The Limitations of Genuis

To compare or contrast with the above:

Organization of the Armee de la Reserve 1800

‘My intention…is to organize an army of the reserve, the command of which will be at the disposal of the First Consul. It will be divided into a right, center, and left. Each of these three large corps will be commanded by a lieutenant general who will have, in addition, one cavalry division like wise commanded by a lieutenant general.’

‘Each of these three large corps will be divided into two divisions, each commanded by a general of division and two generals of brigade, and each Grand Corps will have in addition a high-ranking artillery officer…’

‘Each corps will comprise 18,000 to 20,000 men, including the two regiments of hussars or chasseurs and sixteen guns, a dozen of which will be served by foot companies and four by the horse artillery.’

Correspondence VI. Number 4552, 107; Napoleon to Berthier 25 January 1800.

Further, the following regarding the formation of the Armee de la Reserve, might be helpful:

‘…To execute such a plan required speed, profound secrecy, and great audacity. The secret was the most difficult to keep, for how is it possible to conceal their movement from numerous English and Austrian spies?’

‘The most suitable way…was to reveal it myself by making such a demonstration that it would become an object of ridicule to the enemy, and to act in such a way that the enemy considered all of these declarations as a way to create a diversion to the operations of the Austrian army, which blocked Genoa. It was necessary to give a specific objective to the observers and spies.’

‘Therefore it was decided in messages to the Legislative Corps, the Senate, and by decrees and publication in the papers, and finally by insinuation of ever kind, that the place where the army of the reserve would assemble was Dijon, that I would review it there, etc. Immediately all the spies and observers gravitated to this city. They saw there, during the first days of April, a large officer establishment without an army, and in the course of this month, some 5,000 or 6,000 conscripts and retired soldiers, many of them disabled and moved by their zeal rather than their physical strength.’

‘Soon this army became an object of ridicule, and when I held the review on 6 May, people were astonished to see only 7,000 or 8,000 men, most of them not even in uniform…These misleading reports circulated through Brittany, Geneva, Basle, London, Vienna, and Italy. Europe was filled with caricatures…with the caption that read ‘Bonaparte’s Army of Reserve.’

‘…the real army was formed en route. The divisions were organized at different points of rendezvous. These places were isolated and had no connection with each other…the most difficult thing to conceal was the movement of needed provisions through the mountains where nothing could be found…’

‘The combination of all these means of putting the spies on the wrong scent was crowded with the most fortunate success. It was said in Paris, as in Dijon and Vienna: ‘There is no army of the reserve.’ At Melas’ headquarters it was added, ‘The army of reserve, which threatens us so much, is a band of 7,000 or 8,000 conscripts or invalids, with which they hope to deceive us into abandoning the siege of Genoa. The French count too much on our naivete; they would have us read like the fabled dog who leaves his prey for a mere shadow.’-Correspondence XXXI, 366.