Gribeauval, Jean-Baptiste Vacquette de / Manson, Jacques C. de: Tables Des Constructions Des Principaux Attirails De L'Artillerie, Proposées ou approuvées depuis 1764. jusqu'en 1789, [Paris], [1792]:
Regarding the French horse artillery arm, Gribeauval did not introduce horse artillery because of the ongoing arguments with Vallière over the introduction of the new field artillery system, which Vallière opposed. De Vregilles, after recommending to Gribeauval that a French horse artillery arm should be organized, was told by Gribeauval, ‘You witness the difficulties and enemies which my endeavours to destroy ancient prejudices have raised against me; at a future period we may execute your plan; digest and improve upon it; for the present it would be asking too much.’ Gribeauval did not shut the door on horse artillery, but advised its advocate(s) to be patient and it would come later.
Interestingly, it should be noted that de Vregilles had organized an improvised horse artillery detachment near Wolfenbüttel in 1762 and employed it on an operation. Incidentally, he individually mounted all of his gunners.
Ken Alder's book, which is well-researched, is about the French artillery and small arms manufacturing, hence the title.
And there is little or no indication that Alder, and others, 'have not a lot of ideas what was going on outside of France.
Gribeauval did, however, as he had seen the Prussian artillery arm on a visit to Prussia and had served as an exchange officer with the Austrian artillery and engineers and had fought alongside them against Prussia. Frederick was suitably impressed with Gribeauval's performance in the siege of Schweidnitz that he offered him a Prussian commission, which Gribeauval refused. Indeed, Prussian General Tauenzein who faced Gribeauval at Schweidnitz, referred to the French artilleryman as 'That Devil Gribeauval.'
From De Scheel's Artillery Treatise, page 4:
'Field Artillery was in this situation at the end of the war [referring to the current French artillery of the Valliere System], when Louis XV called Gribeauval from Austria, who, to a perfect knowledge in the art of Artillery, joined the most complete experience in the alterations which had been made by the Austrians and Prussians, since he had commanded that of the former during several campaigns, and had always that of the latter to oppose.'
Howard Rosen in his 'The Systeme Gribeauval' succinctly states that, regarding Gribeauval at the end of the Seven Years' War, 'no one else in France had a more thorough knowledge of recent German advances.'
Gribeauval had been sent to Berlin in 1752, had met Frederick, and he was dispatched to Prussia as he was 'chosen to examine and evaluate the newly reformed Prussian artillery. As a result of this unique assignment, Gribeauval acquired a detailed, first-hand knowledge of the Prussian artillery...'-Rosen, 20.
The Gribeauval artillery system 'was the key technical-military development in the period immediately following the Seven Years' War.'-Rosen, 16.
Rosen's work is also very well-researched, including archival work. What is clearly demonstrated is that Gribeauval developed an artillery system that in technical development, manufacturing, training, organization, education, and tactical development was the best in Europe. And only the British finally produced gun carriages, limbers, and caissons that were superior in design to those of Gribeauval and they came about thirty years after the Gribeauval System was introduced. Those vehicles were greatly admired by the French in Spain and Portugal, and when the Valee System finally replaced the Gribeauval System ca 1827, the inspiration for the new French gun carriages, limbers, and caissons were those of the British Royal Artillery. The American artillery arm was also influenced directly by the British artillery vehicles, as they had been by the Gribeauval System, and the US Army adopted the new designs which were proven in combat in the Mexican War and the US Civil War.
Oh, I really cannot be bothered to do this yet again. A good thread on TMP from 2007 http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=127151 dismantles the nonsense in Alder, another one of these authors trying to justify his conclusions by mangling the facts. There are several TMP threads that cover this ground.
To save anyone the time of going over this however. I will just point out a key logic failure above. If the French are capable of such precision engineering that they can produce a consistent windage, then that requires a consistency of production of the barrel and the ball. Yet we are told that (from de Coudray in 1773) the production was so poor that rings had to be used to check whether the ball was even spherical.
If anyone thinks Gribeauval’s carriage was a new design, there is a photo of an Austrian 1743 3pdr in the same shape in NV72. It was published nearly 20 years ago.
Alder’s claims are just the sort of nonsense that has clouded this subject for 200 years.
‘Having halved the weight of the cannon, artillerists now also had to reckon with a doubled recoil velocity. To the extent that the carriages were now more mobile (with bigger wheel diameters, etc.), this increased the distance they recoiled and the amount of time it took to run them back into firing position, and hence decreased the rate of fire. The Gribeauvalists reduced this recoil velocity by designing the sides of the carriage to slope more steeply, sending the recoil force into the earth…’-Engineering the Revolution by Ken Alser, 154.
Tables of Construction:
The production drawings for the Tables of Construction were finished by 1767. They were not published prior to 1792 because it was allowed that changes and improvements to them might be needed and could be accomplished. All of the drawings were supplied to the arsenals which would manufacture the artillery vehicles and gun carriages. ‘By 1770 some 3,300 new carriages and caissons had been assembled…’-see Engineering the Revolution by Ken Alder, 160.
Cylinders and Pass Balls:
‘To verify the caliber of cannon balls, use is made of brass cylinders, five times the shot’s caliber in length, and from 0.532 to 0.799 inch in thickness according to their calibers. The diameter of these cylinders for twenty-four and sixteen pound shot is 0.132 less then the diameter of the bore of twenty-four and sixteen pounders, and only 0.88 inch less for the twelve, eight and four pound shot. These dimensions are the same in the whole length, except at the extremities of the cylinder, where a rim, or round mass of metal, is made, exceeding its thickness about one inch, and projecting outwards.’
‘Through these cylinders the balls are made to pass, after their measurement has been taken with two rings or pass-balls, either of brass or tempered steel, 0.066 inch thick. The inner circumferences and proportions of these rings should be exact.’
‘The rings or pass-balls are presented to the two opposed diameters of the balls, in order to ascertain that their form is spheric, and not a spheroid: the ball should pass through the largest ring…The ball should enter one diameter, but not pass through the small ring…The difference between the diameters of the two rings is about 0.07inch.’
‘Formerly these pass-balls were the only verification of cannon balls, but their insufficiency is obvious; for it may either happen that the ball has a protuberance, or is of an oval configuration: these two defects might pass unobserved in the use of the pass-ball, in consequence of which the proof through the cylinders has been added.’-Louis de Tousard, American Artillerist’s Companion, Volume I, 353-354.
Go/No Go Gauges:
These gauges are named as ‘pass-balls’ in Tousard’s artillery manual. In Ken Alder’s Engineering the Revolution, they are referred to as ‘Go, No-Go Gauges for Cannonballs.’
‘To minimize these disputes, the Gribeauvalists developed instruments and practices to substantiate the idealized pictures of their Tables of Construction. Take for instance their methods of gauging cannonballs. European artillerists had long passed their cannonballs through a circular ‘go’ gauge (a lunette) to make sure the shell would fit into the barrel. This left the lower threshold for the size of the ball undefined, and hence dependent on the judgment-the ‘eye’- of the cannoneer. At the prompting of Choiseul, the Gribeauvalists now introduced a ‘no-go’ gauge with a diameter 9 points less than that of the lunette. Acceptable balls should not be able to pass through this gauge. Applied in tandem with the ‘go’ gauge, this defined a zone within which the manufacturers had to operate.’-150-151. There is an illustration of both lunettes on page 151 of ‘go’ and ‘no-go’ gauges for a Gribeauval 8-pounder which are in the Musee de l’Armee. The two gauges were manufactured in the Atelier de Precision.
Manufacturing Tolerances:
The manufacturing tolerances for the Gribeauval System were very strict. The bywords for the manufacturing tolerances in the arsenals were ‘precision, solidity, uniformity’ (Alder, 153), and examples of exacting tolerances were the precision of Gribeauval’s etoile mobile, a precision instrument used to measure the interior diameter of the bore of a gun tube to within 0.025 millimeters; and reducing the windage (the distance between the roundshot and the sides of the bore) to within 1/12th of an inch-Alder, page 150. All of the detailed measurements can be found in Volumes I and II of Tousard.
Caliber:
The weights and measures differed by country. There is an excellent table of weights and measures in Tousard’s American artillerist’s Companion, Volume I, Chapter XIII, pages 116-126.
The measure of a pound differed by country and by actual weight. An English pound, a French pound, and an Austrian pound, as examples, do not weigh the same. For example, and taking the English pound as the ‘standard’ the French pound weighs more and the Austrian pound weighs less. Therefore, a French 4-pounder approaches five English pounds, and the 8-pounder is nearly 9 English pounds. Comparing the 6-pounder caliber, the French 6-pounder approaches 7 English pounds and the Austrian 6-pounder weighs less than 6 English pounds. These differences should be taken into account when comparing gun calibers of the different nations.
Iron work:
Iron reinforcement on gun carriages and other artillery vehicles was not new with the Gribeauval System. The System of 1732, Vallieres, certainly used it as did the artillery of other nations.
Mobility:
‘Iron axle-trees and brass boxes placed in the naves of the wheels of the Field Carriages, cause them to go more freely by diminishing the friction, and render them besides much more convenient for using spare axle-trees. To reduce the little friction which takes place betwixt iron and brass, a composition of suet and oil is used, and no tar is necessary; for, after a few hours, tar serves to increase, rather than diminish the friction, which is owing to its resinous parts remaining, after its oily and liquid parts are run off.’-Henri Othon De Scheel, De Scheel’s Treatise on Artillery, translated by Jonathan Williams, 17-18.
Encastrement:
This was the process where the Gribeauval 8- and 12-pounder field pieces changed the gun tubes on the carriages from the travelling trunnion plates to the firing trunnion plates, the gun carriages of both calibers having two sets of trunnion plates each.
The process was done after the pieces were moved into position and while still attached to the limber. It took no longer than it did to either limber or unlimber the piece. The exercise was entitled the 'Maneuver for changing the Trunnion Plates.'-Tousard, Volume II, 97-100.
The Gribeauval 8-pounder field piece:
This excellent field piece was the favorite, according to General Ruty, of the French horse artillery arm. When it was replaced in most units by the AN XI 6-pounder, it was found that the 8-pounder was superior to the new 6-pounder.
Further, France had no light or field artillery system until Gribeauval developed one, and the gun tubes, vehicles, and ancillary equipment was all new and designed purposely for a war of maneuver.
And the new artillery system was completely integrated as already demonstrated. Gribeauval did not do two things-he made no allowance for a horse artillery arm and he did not militarize the artillery train. The latter was done by Napoleon, and when Gribeauval was asked by a colleague why no horse artillery, Gribeauval replied that it would come later, as they were in the middle of a major artillery system dispute with Valliere fils.
The Gribeauval System was designed precisely for a war of maneuver. Gribeauval's emphasis was on field artillery, what was commonly referred to as 'the three calibers.'
The Austrian Leichtenstein System was about ten years older than the Gribeauval System, had the old carriage design of almost straight trails, copied the Prussian elevation system, and while an excellent artillery system, it was not as advanced as Gribeauval's.
Allix wrote his treatise in 1827 as the Gribeauval System was being replaced by the new Valee artillery System.
The straight trail was the the new design - Gribeauval’s three angle short trail can be seen on Austrian guns of the 1740s. You have no evidence for Gribeauval’s guns being designed “for a war of manoeuvre” - what you can claim he imagined in his 1762 report was simply something you made up after not reading the report.
Everyone, including the YrXI, went for the 6pdr after Lichtenstein - except Gribeauval, whose 4pdr was a pop gun and 8pdr was so heavy that it required the double position. All Gribeauval did was to take Maritz’s barrels and shave down the existing carriages to strap them as Lichtenstein did. His howitzer was so poor that as Chartrand notes, French gunners begged N for Austrian and Prussian pieces. There were 25 wheel sizes in Gribeauval’s artillery - how is that standardisation. He did not invent the bricole and neither did he introduce go/no go rings. It is all second hand nonsense and assertion.
I have no problems to call Gribeauval's system, I am however not interested in the opinion of Chartrand but of Allix - or Marmont, French artillery officers in those articles I above mentioned or indeed Nabulieone's.
Gribeauval's system was on its way out - and should have been re placed by the system an 11 which was better in many aspects, one just has to read the findings of the committee.
The best, the genius, Gribeauval's system was solid, it provided the French Revolutionary armies with a good workhorse but it was not up to the new art of war.
The Systeme AN XI was never fully implemented. The only pieces of Ordnance produced in any numbers were the new 6-pounder field piece and the 5.5-inch howitzer. The new system augmented, instead of replaced, the Gribeauval System.
In 1809, the artillery in Davout's large command was mostly from the Gribeauval System. That of the two newly organized corps, the II and IV, (Massena and Oudinot, respectively) were issued the new ordnance. The numbers can be found in Saski's book on the campaign, Volume I.
Regarding the Systeme AN XI, Persy is quite succinct as to the outcome: 'With very few exceptions, all the innovations prescribed by the decree of the year XI, and those which came after it were abrogated, and the system of Gribeauval, exhibited in detail in the tables of construction, rigorously restored.
Rene Chartrand did excellent work on the French artillery of the period in his two Ospreys Napoleon's Guns 1792-1815 (1) and (2). He outlines the problems with the AN XI gun carriages in Volume I and makes the following credible statement regarding the Gribeauval System.
He states that 'On the basis of Gribeauval's report and the minutes of the Strasbourg trials, a royal order for the instroduction of the new system was drafter by the Ministry of War in 1765, approved by Choiseul, and finally by the King in council on 13 August...The royal order introducing the Gribeauval System went into effect from 15 October 1765.'-6-7 of Volume I. This identifies the new Gribeauval System as an actual system.
Further, Chartrand also states on page 3 of the volume that 'After a long series of political battles, France had adopted the innovative system of artillery drawn up and introduced by Gribeauval. The young Napoleon was therefore fortunate to become an officer within a few years of the adoption by the French Army of what was arguably the best artillery system in Europe at the time.'
“On the basis of Gribeauval‘s report” - how many times? This is a report on the Austrian artillery with some references to Valliere.
The Strasbourg trials - the Appendix in your own book - only tested new barrels and Gribeauval himself wanted the 16calibres length of Lichtenstein.
This is not a system.
The US Navy has just built the USS Zumwalt - technologically far ahead of anything else, but they do not have budget to build lots of them. Napoleon needed his cash for other things and when it came to equipping the GA, he went mostly for YrXI and captured pieces. The Gribeauval guns went to the secondary theatre of Spain. N was an artilleryman by training.
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9767741p.texteImage it refers to Griebeauval many times, but the first letter to talk about any reform seems to date from 1767 and later ones go up to 1772. So, where is the basic plan for the project? Where is the horse artillery for this “new mobile artillery”?
I don't see it so negative, it was a great reform and provided for the French artillery a solid working material, still it was designed for warfare of the Ancien Regime and suitable for that, later its deficiencies became apparent, not without any reasons the planned reforms of an 11.
@Hans - Karl Weiß The French reform period was, in part, a result of the poor performance of the French Army, particularly the artillery, in the Seven Years' War. It was also a partial response to the humiliation the Prussians gave to the French Army at Rossbach. And the French reform period lasted, with fits and starts, from 1763-1789.
The Gribeauval System 'was the first effective response to the new operational requirements and opportunities for the artillery which these changes in military tactics presented. As armies acquired the ability to move more quickly, the war of position gave way to a war of movement. Mobility became the chief tactical concern and a more aggressive attitude shifted military thought from the prevention of defeat to the achievement of victory. With the renewed quest for decisive victory, combat, which once might have been judiciouslyh avoided, was now eagerly sought. A slow moving, heavy artillery had no place in this new style of war...The organizational and technical elements of this new system were the thorough expression of this underlying tactical concept...It thus represented a commitment to a new kind of war, one which the old regime had never fought.'-Howard Rosen, The Systeme Gribeauval, 103-104.
The French were not preparing for the last war, but the next one. And in the excellent French artillery schools, future French artillery officers were not only technically trained, but they were trained tactically-training which emphasized infantry/artillery cooperation.
'Duteil envisioned a new sort of training for a new kind of war that had no fixed rules. Artillerists now needed to learn the principles which they could use in a nearly infinite variety of circumstances. Combat was considered a dynamic context in which there were decisive moments and places. Artillery force was to be concentrated at a decisive point of attack and at the decisive moment...Napoleonic tactics did not differ substantially from those of Duteil, his teacher. These were also the tactical perspectives upon which the systeme Gribeauval was based...This translation of technological potential into effective military force was a complicated process in which the systeme Gribeauval played a major part.'-Rosen, 123-124.
I miss quite a lot of works in the provided references by Kevin Kiley, he is not listing those who deal very critical with the so called Gribeauval system, which we have to see in context of the French experience of the 7YW.
Système d'artillerie de campagne du lieutenant-général Allix, comparé avec les systèmes du comité d'artillerie de France, de Gribeauval, et de l'an XI. Anselin et Pochard, Paris 1827
Source: Anonymous, “Observations sur les changemens qu’il paraîtrait utile d’apporter au matériel et au personnel de l’artillerie”, in ‘Le Spectateur Militaire’, Tome troisième (Paris 1827) pp. 129-159.
Warin
Mobilité du Matériele d'Artillerie pendant des Guerres de la Révolution et de l'Empire in Revue d'Artillerie, Tome 53 Octobre 1898 – Mars 1899pp 498 – 518
Toussard again but no
Gribeauval, Jean-Baptiste Vacquette de / Manson, Jacques C. de: Tables Des Constructions Des Principaux Attirails De L'Artillerie, Proposées ou approuvées depuis 1764. jusqu'en 1789, [Paris], [1792]:
3 volumes
the series of articles by Paul Dawson of Napoleon series org
Conclusive evidence that clearly demonstrates that the Gribeauval System of artillery was indeed a 'system.'
‘Such was the state of things, when M. Gribeauval, surveying with the eye of a man of genius, all the branches of the Artillery, undertook to remodel the system fulfilling the conditions of lightness, solidity, uniformity and simplicity. The first condition, that of lightness, which was the main object, especially in relation to field Artillery, required that the limit should be fixed at effects really indispensable; and with this view, experiments commenced at Strasbourg, in 1764, at first with guns of 12, 8 and 4lbs. caliber, chosen to constitute the field Artillery. The result was that these guns, reduced to a total length of 18 times their caliber and the quantity of metal to 150 times the weight of ball, which made them considerably lighter; had the required range and sufficient solidity.’-Persy, 15.
System: ‘Specific Rules and Regulations for the government of an army in the field, or in quarters, &c.’…’Of uniformity untroduced in the French artillery.’-Tousard, Volume II, 658.
‘A system of uniformity was at length determined on by a regulation of the Duke de Choiseul, in the year 1765m at the recommendation of M. de Gribeauval, which has raised the French artillery to the utmost state of perfection.’-Tousard, Volume II, xiv.
‘The author of the new system of artillery, Gribeauval…’-Jean du Teil.
‘Often obscured by the large number of changes it introduced, was the fact that the systeme Gribeauval was a genuine system, a thoroughly integrated blend of organizational principles, tactical ideas, and technology. Gribeauval conceived of the artillery as a system in which every part was designed to functional relation to the whole. Men and material were both viewed instrumentally, as elements of this system. From the details of equipment to its social organization, every aspect of the systeme Gribeauval was designed to achieve a specific purpose: to create an artillery force with sufficient mobility to participate actively in offensive field operations.-Rosen, 30-31.
‘The most significant innovation one sees in the systeme Gribeauval was that it was indeed a system: a thorough synthesis of organization, technology, material and tactics. Every aspect of the system, from the harnessing of the horses to the selection and organization of personnel, embodied a single functional concept. Utility was its principle, mobility was its goal. Every element of the systeme Gribeauval was designed to function in a particular way, in a particular circumstance. Men and technology were considered functional elements in a total system. The date, 1776, of the final official acceptance of the systeme Gribeauval, marked an important stage in the development of modern military institutions, as well as in the social relations of technology. Form followed function in the organization of the systeme Gribeauval. From the overall structure to its specific details, the design of social aspects of the new system embodied the principles of utility, efficiency, and precision…-Rosen 48-49.
‘Gribeauval’s cannon was only one element in an elaborate techno-science system intended to increase the mobility of firepower.’-Alder 43.
References:
-Elementary Treatise on the Forms of Cannon & Various Systems of Artillery Translated for the use of the Cadets of the US Military Academy by Professor N Persy of Metz, 1832.
-De Scheel’s Treatise on Artillery, Translated by Jonathan Williams, 1800, edited by Donald Graves. The US translation of DeScheel’s work for the US Army.
-De Scheel, Otto von, Mémoires d’Artillerie Contenant l’Artillerie Nouvelle ou les Changemens fait dans Artillerie Françoise en 1765, Paris 1795.
-American Artillerist’s Companion, 3 Volumes, by Louis de Tousard, 1809.
- Du Teil, Chevalier Jean, De l’Usage de l’Artillerie Nouvelle dans la Guerre de Campagne, Marchal Librarie, Metz, 1778.
- Du Teil, Jean, The New Use of Artillery in Field Wars: Necessary Knowledge, The Nafziger Collection, n.p., 2003. A translation of the original work.
-Reglement concernant les Fontes et les Constructions de l’Artillerie de France, Volumes II and III, by Jean Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval and Jacques-Charles de Manson, 1792. These two volumes are the Tables of Construction, less the plates, which clearly demonstrate that the Gribeauval System was indeed an artillery system.
-Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815 by Ken Alder.
-The Systeme Gribeauval: A Study of Technological Development and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century France by Howard Rosen.
People misrepresenting what actually happened is not "conclusive proof". These are the same sources that claim the 1762 report was the blueprint and have such limited French that they cannot even read the title of the 1792 collection of drawings. Where is the plan or some statement of the logic behind this system - whose changes occur over 25 years and many were not even introduced when Gribeauval had authority over the subject.
The 1764 Strasburg tests - as you say in your own book - were at the instigation of Maritz and only concerned the barrels. Gribeauval is only mentioned once in that report. Aside from Du Teil - and can we have the original French citation, because so many of these translations have turned out to be wrong - all the other quotes are from later authors, who think that a collection of drawings from 1792 somehow represents a system supposedly devised in 176... something. I am sure you grasp that " Proposées ou approuvées" means proposed or approved - so where is the basic plan, especially when the carriages are still in the previous style, albeit shavd down and strengthened a la Lichtenstein.
‘Such was the state of things, when M. Gribeauval, surveying with the eye of a man of genius, all the branches of the Artillery, undertook to remodel the system fulfilling the conditions of lightness, solidity, uniformity and simplicity. The first condition, that of lightness, which was the main object, especially in relation to field Artillery, required that the limit should be fixed at effects really indispensable; and with this view, experiments commenced at Strasbourg, in 1764, at first with guns of 12, 8 and 4lbs. caliber, chosen to constitute the field Artillery. The result was that these guns, reduced to a total length of 18 times their caliber and the quantity of metal to 150 times the weight of ball, which made them considerably lighter; had the required range and sufficient solidity.’-Persy, 15.
Pery obviously didn't know the Liechtenstein system, and again we have another" genius" here Gribeauval.
There is a copy in the British Library, but the most interesting thing is that contrary to various claims (including the re ent Adye thread) this was a collection of state of the artillery in 1789 after various changes over the previous 25 years. When you consider that the claim of a 1762 blueprint turned out to be a report on the Austrian artillery with some refs to the Valliere French guns, it should be obvious that there was no Gribeauval “system”. Still, why do some research when secondary claims will do?
Regarding the French horse artillery arm, Gribeauval did not introduce horse artillery because of the ongoing arguments with Vallière over the introduction of the new field artillery system, which Vallière opposed. De Vregilles, after recommending to Gribeauval that a French horse artillery arm should be organized, was told by Gribeauval, ‘You witness the difficulties and enemies which my endeavours to destroy ancient prejudices have raised against me; at a future period we may execute your plan; digest and improve upon it; for the present it would be asking too much.’ Gribeauval did not shut the door on horse artillery, but advised its advocate(s) to be patient and it would come later.
Interestingly, it should be noted that de Vregilles had organized an improvised horse artillery detachment near Wolfenbüttel in 1762 and employed it on an operation. Incidentally, he individually mounted all of his gunners.
I whole heartily agree, the problems with a lot of authors - like Alder - they have not a lot of ideas what was going on outside of France.
Oh, I really cannot be bothered to do this yet again. A good thread on TMP from 2007 http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=127151 dismantles the nonsense in Alder, another one of these authors trying to justify his conclusions by mangling the facts. There are several TMP threads that cover this ground.
To save anyone the time of going over this however. I will just point out a key logic failure above. If the French are capable of such precision engineering that they can produce a consistent windage, then that requires a consistency of production of the barrel and the ball. Yet we are told that (from de Coudray in 1773) the production was so poor that rings had to be used to check whether the ball was even spherical.
If anyone thinks Gribeauval’s carriage was a new design, there is a photo of an Austrian 1743 3pdr in the same shape in NV72. It was published nearly 20 years ago.
Alder’s claims are just the sort of nonsense that has clouded this subject for 200 years.
Some Gribeauval Artillery System Improvements
Trails and Cheeks:
‘Having halved the weight of the cannon, artillerists now also had to reckon with a doubled recoil velocity. To the extent that the carriages were now more mobile (with bigger wheel diameters, etc.), this increased the distance they recoiled and the amount of time it took to run them back into firing position, and hence decreased the rate of fire. The Gribeauvalists reduced this recoil velocity by designing the sides of the carriage to slope more steeply, sending the recoil force into the earth…’-Engineering the Revolution by Ken Alser, 154.
Tables of Construction:
The production drawings for the Tables of Construction were finished by 1767. They were not published prior to 1792 because it was allowed that changes and improvements to them might be needed and could be accomplished. All of the drawings were supplied to the arsenals which would manufacture the artillery vehicles and gun carriages. ‘By 1770 some 3,300 new carriages and caissons had been assembled…’-see Engineering the Revolution by Ken Alder, 160.
Cylinders and Pass Balls:
‘To verify the caliber of cannon balls, use is made of brass cylinders, five times the shot’s caliber in length, and from 0.532 to 0.799 inch in thickness according to their calibers. The diameter of these cylinders for twenty-four and sixteen pound shot is 0.132 less then the diameter of the bore of twenty-four and sixteen pounders, and only 0.88 inch less for the twelve, eight and four pound shot. These dimensions are the same in the whole length, except at the extremities of the cylinder, where a rim, or round mass of metal, is made, exceeding its thickness about one inch, and projecting outwards.’
‘Through these cylinders the balls are made to pass, after their measurement has been taken with two rings or pass-balls, either of brass or tempered steel, 0.066 inch thick. The inner circumferences and proportions of these rings should be exact.’
‘The rings or pass-balls are presented to the two opposed diameters of the balls, in order to ascertain that their form is spheric, and not a spheroid: the ball should pass through the largest ring…The ball should enter one diameter, but not pass through the small ring…The difference between the diameters of the two rings is about 0.07inch.’
‘Formerly these pass-balls were the only verification of cannon balls, but their insufficiency is obvious; for it may either happen that the ball has a protuberance, or is of an oval configuration: these two defects might pass unobserved in the use of the pass-ball, in consequence of which the proof through the cylinders has been added.’-Louis de Tousard, American Artillerist’s Companion, Volume I, 353-354.
Go/No Go Gauges:
These gauges are named as ‘pass-balls’ in Tousard’s artillery manual. In Ken Alder’s Engineering the Revolution, they are referred to as ‘Go, No-Go Gauges for Cannonballs.’
‘To minimize these disputes, the Gribeauvalists developed instruments and practices to substantiate the idealized pictures of their Tables of Construction. Take for instance their methods of gauging cannonballs. European artillerists had long passed their cannonballs through a circular ‘go’ gauge (a lunette) to make sure the shell would fit into the barrel. This left the lower threshold for the size of the ball undefined, and hence dependent on the judgment-the ‘eye’- of the cannoneer. At the prompting of Choiseul, the Gribeauvalists now introduced a ‘no-go’ gauge with a diameter 9 points less than that of the lunette. Acceptable balls should not be able to pass through this gauge. Applied in tandem with the ‘go’ gauge, this defined a zone within which the manufacturers had to operate.’-150-151. There is an illustration of both lunettes on page 151 of ‘go’ and ‘no-go’ gauges for a Gribeauval 8-pounder which are in the Musee de l’Armee. The two gauges were manufactured in the Atelier de Precision.
Manufacturing Tolerances:
The manufacturing tolerances for the Gribeauval System were very strict. The bywords for the manufacturing tolerances in the arsenals were ‘precision, solidity, uniformity’ (Alder, 153), and examples of exacting tolerances were the precision of Gribeauval’s etoile mobile, a precision instrument used to measure the interior diameter of the bore of a gun tube to within 0.025 millimeters; and reducing the windage (the distance between the roundshot and the sides of the bore) to within 1/12th of an inch-Alder, page 150. All of the detailed measurements can be found in Volumes I and II of Tousard.
Caliber:
The weights and measures differed by country. There is an excellent table of weights and measures in Tousard’s American artillerist’s Companion, Volume I, Chapter XIII, pages 116-126.
The measure of a pound differed by country and by actual weight. An English pound, a French pound, and an Austrian pound, as examples, do not weigh the same. For example, and taking the English pound as the ‘standard’ the French pound weighs more and the Austrian pound weighs less. Therefore, a French 4-pounder approaches five English pounds, and the 8-pounder is nearly 9 English pounds. Comparing the 6-pounder caliber, the French 6-pounder approaches 7 English pounds and the Austrian 6-pounder weighs less than 6 English pounds. These differences should be taken into account when comparing gun calibers of the different nations.
Iron work:
Iron reinforcement on gun carriages and other artillery vehicles was not new with the Gribeauval System. The System of 1732, Vallieres, certainly used it as did the artillery of other nations.
Mobility:
‘Iron axle-trees and brass boxes placed in the naves of the wheels of the Field Carriages, cause them to go more freely by diminishing the friction, and render them besides much more convenient for using spare axle-trees. To reduce the little friction which takes place betwixt iron and brass, a composition of suet and oil is used, and no tar is necessary; for, after a few hours, tar serves to increase, rather than diminish the friction, which is owing to its resinous parts remaining, after its oily and liquid parts are run off.’-Henri Othon De Scheel, De Scheel’s Treatise on Artillery, translated by Jonathan Williams, 17-18.
Encastrement:
This was the process where the Gribeauval 8- and 12-pounder field pieces changed the gun tubes on the carriages from the travelling trunnion plates to the firing trunnion plates, the gun carriages of both calibers having two sets of trunnion plates each.
The process was done after the pieces were moved into position and while still attached to the limber. It took no longer than it did to either limber or unlimber the piece. The exercise was entitled the 'Maneuver for changing the Trunnion Plates.'-Tousard, Volume II, 97-100.
The Gribeauval 8-pounder field piece:
This excellent field piece was the favorite, according to General Ruty, of the French horse artillery arm. When it was replaced in most units by the AN XI 6-pounder, it was found that the 8-pounder was superior to the new 6-pounder.
Further, France had no light or field artillery system until Gribeauval developed one, and the gun tubes, vehicles, and ancillary equipment was all new and designed purposely for a war of maneuver.
And the new artillery system was completely integrated as already demonstrated. Gribeauval did not do two things-he made no allowance for a horse artillery arm and he did not militarize the artillery train. The latter was done by Napoleon, and when Gribeauval was asked by a colleague why no horse artillery, Gribeauval replied that it would come later, as they were in the middle of a major artillery system dispute with Valliere fils.
The Gribeauval System was designed precisely for a war of maneuver. Gribeauval's emphasis was on field artillery, what was commonly referred to as 'the three calibers.'
The Austrian Leichtenstein System was about ten years older than the Gribeauval System, had the old carriage design of almost straight trails, copied the Prussian elevation system, and while an excellent artillery system, it was not as advanced as Gribeauval's.
Allix wrote his treatise in 1827 as the Gribeauval System was being replaced by the new Valee artillery System.
I have no problems to call Gribeauval's system, I am however not interested in the opinion of Chartrand but of Allix - or Marmont, French artillery officers in those articles I above mentioned or indeed Nabulieone's.
Gribeauval's system was on its way out - and should have been re placed by the system an 11 which was better in many aspects, one just has to read the findings of the committee.
The best, the genius, Gribeauval's system was solid, it provided the French Revolutionary armies with a good workhorse but it was not up to the new art of war.
But end of story from my side - otherwise
scourge of repetition again.
The Systeme AN XI was never fully implemented. The only pieces of Ordnance produced in any numbers were the new 6-pounder field piece and the 5.5-inch howitzer. The new system augmented, instead of replaced, the Gribeauval System.
In 1809, the artillery in Davout's large command was mostly from the Gribeauval System. That of the two newly organized corps, the II and IV, (Massena and Oudinot, respectively) were issued the new ordnance. The numbers can be found in Saski's book on the campaign, Volume I.
Regarding the Systeme AN XI, Persy is quite succinct as to the outcome: 'With very few exceptions, all the innovations prescribed by the decree of the year XI, and those which came after it were abrogated, and the system of Gribeauval, exhibited in detail in the tables of construction, rigorously restored.
Rene Chartrand did excellent work on the French artillery of the period in his two Ospreys Napoleon's Guns 1792-1815 (1) and (2). He outlines the problems with the AN XI gun carriages in Volume I and makes the following credible statement regarding the Gribeauval System.
He states that 'On the basis of Gribeauval's report and the minutes of the Strasbourg trials, a royal order for the instroduction of the new system was drafter by the Ministry of War in 1765, approved by Choiseul, and finally by the King in council on 13 August...The royal order introducing the Gribeauval System went into effect from 15 October 1765.'-6-7 of Volume I. This identifies the new Gribeauval System as an actual system.
Further, Chartrand also states on page 3 of the volume that 'After a long series of political battles, France had adopted the innovative system of artillery drawn up and introduced by Gribeauval. The young Napoleon was therefore fortunate to become an officer within a few years of the adoption by the French Army of what was arguably the best artillery system in Europe at the time.'
a quite interesting article also
Liechtenstein and Gribeauval: ‘Artillery Revolution’ in Political and Cultural Context
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1191/0968344503wh277oa
Looking on Gallica, I found this from 1775
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9767741p.texteImage it refers to Griebeauval many times, but the first letter to talk about any reform seems to date from 1767 and later ones go up to 1772. So, where is the basic plan for the project? Where is the horse artillery for this “new mobile artillery”?
I miss quite a lot of works in the provided references by Kevin Kiley, he is not listing those who deal very critical with the so called Gribeauval system, which we have to see in context of the French experience of the 7YW.
Système d'artillerie de campagne du lieutenant-général Allix, comparé avec les systèmes du comité d'artillerie de France, de Gribeauval, et de l'an XI. Anselin et Pochard, Paris 1827
Source: Anonymous, “Observations sur les changemens qu’il paraîtrait utile d’apporter au matériel et au personnel de l’artillerie”, in ‘Le Spectateur Militaire’, Tome troisième (Paris 1827) pp. 129-159.
Warin
Mobilité du Matériele d'Artillerie pendant des Guerres de la Révolution et de l'Empire in Revue d'Artillerie, Tome 53 Octobre 1898 – Mars 1899 pp 498 – 518
Toussard again but no
Gribeauval, Jean-Baptiste Vacquette de / Manson, Jacques C. de: Tables Des Constructions Des Principaux Attirails De L'Artillerie, Proposées ou approuvées depuis 1764. jusqu'en 1789, [Paris], [1792]:
3 volumes
the series of articles by Paul Dawson of Napoleon series org
The Artillery of System An XI By Paul Dawson
The Artillery of System An XI By Paul Dawson
The Artillery of System An XI
The Findings of the 1801 Committee on Artillery
By Paul Dawson
and the numerous articles in the Smoothbore Ordonnance Journal
otherwise scourge of repetition.
Conclusive evidence that clearly demonstrates that the Gribeauval System of artillery was indeed a 'system.'
‘Such was the state of things, when M. Gribeauval, surveying with the eye of a man of genius, all the branches of the Artillery, undertook to remodel the system fulfilling the conditions of lightness, solidity, uniformity and simplicity. The first condition, that of lightness, which was the main object, especially in relation to field Artillery, required that the limit should be fixed at effects really indispensable; and with this view, experiments commenced at Strasbourg, in 1764, at first with guns of 12, 8 and 4lbs. caliber, chosen to constitute the field Artillery. The result was that these guns, reduced to a total length of 18 times their caliber and the quantity of metal to 150 times the weight of ball, which made them considerably lighter; had the required range and sufficient solidity.’-Persy, 15.
System: ‘Specific Rules and Regulations for the government of an army in the field, or in quarters, &c.’…’Of uniformity untroduced in the French artillery.’-Tousard, Volume II, 658.
‘A system of uniformity was at length determined on by a regulation of the Duke de Choiseul, in the year 1765m at the recommendation of M. de Gribeauval, which has raised the French artillery to the utmost state of perfection.’-Tousard, Volume II, xiv.
‘The author of the new system of artillery, Gribeauval…’-Jean du Teil.
‘Often obscured by the large number of changes it introduced, was the fact that the systeme Gribeauval was a genuine system, a thoroughly integrated blend of organizational principles, tactical ideas, and technology. Gribeauval conceived of the artillery as a system in which every part was designed to functional relation to the whole. Men and material were both viewed instrumentally, as elements of this system. From the details of equipment to its social organization, every aspect of the systeme Gribeauval was designed to achieve a specific purpose: to create an artillery force with sufficient mobility to participate actively in offensive field operations.-Rosen, 30-31.
‘The most significant innovation one sees in the systeme Gribeauval was that it was indeed a system: a thorough synthesis of organization, technology, material and tactics. Every aspect of the system, from the harnessing of the horses to the selection and organization of personnel, embodied a single functional concept. Utility was its principle, mobility was its goal. Every element of the systeme Gribeauval was designed to function in a particular way, in a particular circumstance. Men and technology were considered functional elements in a total system. The date, 1776, of the final official acceptance of the systeme Gribeauval, marked an important stage in the development of modern military institutions, as well as in the social relations of technology. Form followed function in the organization of the systeme Gribeauval. From the overall structure to its specific details, the design of social aspects of the new system embodied the principles of utility, efficiency, and precision…-Rosen 48-49.
‘Gribeauval’s cannon was only one element in an elaborate techno-science system intended to increase the mobility of firepower.’-Alder 43.
References:
-Elementary Treatise on the Forms of Cannon & Various Systems of Artillery Translated for the use of the Cadets of the US Military Academy by Professor N Persy of Metz, 1832.
-De Scheel’s Treatise on Artillery, Translated by Jonathan Williams, 1800, edited by Donald Graves. The US translation of DeScheel’s work for the US Army.
-De Scheel, Otto von, Mémoires d’Artillerie Contenant l’Artillerie Nouvelle ou les Changemens fait dans Artillerie Françoise en 1765, Paris 1795.
-American Artillerist’s Companion, 3 Volumes, by Louis de Tousard, 1809.
- Du Teil, Chevalier Jean, De l’Usage de l’Artillerie Nouvelle dans la Guerre de Campagne, Marchal Librarie, Metz, 1778.
- Du Teil, Jean, The New Use of Artillery in Field Wars: Necessary Knowledge, The Nafziger Collection, n.p., 2003. A translation of the original work.
-Reglement concernant les Fontes et les Constructions de l’Artillerie de France, Volumes II and III, by Jean Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval and Jacques-Charles de Manson, 1792. These two volumes are the Tables of Construction, less the plates, which clearly demonstrate that the Gribeauval System was indeed an artillery system.
-Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815 by Ken Alder.
-The Systeme Gribeauval: A Study of Technological Development and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century France by Howard Rosen.
Dave,
Indeed! 😃
Steve
There is a copy in the British Library, but the most interesting thing is that contrary to various claims (including the re ent Adye thread) this was a collection of state of the artillery in 1789 after various changes over the previous 25 years. When you consider that the claim of a 1762 blueprint turned out to be a report on the Austrian artillery with some refs to the Valliere French guns, it should be obvious that there was no Gribeauval “system”. Still, why do some research when secondary claims will do?