de l'attaque, les 12 bataillons se ploieraient en colonne par bataillon, [...] la colonne étant composée de 4 divisions [ainsi chaque division d'un front de 2 pelotons] [...] à 3 pas [1,9 m] de distance. [...]
Lorsque le signal de l'attaque sera donné, les 3 bataillons d'infanterie légère, éloignés de 150 pas [97,5 m] du front des colonnes, marcheront vivement en avant en faisant un feu soutenu. Les 12 colonnes les suivront au pas de manœuvre [c'est le même comme le pas accéléré ou le pas redoublé, tous de 100 pas par minute], et lorsque l'infanterie légère sera arrivée à 50 pas [32,5 m] du front de l'ennemi, elle s'arrêtera; si l'ennemi tient ferme, elle redoublera son feu; les colonnes serrées en masse par divisions, la première croisant la baïonnette, les trois autres les armes hautes doubleront le pas en conservant leur ordre de profondeur, passeront à travers l'infanterie légère, qui viendra se placer par pelotons dans les intervalles, et se précipiteront à la baïonnette sur la ligne ennemie.
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Lorsque ces différentes attaques furent commencées, le général Victor, avec la dix-huitième demi-brigade de bataille, en colonne serrée par bataillon, et à la hauteur de division, marcha droit à l’ennemi" (..)
Grenadier LABEILLE
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Je fis aussitôt former la 18e demi-brigade et la 32° en colonne serrée par bataillon, et pendant le temps qu'au pas de charge nous cherchions à percer l'ennemi, celui-ci s'étendait davantage pour nous envelopper. Sa manoeuvre me parut un sur garant de la victoire. Masséna envoya seulement quelques tirailleurs sur les ailes des ennemis pour retarder leur marche.
5 aout 1796: la bataille de Castiglione
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Le gros des Espagnols s'était rallié, sur la route de Cordoue, au sommet d'un plateau qui d'un côté se terminait au Guadalquivir, de l'autre se reliait à la Sierra-Morena. L'armée française était au pied du plateau en colonne serrée par bataillon, la cavalerie et l'artillerie dans les intervalles. Après lui avoir laissé prendre haleine, le général Dupont la porta en avant. À la seule vue de ces troupes marchant à l'ennemi comme à la parade, les Espagnols s'enfuirent en désordre, et nous livrèrent la route de Cordoue.
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Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, Vol. (9 / 20), by Adolphe Thiers
Bataille de la Moskova
TOUTE LA GARDE IMPÉRIALE EUT L'ORDRE DE SE METTRE EN GRANDE TENUE.
LE LENDEMAIN, A CINQ HEURES DU MATIN, NOUS ÉTIONS SOUS LES ARMES EN COLONNE SERRÉE, PAR BATAILLON. L'EMPEREUR PASSA PRES DE NOUS EN PARCOURANT TOUTE LA LIGNE, car déja depuis plus d'une demi-heure il était a cheval. A sept heures la bataille commença. Il me serait impossible d'en donner le détail; mais se fut dans toute l'armée une grande joie en attendant le bruit du canon, car l'on était certain que les Russes, comme les autres fois, n'avaient pas décampé et qu'on allait se battre.
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Républicain du Nord / Gal JOUBERT attack
bonaparte 16 germinal an 5 general en chef armée d' italie ...
Le général Laharpe marcha avec sa division sur trois colonnes serrées en masse; celle de gauche, commandée par le général Causse, passa la Bormida sous le feu de l'ennemi,
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Je fis aussitôt former la dix-huitième demi-brigade et la trente-deuxième en colonne serrée, par bataillon; et pendant le temps qu'au pas de charge, nous cherchions à percer l'ennemi, celui-ci s'étendait davantage pour chercher à nous envelopper: sa manoeuvre me parut un sûr garant de la victoire. Masséna envoya seulement quelques tirailleurs sur les ailes des ennemis, pour retarder leur marche; la première colonne arrivée à Lonado força les ennemis.
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Lorsque ces différentes attaques furent commencées, le général Victor, avec la dix-huitième demi-brigade de bataille, en colonne serrée par bataillon, et à la hauteur de division, marcha droit à l'ennemi; la trente-deuxième demi-brigade, soutenue par le général Kilmaine à la tête de deux régimens de cavalerie, marcha par la droite pour acculer les ennemis, et les pousser du côté où était le général Pigeon.
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le général de brigade Victor, à la tête de la dix-huitième demi-brigade d'infanterie de bataille en colonne serrée par bataillon, perce par le grand chemin; la résistance de l'ennemi est long-temps opiniâtre:
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Le général Pigeon passe avec l'infanterie légère sur la droite; trois cents tirailleurs se jettent sur les bords de l'Adige pour commencer la fusillade, et trois demi-brigades en colonne serrée et par bataillon, l'arme au bras, passent le défilé.
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Le général Augereau fait sur-le-champ ses dispositions; la brave cinquième demi-brigade d'infanterie légère attaque l'ennemi en tirailleurs; la quatrième demi-brigade d'infanterie de bataille, en colonne serrée et par bataillon, marche droit à l'ennemi, protégée par le feu de l'artillerie légère: le village est emporté.
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Au quartier-général à Scheifling, le 16 germinal an 5 (5 avril 1797). _Au directoire exécutif._Combat de Burk._
Citoyens directeurs,
Le général Joubert a attaqué, le 8, la gorge d'Inspruck: les bataillons fraîchement arrivés du Rhin voulaient la défendre; après une canonnade de quelques instans, le général Joubert a décidé l'affaire en marchant droit à la tête de la quatre-vingt-cinquième demi-brigade, en colonne serrée par bataillon: l'ennemi a été culbuté en laissant cent morts, six cents prisonniers, deux pièces de canon, tous les équipages et vingt dragons.
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ce poste essentiel, «Le 16, à h poîn.e du jour, nous» nous trouvâmes en qui ét.jit à notre gauche, devait attaquer Salo; le an centre, et la droite, L'eniu'tni, Mu lieu d'être à • onado. Déjà elle était enveloppée, et le Ifiie à cheval je fi* aussitôt ibmwr la 18 demi-brigade et la en colonne serrée, par bataillon qu'au pas de charge nous chFichtous i pri'ctT lVnnemt, sur les ailes des ennemis
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Le nous nous trouvons en pré-store: une division de l'ennemi gardait les défilés inexpugnables de gardai* le Le général Pigeon, avec une partie de les hauteurs de la gauche de Marco à la tête de la dix huitième demi-brigade d'infanterie légère, attaque l'enaflui en tirailleurs j le à la tête de la d'infanterie de bataille en colonne serrée par bataillons, perce par le grand chemin. La résistance de l'ennemi est long-temps opiniâtre: au même instant le général Vaubois attaque Je camp retranché de Mori après deux heures de combat ttès-vif, l'ennemi plie par tout. Le citoyen Marois mon capitaine, porte l'ordre au général Dubois de faire avancer le premier jtégiment de hussards et de poursuivre vivement l'ennemi.
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Il Faut de nouvelles dispositions le général Dammartui fait avancer huit pièces d'artillerie légère pour commencer la canonnade; il trouve une bonne posi- tion d'où il prend la gorge en écharpe. passe avec Pinfa terie légère sur la droite; trois cents tirailleurs se jettent sur les bords de l'Axfige pour commencer la fusillade, et tuais demi brigades, en colonne serrée et par bataillon, l'arme au bras, passent le défilé. L'ennemi, ébranlé par le' u vif de l'artillerie, par la hardiesse «les tirailleurs, ne reiste pas à la tuasse de nos colonnes; il abandonne l'entre de la gorge.
> Titre : Campagne du Général Buonaparte en Italie, pendant les années IVe et Ve de la République française / par un officier général / Auteur : Pommereul, François-René-Jean de (1745-1823).