-The repulse of Nelson's attack on the Boulogne Flotilla on the night of 15-16 August 1801. This bloody repulse was not the only one inflicted on the Royal Navy by French Admiral Latouche-Treville.
-From 21 February to 21 March 1805 Admiral Missiessy conducts a successful naval campaign in the Caribbean, raiding the islands of Dominica, Nieves, Montserrat, and St Christopher, and resupplied French forces on Guadaloupe, Martinique, and Santo Domingo before successfully returning to France by 30 March.
-Capture of the island redoubt of Le Diamant, off Martinique, on 25 June 1805.
-The defeat and destruction of a British squadron of 4 frigates at the Battle of Grand Port at Ile-de-France on 23 August 1810.
What about the 1794 Atlantic campaign? We Brits focus on the Glorious First of June, but tend to gloss over the fact that the French got their convoy safely home. Question then is whether said convoy did indeed save the Revolution from starvation?
Nobody got any thoughts on what difference the grain convoy's arrival made then? I'd asked it as a genuine question - it's implied that it saved the Revolution from collapse, but that seems like it might be an exaggeration in actual terms, even if the propaganda value might have been more significant.
@Andrew Bamford Apparently the French harvest had failed and there was famine in France. That combined with the chaos of the Revolution, et al, the situation in France regarding food was critical.
The Royal Navy had a tactical success in the actions, but getting the convoy through to France was the mission and it was critical to the Revolution and the French people. Therefore it was a strategic success for the French Navy as the grain convoy made it unharmed into Brest.
Good catch and excellent postings by the way. Well done.
We tend to concentrate on the warfare but gloss over the civilian and commercial effects.
However, one convoy vs a population of approx 28 million? How much material difference would it have made?
I’d want to see the math or I’d write this off as yet another myth peddled by historians.
A good, not great, reference for the action is on pages 211-216 of EH Jenkins' A History of the French Navy. On page 211 it reads 'Villaret's instructions were to avoid a battle unless it were necessary to save the convoy...' As he accomplished that, the French strategic objective was achieved.
Whether or not the entire country was fed by the convoy is irrelevant. Paris was 'resupplied' and that kept that volatile city calm and at least semi-loyal. At that time, that was enough. The French revolutionary governments were unstable and subject to being overthrown. Governmental stability did not 'appear' until after the Brumaire coup and a competent head of state.
No argument that Villaret completed his mission; I'd say that the general consensus on the campaign is British tactical victory on 1 June, but French strategic success in the campaign as a whole (which in turn fits with the pre-Revolution French doctrine of prioritising the mission over battle).
If we're judging whether that success counts as France's 'greatest', as per Zack's question, though, then I'd submit that part of that answer depends on how vital the convoy actually was, and whether getting it safely to Brest was worth the ships and men lost on 1 June. The paper that I linked to above argues that although it helped keep Paris fed the Robespierre regime still fell (but then again, as you say, French Revolutionary governments had a habit of falling anyway), so for me the jury's still out on that one.
I don't have any particular axe to grind on this, I'm just enjoying thinking a bit more critically about something that I hadn't considered before.
@Andrew Bamford "The paper that I linked to above argues that although it helped keep Paris fed the Robespierre regime still fell (but then again, as you say, French Revolutionary governments had a habit of falling anyway), so for me the jury's still out on that one."
Of course, Robespierre wasn't the Revolution (Napoleon was 😁). To say one thing "saved the Revolution" is silly, but feeding Paris was a primary problem (see the armées révolutionnaires). So had the RN stopped the convoy, there would have been more unrest, the effect of which we can't know-could even have made things more radical.
@tomholmberg Point taken, although if it was the Robespierre regime that organised the supply convoy (was it? one wonders how long it took to set something like that up?) then in that specific sense it was a failure for their particular brand of Jacobinism since the extra food didn't prevent their fall even if the Revolutionary government, or at least the Republic, continued for a few more years.
I'm glad you brought it up. It gave me an opportunity to research some naval material on the period. And as I'm rereading the Bolitho series, it makes it entirely relevant.
Transferring Napoleon's army safely to first Malta and then Egypt.
Excellent choice, indeed amazing
-The repulse of Nelson's attack on the Boulogne Flotilla on the night of 15-16 August 1801. This bloody repulse was not the only one inflicted on the Royal Navy by French Admiral Latouche-Treville.
-From 21 February to 21 March 1805 Admiral Missiessy conducts a successful naval campaign in the Caribbean, raiding the islands of Dominica, Nieves, Montserrat, and St Christopher, and resupplied French forces on Guadaloupe, Martinique, and Santo Domingo before successfully returning to France by 30 March.
-Capture of the island redoubt of Le Diamant, off Martinique, on 25 June 1805.
-The defeat and destruction of a British squadron of 4 frigates at the Battle of Grand Port at Ile-de-France on 23 August 1810.
Battle of the Capes and Battle of Cape Henry before that
What about the 1794 Atlantic campaign? We Brits focus on the Glorious First of June, but tend to gloss over the fact that the French got their convoy safely home. Question then is whether said convoy did indeed save the Revolution from starvation?
Nobody got any thoughts on what difference the grain convoy's arrival made then? I'd asked it as a genuine question - it's implied that it saved the Revolution from collapse, but that seems like it might be an exaggeration in actual terms, even if the propaganda value might have been more significant.
@Andrew Bamford Apparently the French harvest had failed and there was famine in France. That combined with the chaos of the Revolution, et al, the situation in France regarding food was critical.
The Royal Navy had a tactical success in the actions, but getting the convoy through to France was the mission and it was critical to the Revolution and the French people. Therefore it was a strategic success for the French Navy as the grain convoy made it unharmed into Brest.
Good catch and excellent postings by the way. Well done.
We tend to concentrate on the warfare but gloss over the civilian and commercial effects. However, one convoy vs a population of approx 28 million? How much material difference would it have made? I’d want to see the math or I’d write this off as yet another myth peddled by historians.
A good, not great, reference for the action is on pages 211-216 of EH Jenkins' A History of the French Navy. On page 211 it reads 'Villaret's instructions were to avoid a battle unless it were necessary to save the convoy...' As he accomplished that, the French strategic objective was achieved.
Whether or not the entire country was fed by the convoy is irrelevant. Paris was 'resupplied' and that kept that volatile city calm and at least semi-loyal. At that time, that was enough. The French revolutionary governments were unstable and subject to being overthrown. Governmental stability did not 'appear' until after the Brumaire coup and a competent head of state.
No argument that Villaret completed his mission; I'd say that the general consensus on the campaign is British tactical victory on 1 June, but French strategic success in the campaign as a whole (which in turn fits with the pre-Revolution French doctrine of prioritising the mission over battle).
If we're judging whether that success counts as France's 'greatest', as per Zack's question, though, then I'd submit that part of that answer depends on how vital the convoy actually was, and whether getting it safely to Brest was worth the ships and men lost on 1 June. The paper that I linked to above argues that although it helped keep Paris fed the Robespierre regime still fell (but then again, as you say, French Revolutionary governments had a habit of falling anyway), so for me the jury's still out on that one.
I don't have any particular axe to grind on this, I'm just enjoying thinking a bit more critically about something that I hadn't considered before.
@Andrew Bamford "The paper that I linked to above argues that although it helped keep Paris fed the Robespierre regime still fell (but then again, as you say, French Revolutionary governments had a habit of falling anyway), so for me the jury's still out on that one."
Of course, Robespierre wasn't the Revolution (Napoleon was 😁). To say one thing "saved the Revolution" is silly, but feeding Paris was a primary problem (see the armées révolutionnaires). So had the RN stopped the convoy, there would have been more unrest, the effect of which we can't know-could even have made things more radical.
@tomholmberg Point taken, although if it was the Robespierre regime that organised the supply convoy (was it? one wonders how long it took to set something like that up?) then in that specific sense it was a failure for their particular brand of Jacobinism since the extra food didn't prevent their fall even if the Revolutionary government, or at least the Republic, continued for a few more years.
I'm glad you brought it up. It gave me an opportunity to research some naval material on the period. And as I'm rereading the Bolitho series, it makes it entirely relevant.