Andrew Field joins me to talk about the research behind his book Quatre Bras: Prelude to Waterloo. We walk through the battle looking at the perspective of both sides to better understand why it unfolded in the way that it did.
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In this podcasts a lot of different aspects about this battle is discussed and exceeds far from the French perspective, amongst else leadership issues on the French, Dutch/Belgian and even the British side. I found it interesting that some key leaders of the Dutch / Belgian Army never fought on the French side during the Napoleonic Wars.
At the end of the podcast both Zack and Andrew discussed whether Quatra Bras was a tactical victory/loss - or strategic victory / loss for any of those paritcipating.
In my view - the battle of Quatre Bras as well as Ligny are to be seen as one, there both had a very strong influence on each other - and for the whole campaign.
It would be interesting to know the honest aim of Napoleon at the 15th of June - and why he created such a powerfull army under Ney's command? In case he liked to crush one of the two Allied armies, and seemingly he achieved separting them - his main aim should have been to win one decisive victory over any of those two armies, and by that concentrating the bulk of the Armée du Nord under Boney himself and a sort of observation detachment (one infantry and one cavalry corps) for the other sub leader.
Only by achieving a decisive victory over one of those two Allied Armies would enable him to concentrate his army again the crush the reminder.
This operational art of war - did fail due to Boney creating two seperate armies which were too weak to cause a decisive victory over the Allies.
The consequences can be seen at the 16th. Due to the dual battles / one battle - also the French forces were committed or pinned - with the exception of Drouet (and due to communication brake down - this corps did not play the decisisve part it could have) Though Andrew Fields has good arguments blaming Ney, I see also a big blame of Boney himself. Why didn't he also sent an ADC directly to Ney telling him that Drouet's corps was taken away from him and that it had to be engaged at Ligny?
In case Drouet would have been with Boney, this hickup wouldn't have happened.
Nabulieone further had the illusion that he knocked out the Prussian Army for several days and won a decisive victory and that he could beat Wellington's army in detail then.
The catastrophic results for him are shown on the 18th of June and consequences of again of how he allocated the units, Gouchy maybe too strong to observe the crushed Prussian Army?
So my view is that the results of the dual battles are clearly a strategic Allied victory - preventing a split of of their two armies and being able to concentrate them on the 18th - while Nabulieone completly misjudged his tactical victory at Ligny.
Nabulieone was misreading Wellington as well, there he did not reckon that he would make a stand on the 18th, Bernard Coppens is discussing this subject quite well in his mensonges - and maybe for that reason the casual way how he dealt with Grouchy and how he made Grouchy's force.
I just read Andrew Field book about the French perspective about Quatre Bras, or should I better say the left wing of the French Army?
As usual a lot of conclusions of Andrew Field are solid and thought provoking, but after finishing reading the book, I ask myself what did realy work in the French Army? Clear orders were ignored, badly executed or no intelligence with gathered with enough energy.
One of a key problem, and still underplayed in my view, how is Ney supposed to run an Army - without a staff. He is accused to get sucked into the battle or just into what is in front of him. But how can he run an army without staff, how can he direct a battle and send regular dispatches of information to Boney? There are simply too many task at his hands.
I very much agree about his legargic way of executing Boney's orders, like how to position the divisions he had at hand at Quatre Bras. But when I look where those units were and what turmoil it cause while one disvision is delaying the other - how could he achieved it before luchtime at Quatre Bras? The whole French army was slow. Even Kellermann, just has one brigade at his hands and left the others behind. Also I cannot say that Quatre Bras is brilliantly tacticaly fought from the French side - other than pinning Wellington and preventing him sending units to help Blücher. Reading the accounts, it seemed that the French fought Quatre Bras just like a big skirmish, with massive artillery support and a cavalry charge. I cannot see an effort of brake through with the formed line units neither that they used the ordre mixed.
Drouet gets clear orders from an ADC of Boney who fails then to travel to Ney to inform him about those orders, and Ney stays blissfully unaware for quite a while about this, and runs his battle for a while as Drouet would be still under his orders. Still then even when Drouet receives the counter order of Ney, and he split his command, Drouet had clear oders by Napoleon and it is surprising that he ignored it. Neither seemed he - or a lot of others realy pushing his soldiers to make a move to be able to interfer at the battle or reach his points of destination.
The whole army is just not working, in case Napoléon is not informed what was going on at Quatre Bras, why then he did not send one ADC after the other gather intelligence were the units were and by that preventing being surprised when Drouet did not show up where he was believed to show up to? In case Ney as sucked into the battle and distracted, almost the same has to be said about Boney was well.
Well I could go on for a while but before stepping - ones sees how dangerous it is to use unsourced material and therefore it is better to ignore Elting about his claim that Ney reacted so sluggish because he had a hang over.
The complete French team seemingly failed and therefore I cannot agree with Andrew Field that Boney outgenereld and outmanouevred the Allies, it was the other way round.
@Hans - Karl Weiß Quite a lot of scapegoating comes his way. We only have to look at the thread devoted to his formation at Waterloo and the endless debate on whether it should/shouldn't have worked. the working up of the 1815 narrative of Napoleon the genius, betrayed only by treachery and incompetence. Oh the poor tortured soul! Oh the tragedy! (Oh the book sales!)
The truth at last as one book puts it? To quote a film from another era "I want the truth!" "You can't handle the truth!!
Did Napoleon have better Corps Commanders available to him in his halcyon days? Undoubtedly. Not many, I would contend were left by 1815. But a workman should not blame his tools, soldiering is a practical undertaking where you have to work with what you have.
Whilever we ever prefer romantic myth to mundane truth, the debate goes on!
The Allies concentrated in my view quite quickly, but by that they played into the hands of Boney, who wanted early battles and quick victories.
I always wondered if the Allied strategy would be more like as in 1813 - the Trachenberg plan, Blücher retreats to the East, Wellington to the West and the rift between the armies gets bigger and bigger, by that Boney's lines of communication bet longer and who could cope with two big armies being distant and refusing to give battle against him but would wage a battle against a weaker subordinate? The Armée du Nord alone would not suffice to deal with two strong opponents.
Well the podcast prompted me to buy Andrew Fields Quatre Bras and Grouchy - very reasonable on kindle, hm what to read first, most likely Grouchy.
on some more second thoughts, what would have happened in case Drouet did reach Quatre Bras in full force? OK - he might have pused Wellington's army back, but could he have caused a decisive victory compelling Wellington to give up the idea of a battle before Bruxelles and to concentrate much far back to the rear and the west?
@Hans - Karl Weiß , I have similar questions. This has been obfuscated by Napoleon’s St Helena scapegoating and excuse making, and the two centuries of embroidery and speculation since. The possible strategic role of D’Erlon’s Corps is in my view overstated. It was out of position due to the deployment and routing errors of 14th and 15th. Even when Ney had it under his hand, he only had orders to occupy the crossroads, not crush or pursue. Effectively, it would have bought forward Wellington’s retreat and forced the ad hoc commitment of his cavalry as he fell back upon it. From of the timings and the ground, the possible strategic impact on Ligny might not have been as significant as some opine. It is one thing to sight a corps from a distance in column of route, quite another to see it deploy into battle formation. D’Erlon was not a Davout, and this is not Auerstädt. There would therefore be a considerable delay before it’s effects were felt in the Ligny battlefield. Operationally, Wellington would have reached the Waterloo battlefield earlier, perhaps needing a larger cavalry/rearguard action around Genappe on the 17th. Bülow’s Corps will still have been fresh and untouched. The general line of Prussian withdrawal will be the same, being dictated by the availability and marking of maps. If Napoleon goes on to oblige with the same mistakes on 17th, the strategic nett effect of the D’Erlon débâcle is not as large as you might think. Or want people to think if you are trying to distract students of history from your errors and lethargy of the 17th.