The Disastrous Abbe De Pradt

This new book, not out yet, might be both helpful and interesting:

Polish Eyewitnesses to Napoleon's 1812 Campaign: Advance and Retreat in Russia: Lalowski, Marek Tadeusz, North, Jonathan: 9781526782618: Amazon.com: Books

Napoleon always established a line of communications on campaign, even in Russia. Magazines were established at Vilna, Minsk, Kovno all three of which were large. Vilna had 100,000 rations for forty days, 27,000 muskets, 30,000 pairs of shoes, and other supplies, such as brandy and beer.

Smaller ones were established at Smolensk, Vitebsk, and Orsha. Orsha was the salvation of the army during the retreat. Troops were resupplied, and even artillery pieces were issued to artillery units. Orsha was competently run, not so with some of them. The Intendence was not always efficient and honest and some governors, such as Jomini, were incompetent.

As a bonus, some large Russian supply dumps were captured intact, as the Vienna arsenal had been in 1805 and 1809.

As for Pradt’s complains about the poor situation of the economy of the Duchy of Warsaw, which hampered his activities in the rear of the Napoleon’s army, they seem to be rather exaggerated. 

I would rather agree with Pradt - reading all those numerous eye witness accounts when units were stationed in 1812 as jump point to attack Russia - the comments how poor Poland was are very stricking.

Yes - the megalomania of Nabulieone shines very much through, he failed abysmally to construct functioning magazines in the rear of his army, but it is always fitting for him to blame it on others, how convenient.

Thanks, Sir Tom, very interesting. And agree with you that the 'Polish Question' was nearly insoluble.

From page 179, footnote number 77 in Baron Fain's memoir (Napoleon: How He Did It):

'The priest de Pradt had emigrated; he returned to France in 1801, and thanks to the support of Duroc whose relative he was, he became chaplain of the chapel, then bishop of Poitiers and finally archbishop of Malines. During the council of Paris, Napoleon often detained him at his levees to discuss clergy matters with him. Ambitious and scheming, de Pradt took advantage of this opportunity for increased intimacy. As an agent of the Duke of Rovigo (Savary), he acted as deputy for the bishops who were going to make contact with the Pope at Savona. In 1812 he was nominated by the Duke of Bassano to replace Baron Bignon, but his conduct in Warsaw caused him to be sent back to Paris. From that time on he became a bitter enemy of Napoleon and was one of the first to speak out against him when the Allies were in Paris. He left many writings. In his work entitled L'Europe et l'Amerique en 1821, he defends Napoleon and writes that his earlier appraisal (Histoire de l'ambassade dans le grand-duche de Varsovie) had been wrung from him by anger and discontent.'

'Napoleon had been protrayed as a man-eater, a brutal and ruthless soldier! Nothing could be further from the truth. His bark was worse than his bite: the storm clouds dispersed in a hail, a hurricane of words to which he himself attached no importance the next moment. I have heard him say, following a fierce outburst against one of his relatives: The poor wretch! He makes me say what I do not think and what I would never have meant to say!' A quarter of an hour later, he would call back those he had abruptly dismissed and return to those he had offended: I have had this experience.'-de Pradt. From Baron Fain's Memoirs, page 191.

Tom, thanks! Here de Pradt's presentation:

books.google.de

Best regards, Thomas