I have been reading quite a lot on 1796 in Italy recently as part of looking at Napoleon's intelligence efforts in the Italian campaigns. One theme that keeps coming up is the "stupid Austrians" dividing their troops in the four main efforts to relieve Mantua. I noticed Zack has perpetuated this myth: "This type of plan was typical of Alvinczy, who had not seemed to realise that if he united all of his troops against Napoleon he would have a great numerical advantage – more than enough to defeat him. "
There is actually a good reason why the Austrians divided their troops - the Alpine roads were so bad that they could not take any more troops, so that if all had been on one route, it would have simply meant that Napoleon had to met the head of the column before the rear units could intervene. The other side of the coin then becomes that Napoleon had to know which was the main force. That is where the intelligence effort came in!
Dave are you sure that we talk about the same source? I find also the 2nd volume extremely disappointing regarding Alvintzy, here the book link I supplied provides much more detail.
What made me aware reading some of the correspondence is that the Austrian Army in Italy was in a very bad shape.
Also I fail to comprehend why you had to control the Monte Baldo to ensure a good offensive via the Etsch / Adige valley.
Je parle un petit peu de français
How good is your French?
Thank you for flagging this, David - always happy to stand corrected where there are issues with myths that I have absorbed into the website. Do you have any recommendations in terms of reading, as I look at re-appraising this?
I see now, it is about the relief of Mantua and not the first part of the Italian campaign.
So basically forget my above statement about the Sardinian Army, nonsense in that context.
Still about concentration or lack of concentration, Clausewitz is quite critical about the Austrians in all the 1796 campaign.
I always thought that the terrain was indeed the factor, and not once but at least two more times. The maps for the overall campaign are certainly sufficient to show the geographical--and logistical--restrictions the Austrians faced, and Bonaparte as well, although his forces were smaller and less condensed. But as we know, Austrian sources would explain exactly what Alvinczy was doing, and why. Or even the ability to analyze topo maps properly.
@david.a.hollins You make a good point, that the role of the ground and the reality of logistics are often neglected. This means that inconsistencies have to be explained away, often giving way therefore to myths. It unsurprising though on a number of levels. When the historian’s natural environment is the archive and they have never pressed their belt buckle to the ground, they find it difficult to appreciate the perspective. Until you have walked, ridden or driven the terrain you don’t really gain an insight. Period (and some modern) maps struggle to show factors such as elevation and vegetation density. Anyone who has had to do what used to be called “intelligence preparation of the battlefield” knows how difficult that can be. Modern digitised maps, air photography and satellite imagery and it’s hard enough. Whilst trying to transport you, and the development of the terrain back two centuries perhaps doubly so. We tend to see campaigns and battles as episodic, because in retrospect that’s how they appear. However, the participants do not have the benefit of hindsight and experience it as a continuous stream, at best a cycle of planning and decision making. The limiting factors of communication and logistics often bamboozle serving soldiers, and they are frequently particularly unappealing to the historian (amateur or professional). However, as you point out, they are often the real reasons underpinning the decision making process. Neglect of them results in a gap in understanding to which a myth must be inserted if sense is to be made of it. This is why we need a diverse and multi-disciplinary approach.