Admiration or hyperbole is just a matter of judgement of degree. If you are a fellow admirer, you see a fair assessment. You might even delude yourself into believing it to be a fact rather than an opinion. If you have a more balanced outlook, you see hyperbole. Hyperbole, like beauty, is therefore in the eyes of the beholder.“‘Vive L’Empereur’ that echoes yet across the centuries”Just too hyperbolic and romantic for me, I’m afraid. It sells books though, especially in the US where admiration for Napoleon (if that’s what we are calling his personality cult these days) is more widespread. But that’s probably saying more about me, the dry, soulless, boring empiricist.I think times have moved on from Swords, and that style is less appropriate to the Google Books and Gallica generation. Today I think there is more desire for a more open evidence-analysis-conclusion rather than the older ‘trust me, I’m an expert’ approach of three or four decades ago. Why trust the opinions of an open admirer, when the source material is readily available?No criticism of Elting personally or even Napoleon. As a friend of one and an admirer of the other, of course our opinions are likely to differ. However, I have little brains, but having applied them have to speak as they direct me. That doesn’t mean Swords will be eliminated from my bookshelf, just used carefully and cognisant of the perspective of the author.
When I want to cheer the hero and boo the villain I go to the pantomime. Realpolitik is a much more complex, nuanced and ultimately interesting affair. Human beings are capable of great things but fallible, and when bound together in society then more so. None of us should reasonably expect our nation or national heroes to come out unscathed. To do so is either mendacious or incredibly naive.
Are you suggesting serving France is a good thing, if you are a Pole? If so, I can’t see how all the blood shed in the service of “the greatest man of the century” got them very far. Based on Napoleon’s record of ending up on a rock in the Atlantic, so not really contributing much to the nett cause of an independent Polish homeland. Or perhaps I’m missing the point?
@Jonathan North No, the Russians merely deployed thousands of troops for self-aggrandizement against Turkey and Sweden, the Adriatic and western Europe to further their idea of expansion. And the Russians seldom cared how many they lost. When Peter the Great had St Petersburg built, more Russians died in that effort than in the entire Great Northern War on both sides.
Alexander, and any other Tsar, did not care how many troops were lost in their military misadventures-there were always more Russians. One of their training philosophies was ‘conscript three, beat two to death, train one.’
Napoleon didn’t send anyone to ‘die’ in Santo Domingo (Haiti), he sent them there to recover France’s richest colony. Thousands of British troops also died in the Caribbean. Do you believe that they were sent there ‘to die’?
A war of liberation? For whom? The French were putting down a revolt.
Toussaint’s ‘liberation’ maintained the former slaves as ‘agricultural workers.’ That doesn’t seem to be anything more than a change of title and not practical function.
And Alexander himself at the very least agreed with the coup against his own father and promoted the man in charge of it-Levin Bennigsen. For all intents and purposes, Alexander was, among other perfidious things, a patricide. One of the reasons that he refused to negotiate with Napoleon during the Russian campaign is that he didn't want to end up like his father.
And if you look deeper into Tousaint and his objectives, you'll find that he was no republican and the Haitians were bent on conquering the Spanish half of the island.
It’s all perspective. If you are anti-Russian and pro Napoleon that is. Another perspective would run like this “Well, at least Alexander’s father was a Tsar so he had a right to succeed him. He did not have to seize power in a grubby little coup whilst stabbing his co-conspirators in the back”.
Yes, my point. Not out of a sense of loyalty to an appointed or anointed monarch, from whom they were released, but personal attachment. “Eternal” “homage” “devotion” maybe, but these words all exceed those of mere support or allegiance, indeed they are those we associate with cult-like behaviour. They were not Elbanese so owed him nothing except as his person. It is really remarkable that Napoleon could achieve this, and much more interesting than writing it off as mere loyalty. The sheer magnetism required to command that level of devotion is staggering. It’s not derogative to articulate those powers he undoubtedly had. What is open to debate is how aware he was of them and how much credence he gave them. That for me is the real fascination, not the semantics of the label we give it. History periodically seems to throw up these commanding mesmeric figures, capable of moving not just individuals but whole nations. For good or ill (which is a different debate) that is what I believe Napoleon was.
@david Tomlinson Poles who fought in the Polish Legions in the 1790s could face sanctions ... I have read of such ... from the Austrians. I came across this letter from a Polish officer (Franciszek Żymirski) taken prisoner in Haiti in 1803:
“The undersigned is a native of Poland who, following the most recent partitions of his country, found himself a citizen of Austria. I had only received news that my father had passed away before I was captured by the ship the Snake, and, as eldest in the family, I find it necessary to return at once to settle my father’s affairs otherwise they will be sequestered as they know that I am in the service of a power not entirely on good terms with the House of Austria. I am therefore obliged to ask you, admiral, that in the name of all that is sacred, for permission to depart at the first opportunity for Europe or for Philadelphia so that I might reach France and hand in my resignation."
I am currently working on a book on the Poles in 1812 and a surprising number of generals took up Russian service: Dembiński, Krasiński (Wincenty and Jozef), Zayonchek, etc. Many later took part in the revolt of 1830, but, in those early years after the war, many settled comfortably into Russian service.
We should also note the Lithuanians and Poles (such as Tchaplitz) who served in Russia's armies throughout the Napoleonic period.
Thanks, with the geographical drift of Poland it didn’t occur to me that there was an Austrian component. I don’t thing anyone would think of demonising Austria today off the back of it though.With the romanticising of Napoleon’s relationship with the Duchy, it never occurred to me that Polish patriots would be fighting on both sides. Very instructive, thank you
@david Tomlinson Same applied to the Belgians. The French and the Austrians were constantly (especially before the empire) trying to persuade or force Walloon officers to leave one nation's service for the other's.
Just one more thing on the Poles: the Grand Duchy was originally formed from territory taken from Prussia and Austria, not from Russia. Napoleon evidently viewed it as a bargaining chip in his relationship with Russia. If Russia behaved, the duchy would continue as it was; if Russia misbehaved, Napoleon would stir a bit of Polish patriotism and talk of expansion to exert pressure. I think that says a lot about how Napoleon viewed his foreign auxiliaries.
[Napoleon] could get such service out of his men because he shared (portions of the 1812 campaign excepted) his men's dangers and hardships, riding just behind his advance guard, often taking what fortune might send in the way of food and shelter-a tumble-down farm building with some straw for his bed and rain and wind for company; a few potatoes, roasted in the embers of a campfire and shared with his staff, for supper.
This is utter nonsense, the reality is totally different, Boney stayed as along as possible in Paris, then he was travelling in a coach as often and as long as possible because he could use it as office, riding he had to do as well, as all other military commanders did, though he despised tents for his soldiers he just used those.
A few potatoes, what a laugh, look what kind of field kitchen he was taking into Russia with him.
And no - he would not necessarily ride with the advance guard, look at the Prussian campaign of 1806 for example.
In the Russian retreat he was eating plenty of food while his soldier died miserably around him.
I am not blaming that Boney used good living conditions and ample lodging, as cic he needed it to function and on top of that he had to run a state.
I haven't seen ever a worse description of Boney at a campaign, yes he would share occasionally hardships, and without any doubt he risked his life at battle, but other cic did the same, what is so extraordinary about it? Nothing special, Fredrick the Great did the same, Barclay de Tolly did ride in full parade dress into the battle of Borodino, much more exposed than Boney.
Why did the army follow him - success, especially in the 1805 - 1806 campaign, he swore in and corrupted that Grande Armée on his person, also he allowed plunder and it was an understanding that the soldiers were allowed to do it and they risked their lives for his glory.
A very good book, to describe the reality - as seen by contemporaries is
Coppens, Bernard : L'Aveuglement de Napoléon - Russie 1812,, Les Éditions Jourdan, Bruxelles - Paris, no year of publication.
It should dim to Boney, which apparently it didn't that his victories in the spring campaign, where hollow indeed, why otherwise would he agree to make an armistice?
This idea of a bonne bataille, he so vainly tried to achieve in 1812 - didn't work any longer at all, with the exception of Belle Alliance 1815 for the Allies though.
His only way to prevent Austria to keep out of joining the Alliance would be to make peace and give Austria back those territories he annexed or gave to Bavaria.
He was not any longer in the active driving seat as he was before 1812.
When Austria joint - he wasn't even able to change he geo strategical aims - and his kind of operational art of war, which was top notch in 1805 - 1806 - was not working any longer.
"Boney could have solved the Polish problem, he created it with the formation of the Duchy of Warsaw, in 1809 he could have created a Kingdom of Poland or at the latest in 1812."
That wouldn't have solved the diplomatic problem of Poland. It would have made it worse.
It would have drawn a clear line, creating a big puffer state, sitting right on the borders of Austria, Prussia and Russia - would have been of big geo strategical importance.
Boney could have solved the Polish problem, he created it with the formation of the Duchy of Warsaw, in 1809 he could have created a Kingdom of Poland or at the latest in 1812.
Despite the Poles sacrificed everything for Boney he played double games, when discussing the campaign of 1812 with Caulaincourt, already then he said again and again that he had no intention to create a stronger Poland.
I agree that a strong Poland would have been a big cause for Russia to not come to terms with Boney, which they didn't come to anyway.
Most of the Poles of course did not know about Boney betraying them and therefore still clung to the Boney propaganda - and for that reason they - at least the so called Polish squadron - served still in 1815.
How else would you describe Spaniards forced to become subjects of King Joseph, presumably at the points of the Chevau-leger’s sabres?I think it would be stretching interpretation to breaking point to characterise Spaniards as enthusiastic Napoleon acolytes.I feel that subjugation is a fair description when you install members of your family to thrones through force of arms?
Interesting and thought provoking. What it reveals to me is how nationalism can be subverted to a cult focussing on an individual. Even when that individual's interests run contrary to their nation or cultural sympathies. That a Squadron eventually found it's way to a muddy field in Belgium shows how a charasmatic leader and unit cohesion can work.
Admiration or hyperbole is just a matter of judgement of degree. If you are a fellow admirer, you see a fair assessment. You might even delude yourself into believing it to be a fact rather than an opinion. If you have a more balanced outlook, you see hyperbole. Hyperbole, like beauty, is therefore in the eyes of the beholder.“‘Vive L’Empereur’ that echoes yet across the centuries”Just too hyperbolic and romantic for me, I’m afraid. It sells books though, especially in the US where admiration for Napoleon (if that’s what we are calling his personality cult these days) is more widespread. But that’s probably saying more about me, the dry, soulless, boring empiricist.I think times have moved on from Swords, and that style is less appropriate to the Google Books and Gallica generation. Today I think there is more desire for a more open evidence-analysis-conclusion rather than the older ‘trust me, I’m an expert’ approach of three or four decades ago. Why trust the opinions of an open admirer, when the source material is readily available?No criticism of Elting personally or even Napoleon. As a friend of one and an admirer of the other, of course our opinions are likely to differ. However, I have little brains, but having applied them have to speak as they direct me. That doesn’t mean Swords will be eliminated from my bookshelf, just used carefully and cognisant of the perspective of the author.
Admiration or hyperbole is just a matter of judgement of degree. If you are a fellow admirer, you see a fair assessment. You might even delude yourself into believing it to be a fact rather than an opinion. If you have a more balanced outlook, you see hyperbole. Hyperbole, like beauty, is therefore in the eyes of the beholder. “‘Vive L’Empereur’ that echoes yet across the centuries” Just too hyperbolic and romantic for me, I’m afraid. It sells books though, especially in the US where admiration for Napoleon (if that’s what we are calling his personality cult these days) is more widespread. But that’s probably saying more about me, the dry, soulless, boring empiricist. I think times have moved on from Swords, and that style is less appropriate to the Google Books and Gallica generation. Today I think there is more desire for a more open evidence-analysis-conclusion rather than the older ‘trust me, I’m an expert’ approach of three or four decades ago. Why trust the opinions of an open admirer, when the source material is readily available? No criticism of Elting personally or even Napoleon. As a friend of one and an admirer of the other, of course our opinions are likely to differ. However, I have little brains, but having applied them have to speak as they direct me. That doesn’t mean Swords will be eliminated from my bookshelf, just used carefully and cognisant of the perspective of the author.
Interesting article, pretty strange website.
Absolutely Hans, but some see the issue of the Poles being part of some anti-Russian agenda. I’m merely trying to point out how inappropriate that is.
Are you suggesting serving France is a good thing, if you are a Pole? If so, I can’t see how all the blood shed in the service of “the greatest man of the century” got them very far. Based on Napoleon’s record of ending up on a rock in the Atlantic, so not really contributing much to the nett cause of an independent Polish homeland. Or perhaps I’m missing the point?
Yes, my point. Not out of a sense of loyalty to an appointed or anointed monarch, from whom they were released, but personal attachment. “Eternal” “homage” “devotion” maybe, but these words all exceed those of mere support or allegiance, indeed they are those we associate with cult-like behaviour. They were not Elbanese so owed him nothing except as his person. It is really remarkable that Napoleon could achieve this, and much more interesting than writing it off as mere loyalty. The sheer magnetism required to command that level of devotion is staggering. It’s not derogative to articulate those powers he undoubtedly had. What is open to debate is how aware he was of them and how much credence he gave them. That for me is the real fascination, not the semantics of the label we give it. History periodically seems to throw up these commanding mesmeric figures, capable of moving not just individuals but whole nations. For good or ill (which is a different debate) that is what I believe Napoleon was.
[Napoleon] could get such service out of his men because he shared (portions of the 1812 campaign excepted) his men's dangers and hardships, riding just behind his advance guard, often taking what fortune might send in the way of food and shelter-a tumble-down farm building with some straw for his bed and rain and wind for company; a few potatoes, roasted in the embers of a campfire and shared with his staff, for supper.This is utter nonsense, the reality is totally different, Boney stayed as along as possible in Paris, then he was travelling in a coach as often and as long as possible because he could use it as office, riding he had to do as well, as all other military commanders did, though he despised tents for his soldiers he just used those.
A few potatoes, what a laugh, look what kind of field kitchen he was taking into Russia with him.
And no - he would not necessarily ride with the advance guard, look at the Prussian campaign of 1806 for example.
In the Russian retreat he was eating plenty of food while his soldier died miserably around him.
I am not blaming that Boney used good living conditions and ample lodging, as cic he needed it to function and on top of that he had to run a state.
I haven't seen ever a worse description of Boney at a campaign, yes he would share occasionally hardships, and without any doubt he risked his life at battle, but other cic did the same, what is so extraordinary about it? Nothing special, Fredrick the Great did the same, Barclay de Tolly did ride in full parade dress into the battle of Borodino, much more exposed than Boney.
Why did the army follow him - success, especially in the 1805 - 1806 campaign, he swore in and corrupted that Grande Armée on his person, also he allowed plunder and it was an understanding that the soldiers were allowed to do it and they risked their lives for his glory.
A very good book, to describe the reality - as seen by contemporaries is
Coppens, Bernard : L'Aveuglement de Napoléon - Russie 1812,, Les Éditions Jourdan, Bruxelles - Paris, no year of publication.
It should dim to Boney, which apparently it didn't that his victories in the spring campaign, where hollow indeed, why otherwise would he agree to make an armistice?
This idea of a bonne bataille, he so vainly tried to achieve in 1812 - didn't work any longer at all, with the exception of Belle Alliance 1815 for the Allies though.
His only way to prevent Austria to keep out of joining the Alliance would be to make peace and give Austria back those territories he annexed or gave to Bavaria.
He was not any longer in the active driving seat as he was before 1812.
When Austria joint - he wasn't even able to change he geo strategical aims - and his kind of operational art of war, which was top notch in 1805 - 1806 - was not working any longer.
"Boney could have solved the Polish problem, he created it with the formation of the Duchy of Warsaw, in 1809 he could have created a Kingdom of Poland or at the latest in 1812."
That wouldn't have solved the diplomatic problem of Poland. It would have made it worse.
Boney could have solved the Polish problem, he created it with the formation of the Duchy of Warsaw, in 1809 he could have created a Kingdom of Poland or at the latest in 1812.
Despite the Poles sacrificed everything for Boney he played double games, when discussing the campaign of 1812 with Caulaincourt, already then he said again and again that he had no intention to create a stronger Poland.
I agree that a strong Poland would have been a big cause for Russia to not come to terms with Boney, which they didn't come to anyway.
Most of the Poles of course did not know about Boney betraying them and therefore still clung to the Boney propaganda - and for that reason they - at least the so called Polish squadron - served still in 1815.
Poles might see it differently.
Interesting and thought provoking. What it reveals to me is how nationalism can be subverted to a cult focussing on an individual. Even when that individual's interests run contrary to their nation or cultural sympathies. That a Squadron eventually found it's way to a muddy field in Belgium shows how a charasmatic leader and unit cohesion can work.