Chief of Staff

@Kevin F. Kiley I think you may have mistaken discourse for competition. If so, you have also misinterpreted me as your opponent. You cannot ‘win’ nor can any one ‘lose’. Any victory is illusory, and ultimately Pyrrhic. The problem is that anyone reading threads such as this will fear contributing, not wishing to be savaged for being ‘wrong’. This will drive newcomers away, therefore driving out the very lifeblood of any hobby or interest. This is providing a really weird spectacle. Namely an author systematically trying to alienate his buying public. Very Miss Favershamesque if you ask me. On social media it is good advice to stop feeding a troll and move on. In that vein, stay safe, stay well.

@Kevin F. Kiley this is what crosses the line between making an argument, and being argumentative.

I don't understand the apparent need to extol Berthier as the "best" at anything, or the preeminent chief of staff at the time with a legacy larger than life. I don't see the need to put his chubby little self up on a pedestal and then snipe at his contemporaries and later historians who failed to grasp his alleged genius. I've spent a lot of years with these people, many of whom feel like family members after all this time. But I have never made any claims about any of them that they were the best at anything. On good days they were better than many, in other occasions they needed a swift kick in the posterior. I have also never taken the words, experience, or scholarship of anyone else as gospel. That's why there are archives, historical inquiry, and independent thinking. As far as Berthier is concerned, I believe he was unusually indefatigable, possessed of a phenomenal memory, able to recall who was where, at what time, and doing--supposedly--what he had been instructed to do. Berthier could write orders, filtering Napoleon's shorthand into something most commanders could understand. So all that makes him capable. But does it make him the best chief of staff on the planet between 1800 and whenever?

I don't think so. Better than a chief clerk, though.

I can say that Berthier could often be a short-sighted prig, obviously terrified to deviate in the slightest from Napoleon's instructions, or what he thought they were, and lashing out at anyone who failed to follow the letter of the law. He also carried on a lengthy, sniping, and often pompous correspondence with those commanders who either dared to think for themselves or failed to cross a particular river at six o'clock on the dot. Lannes couldn't stand him; he called Berthier a prick, and that was the nicest thing he had to say.

So while you all debate and argue about "was he/wasn't he" and historical interpretation and the rest of those weighty subjects, I just thought I'd add our opinion on the topic.

@Kevin F. Kiley I’m an empiricist, being distrustful is in my DNA! When I was commanding my squadron, there was a notice in the armoury “In God we trust. Everyone else will sign the book!” So “In God we trust, for everyone else there are footnotes.”

What should be done is to judge historical personages in the norms of  their time, not ours and to use good judgment when analyzing source  material and the credibility of that source material.

Just do it then - so far in my opinion you fail.

@Kevin F. Kiley My point still stands, and I don’t retreat from it a bit. Contemporary evidence cannot be dismissed quite so easily. I don’t doubt your modern opinions are earnestly held, but that’s all they are. Put simply, you have never met or worked with Berthier, those people had. Forgive me then if I give their words more weight? Berthier is dead, as are all the commentators. I have no dog therefore in the fight of who slandered who. Why would anyone today be so vehement? It is very easy for romanticism and affection for our heroes to cloud our judgment. Just not this callsign.

Professor Horward translated Pelet's account of the French campaign in Portugal.

A translation again, why not reading Pelet's account in original French language?

As to Six - it is better for people to look it up themselves, in case they are interested to obtain the full information, your excerpt is by far not complete, and yes, in case you read my posting, I already supplied this source.

Six, Georges : Dictionnaire Biographique Des Généraux & Amiraux Francais De La Révolution Et De L'Empire (1792 - 1814), Tome II, K - Z
Paris 1934, re - print Paris, Gaston Saffroy 1974
pp 294 - 295

a good extra to Six, is

see link and learn much more about Pelet on a quick glance is the

De Courcelles : Dictionnaire des Généraux Francais, several volumes, as I see available for download, volume 7, pp.322 - 330

https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QadGhbhKzYKaYBtWuNV6Ol5xv_S2cN3gM7bm3HRTWUw7toxcZvqDDuP-NHhVtkO_fWgV6La-kUb0iBCgyYDJ4PmHaBVOIQmaTOYxvIIpnA9dDnltKDvrL3-4gfsHTbOY1FcpWCO9crA5JOdlSCTwus1pEtYKNDW2M-7ntVzrlx06z2I4Bwf-kMnoueYehjtvIamqG0stEVGqzUAsbg1fOlWj3cKfic2gKgdGe9gceufO8wlfNP35mBLpvgN07cx1pIno9Rj1qjknDyumdi7OKqhGeR0RF0x8ZqXLansBR5iWg5qcN1s

After posting material on Pelet, I found a more detailed accounting of his service, again written by Don Horward, in The Journal of Military History from January 1989.

Again an English source, about a foreign army/officer ,there is much better around in French, in case of a more detailed accounting you just have to consult Six, and you will learn much more

adjutant - commandant à l'état - major du général Marchand à la Grande Armée

Six, Georges : Dictionnaire Biographique Des Généraux & Amiraux Francais De La Révolution Et De L'Empire (1792 - 1814), Tome II, K - Z

Paris 1934, re - print Paris, Gaston Saffroy 1974

pp 294 - 295

So he is well versed to make up his mind and opinion about Berthier's work, he was running a staff.

It has been demonstrated by upteen sources (including Elting - read my quote of Chuck White on this) that Berthier was a subordinated administration officer, important without any doubt, but nothing other then a chief clerk, not involved in operational planing (it would have done Boney well to give Berthier a chance on that from the beginning but his overblown ego as well as personal disorder wouldn't allow this).

'To then claim that experience of staff work in the 20th century, the age of the tank, jet fighter and nuclear warheads with it’s telegraph, radio’s and microprocessors as giving any meaningful insight to the age of the quill pen and galloping horse is stretching the credulous to breaking point. I say that as a trained staff officer with operational experience of staff work. We might as well say that being a truck driver gives you unique insight to the operation of a Napoleonic artillery train.'

I disagree. The main thrust or reason for staff work is to relieve the commander of anything not involving allowing him to command.

And if you substitute trucks for horses, computers for pen and ink (and the latter is still used), and radios for couriers, you still today strive to accomplish in the same manner the staff work of ca 1800.

I say that as a trained staff officer with operational experience of staff work in peace time and in combat. I've served on every staff level from battalion to national staffs and two joint staffs and have been a principal staff officer twice.

And the model for US chiefs of staff and how they operate can be traced to Berthier and the Napoleonic Imperial staff-in organization, functioning, and operations.

Napoléon dirigeait néanmoins les grands travaux de l'état-major général, et dictait ou corrigeait les dépêches les plus importantes.
(...)
Le major-général, malgré ses éminentes dignités, n'était que le premier aide-de-camp, l'expéditionnaire de Napoléon.
S. 407
Le Spectateur Militaire, Ive volume, XXIIIe Livraison, Paris 1828, Etat – Major, Général Pelet

so even Pelet agrees that Berthier was only the first ADC to Boney - or as I say the chief secretary.

Something has been niggling at me about all this and so, I read some of Bourcet's Principes again. In view of the strange idea above that something unsourced should be held above sourced material, it should perhaps be noted that Hennet, while written in 1911, quotes extensively from contemporary correspondence around Bourcet and Choiseul.

Anyway, it is worth reiterating that Bourcet himself, writing in about 1775, states that Principes was written for officers, who had not served in the mountains and makes no mention of any course, let alone a college. If we look at the relevant five pages of Bourcet on the chief of staff - pp.55-60, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k86486q/f61.image there is a strange problem: Several times, Bourcet starts a paragraph with "Il doit" - he must - know the talents of his officers, be aware of the performance of the artillery and its ammunition supply, the correspondence, make reconnaissances, know the layout of villages (for billets), plus the usual things about arranging marches and camps. This is preceded by some important comments; at the top of p.56, he says "All the ideas or projects of operations, must be presented by him to the general, who must only concern himself with adjustments" - this was only happening in Austria at the time and it is often cited as Bourcet devising modern staffs. But Berthier did not do this, so there can be no line of descent from Bourcet through Berthier to Moltke or modern practice. There is an alternative, given the points above about Arvers and his agendas: In the short piece just after Bourcet's Avant-Propos, it says that Arvers has "restored the sense of certain passages, altered by omission and corruption of words". It would require seeing the original manuscript, but has Arvers added this planning role in?

Something else, which may support that thought is the allocation of jobs - the much-mentioned four departments, copied by Berthier. At the bottom of p.59, Bourcet says the CoS will need "at least" four assistants. The first is for the office - order of march and orders - the second for setting the marches off and two others for the reconnaissances. So, actually, it is only three activities and Bourcet we know is very big on reconnaissance in the mountains. Yet, who is doing the planning to be presented to the commander?

'On our part we could only admire the way in which the various stages of the march were organized.  Everywhere one could see, in the smallest of details, the aura of a master perfectly obeyed.  As all orders concerning troops on the march emanated from the Ministry, all the quartermasters and commissaries knew where to meet us at the various stops and the Ministry knew exactly which troops would be where and when.  When we reached a halt, the quartermasters would first obtain a permit from the commander of the place or from the commissioner and then a list of billets from the town hall and receipts for food, supplies, and wagons which they would hand over to the suppliers.  Collections of the meat ration could either be individual or as a whole, but bread was always as a whole.  Companies to be billeted in villages alongside the main road picked up their rations as they were passing through or were obliged to come in and get them.  This organization, imitated by each of the great powers since, worked with a precision and ease unimaginable.  It was rare indeed that any complaints were forthcoming...'

I fail to see the context of that quote regarding operational planning or any outstanding work in general, unit movements were planned in all armies - ages ago - inside ones own country, so what should be exceptional about this? This is basic administrative work.

Of course Berthier stayed with his head quarters - he would be stupid not to do so, wasn't he also Le Ministre de la guerre, and Paris would be a proper place?

Ordre du Jour
Au quartier général impérial de Paris, 4e jour complémentaire an XIII (21 septembre 1805).

L'Empereur ordonne les suivants dispositions : (...)

p. 628
Alombert & Colin - La Campagne de 1805 en Allemagne, re - print Editions Historiques Teissèdre,  Paris 2002. Tome I

and again in 1806

About L’état-major général
« Il ne participe aucunement à la conceptions des plans d’opérations. »
p. 211
Berthier est, malgré tout, placé dans une position clairement subordonné, comme il le rappelle lui-même dans une lettre adressée à Napoléon le 17 septembre 1806 : « Votre Majesté se rappelle qu’elle m’a prescrit de rien faire, c’est-à-dire de ne faire mouvoir aucun des corps de Messieurs les maréchaux sans ses ordres ultérieurs (…). Je me borne à exécuter ponctuellement les ordres de Votre Majesté et à tenir tout en état pour être prêt à agir ».
p. 212
Béraud, Stéphane : La révolution militaire napoléonienne 1 Les Manœuvres, Bernard Gionvanangeli Éditeur, 2007, 2013

Brand comments about a march back from Spain through France, not quite an operational undertaking,

@david.a.hollins Who did the planning for the Grande Armee's march from the Channel in 1805 as well as other operational movements?  It wasn't Napoleon he was a little busy commanding the Grande Armee.  It was Berthier and his staff that did the work and that is documented and posted on this forum.  It was excellent staff work and was operational planning of the highest order.

No - Berthier was not involved in operational planning, of course Berthier had to keep the records of movement - but the planning was done as usual by Napoleon.

Le maréchal Berthier au maréchal Bernadotte

Paris, le 18 fructidor an XIII (5 september 1805).

Monsieur le Maréchal, S.M. l'Empereur vous ordonne de partir avec votre corps d'armée pour vous rendre à Würtzburg, et de combiner votre marche de manière à y être arrivé du 1er au 2 vendémiaire. (23 - 24 septembre).
p. 435
Alombert & Colin - La Campagne de 1805 en Allemagne, re - print Editions Historiques Teissèdre,  Paris 2002.

The original print should be available on the web for download

I thought it might be interesting to look at who the French chiefs of staff were. We all know a few Prussians, such as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Grolmann. We know some Austrians such as Mack, Zach, Radetzky and Weyrother plus perhaps Schmitt, Mayer, Nugent and Wimpffen. The likes of Ney and Desaix did their time as adjutants-generaux in Germany, but actual CoSs would include:

Berthier - topographical engineer - colonel and various staff positions in the 1780s. CoS to Luckner in 1792; CoS to Kellerman in 1795.

Soult - Hundred Days - Joined the infantry in 1785 serving to 1792. Chef de brigade and adjutant-general at Fleurus in 1794. Served in various commands in Germany and Switzerland until 1799.

Suchet - initially in the National Guard cavalry, he was a chef de bataillon in 1793. Fought in Italy in the First Coalition, then with Brune in 1798 until CoS under Joubert and Championnet in 1799 in Italy. GD in Genoa in 1800.

Dessolles - joined the army in 1792, adjutant-general under Napoleon in Italy in 1796, then CoS to Moreau in Italy in 1799 and Germany in 1800. Then left the army.

Reynier - gunner after joining in 1792. GB in January 1795 - Moreau's CoS in Germany in 1796. Fought in Egypt and in Italy in 1805-6, defeated at Maida.

Charpentier - joined the infantry in 1791, CoS to Desjardins on the right of the Nord in 1794 and Hatry besieging Luxembourg in 1795. GB in 1799 in Italy and GD in 1804. CoS to Massena at Second Caldiero in 1805.

Ernouf - joined the infantry in 1791 and GB in Sept 1793. Jourdan's CoS from late 1794 with the Nord and Lower Rhine Armies. Governor of Guadeloupe 1804-10.

It is not a scientific sample, but Berthier and Dessolles aside, they seem to have enjoyed rapid promotion after joining up in the early 1790s and then done a short stint as adjutant-general and then CoS before going elsewhere. So, what do we make of this 30-strong staff unit ordered by the Revolutionaries in 1790, which reaches 110 in 1799. This is why I had the impression that it was a kind of approved list, rather than some group that stayed together. In 1790, it was the Revolutionaries, who decreed the four adjutants-genereaux per army, although this varied from three to five according to Griffiths. Berthier's actual contribution appears to have just been to suggest how the tasks might be allocated, rather than establishing four.

le 20 février 1769, il fut employé en Corse - so he couldn't run a staff school then -

compare

In 1764 Bourcet was appointed Director of a Staff College at Grenoble, where he taught the art of war for seven years ...

Wilkinson, page 34

a proper citation would be nice.

Even wikipedia is in this case better than Wilkinson and or Elting

In 1752, he accompanied M. de Paulmy in his tour of inspection of the Alps.[2]  Contrary to claims about his role on the army staff in the Seven Years' War,  he was director of the fortifications at Dauphiné from 1756 (appointed 1  June 1756) to 1777. At the end of 1759, he was made king's chief  commissioner and charged with delineating the border between France and  Piedmont-Sardinia, a mission concluded by treaty on 24 March 1760. That  year also saw him involved in diplomatic missions to the Sardianian  court in 1760. By 1762, he was in Versailles dealing with more secret  correspondence. The end of the Seven Years' War saw him back in Grenoble, again working on the delineation of the border.
There is a popular myth that under the direction of the minister of war, Choiseul,  in 1764 he established a staff-officer training school at Grenoble (it  disappeared in 1771), where he taught on mountain warfare. This myth,  designed to suggest that France developed modern military staffs stems  from the 1888 printed version of 'Principes de la guerre de montagne'  Bourcet's 1775 script, which has the claim made by Arvers, a Lt-Colonel  in the French War Ministry, who "has restored the sense of certain  passages, which have been altered by the omission or corruption of  certain words". The claim is not footnoted.[3] No such college existed. In fact, Bourcet was the Director of Engineering at Grenoble in 1763.[4] On 1 April 1766, Bourcet was charged with "the direction of officers  engaged in reconnaissance of the land". It was only in 1783 that Louis  XVI ordered the creation of a permanent staff corps (whose members  included Berthier)[5]

Bourcet was never CoS to anyone, but an aide-marechal (adviser) to the CoS in 1744 - on siege warfare. He cannot have been "teaching in a college in Grenoble 1764-1771, as he was in Corsica 1769-71. The fabled order by Choiseul cannot be true as in 1765, Bourcet wrote a memoir to Choiseul: "On the necessity to form up some officers for the military reconnaissance of a country".

Dave Hollins more than once answered the question about Bourcet.

One has just to read - yes non English source and for that seemingly impossible to accept that a French source can be better than an English one :

Hennet, Léon : Regards en arrièr, études d'histoire militaires sur le XVIIIe siècle - l'état-major, Paris 1911, pp. 44.

It is available on Gallica, there it might not be the first time - that I am blind and not finding a certain reference I would just invite all discerning readers to read it.

What kind of discussion is this - Wilkinson says so and therefore it must be and ignoring other sources of great evidence?

Dave Hollins is accused to show up answers, despite he did several times.

And no - for a decent quote just a name thrown in - isn't doing it, there despite I am only an amateur historian - I insist of author, title, place of publication, date of publication / print and page.

Also so far it is evident in my view that Berthier indeed was only an important chief clerk.

Creveldt won't do to bring this discussion forward - see Mikaberidze quest for more detailed information about supply system in the Napoleonic time, it is a general primer - the only benefit seemingly it is in English.

And more stuff which clearly shows, though without any doubt Berthier play an important role to run Boney staff - that he is an important chief clerk, nothing more or less - and by no means the first great staff officer in modern history - far from it.

Béraud:
La conception des manœuvres stratégies relève du « domaine réservé » de l’Empereur. (…)C’est également lui qui pilote la conduite des opérations des analysant les informations collectées et en ordonnant les marches des différentes unités. Napoléon est son propre bureau de planification et de conceptions des opérations. (…) Sa maison militaire et l’état-major général ne sont que des organes de préparation technique qui alimentent Napoléons en données.(…) Ils ne participent pas à la décision à l’instar des états-majors modernes. Le processus de décision est don strictement centralisé dans la personne de l’Empereur.
p. 184 – 185
Jomini : »L’Empereur était lui-même le vrai chef de son état-major.
p. 185
About L’état-major général
« Il ne participe aucunement à la conceptions des plans d’opérations. »
p. 211
Berthier est, malgré tout, placé dans une position clairement subordonné, comme il le rappelle lui-même dans une lettre adressée à Napoléon le 17 septembre 1806 : « Votre Majesté se rappelle qu’elle m’a prescrit de rien faire, c’est-à-dire de ne faire mouvoir aucun des corps de Messieurs les maréchaux sans ses ordres ultérieurs (…). Je me borne à exécuter ponctuellement les ordres de Votre Majesté et à tenir tout en état pour être prêt à agir ».
p. 212
Quand les opérations s’accélèrent, Napoléon transmet des ordres laconiques fixant principalement des points géographiques à atteindre sans donner plus de détail sur l’esprit de la manœuvre. Par ailleurs, Il n’y pas de répartition stricte des tâches entre Napoléon et le major-général. Cette confusion des rôles aboutit souvent à des duplications d’ordres aux commandants de corps et parfois à des ordres contradictoires.
p. 216
Or cette activité est strictement délimitée par Napoléon dans une lettre du 14 février 1806 : « Tenez-vous en strictement aux ordres que je vous donne ; exécutez ponctuellement vos instructions ; que tout le monde se tienne sur ses grades et reste à son poste ; moi seul je sais ce que je dois faire ».
(…)
Les états-majors des corps d’armée n’ont aucun pouvoir de décisions opératique. En cas de dysfonctionnement de circuits de transmission, les états-majors de corps deviennent alors incapable de prendre les initiatives nécessaires. Les limites de ce modèle apparaîtront dès 1812 et seront les principales causes de l’échec de la campagne de 1813.
p.234
Béraud, Stéphane : La révolution militaire napoléonienne 1 Les Manœuvres, Bernard Gionvanangeli Éditeur, 2007, 2013

This pretty much sums up the limitations of the influence of Berthier and the problems of that system - and I agree with Béraud, that this is pretty evident in 1812 and 1813.

Thanks. I totally agree.

Can I remind all involved in the discussions in this thread to keep conversations civil. Rigorously debate and vehemently disagree by all means, but remain polite and respectful. Rude or patronising language will not be tolerated.

With the exception of this personnel of the Maison who took orders directly from the Emperor, all the remainder of l’Etat-Major de l’Empereurwas placed under the orders of Marshal Berthier, the chief of staff.

In 1813 Berthier was 59 years old and had been fairly seriously ill at the beginning of the year, due to the fatigues of the retreat from Russia; but from March he had resumed his duties and during the spring campaign he showed his customary activity by working unceasingly day and night at Napoleon’s side.  But as major-général he merely executes whatever orders his chief gives him, he is never in the role of counsellor, never on his own takes the least decision about operations.  He described his functions with perfect accuracy when he summarised them thus to the Emperor: “to issue Your Majesty’s orders, to give those of movement[3] and administration, to keep situation reports, of organisation and personnel, and finally to serve actively in war beside Your Majesty”.[4]

The GQG [Headquarters] of Napoleon I: Part II

By Lieutenant Colonel René Tournès

Translation and Comments by John Hussey

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared in the Revue de Paris, 1 May 1921, pages 134-158. Notes by Colonel Tournès are identified numerically; those of John Hussey are in red. Additional comments in square brackets are by John Hussey

Berthier - of course was an expert in staff system, no doubt about it - as his insturctions for l'armée des Alpes shows, though I agree with Dave Hollins - to look at those primary documents, which are available online - here another comment by Eman Vovsi

Although the army staff organization outlined by de Bourcet did not became official doctrine for the French royal forces, the expeditionary corps under the orders of Lieutenant-général, J.-B.-D. de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau, which landed at Newport, Rhode Island, on 11 July 1780, did have a staff organization.[10]  This included:

-        Maréchal-de-camp F.-J. de Beauvoir, marquis de Chastellux 
-        Brigadier des armées du roi(branch of service) C.-G. duc de Choisy
-        Maréchal général-des-logis P.-F. de Béville and Lieutenant-colonel F.-A.-L. Thibault de Menonville (on 12 January 1781, a twenty-seven year old captain, L.-A. Berthier, was assigned to staff as a supernumerary aide-maréchal général-des-logis)   
-        Chief of artillery and equipages Colonel F.-M. comte d’Aboville assisted by captain La Chèze   
-        Chief of engineers Colonel J.-N. Desandrouins with four attached engineer officers and captain Duchesnoy, aningénieur géographe 
-        Intendant-general Colonel B.-J. de Tarlé
-        Commissary officer C. Blanchard 
-        Superintendent of hospitals M. de Mars
-        Chef physician J.-F. Coste and chef surgeon Robillard 
-        Chaplain l’abbe de Glenson
-        Staff also included fifteen senior officers of infantry and cavalry and number of aides-de-camp, including members of the most ancient and illustrious French families, such as marquis de Vauban, chevalier de Lameth and others.

Although the Rochambeau’s staff did not see much action before the siege of Yorktown it, nonetheless, contributed to the final victory.  Thus, by the last week of April 1781, maréchal général-des-logis de Béville had mapped out a route from Rhode Island to the American headquarters in New Windsor.  Further in October, a senior officer on staff duty, Brigadier de Choisy was sent to take command of Allied troops (Weedon’s Virginia militiamen and Lauzon’s Legion) at Gloucester in anticipation of a disagreement between two commanders.[11]  And, no doubt, the staff officers of the engineers and artillery directed the trench work at Yorktown until the British finally surrendered.

In the last decades of the Ancien Régime the staff system remained in its previous form until after it was given further push by a War Minister, maréchal de France P.-H. marquis de Ségur (1724-1801). In 1783 he formed a staff corps of senior officers, composed of aides-maréchaux généraux-des-logiscarrying the brevet of a colonel or lieutenant-colonel; each of them was assisted by a captain. At the moment of formation, this staff included 19 colonels, 24 lieutenant-colonels or majors and 25 captains. These officers were supposed to be versed in various military disciplines, such as topography, history, geography; they also should possess the art of commentaries on mémoires, know how to perform a reconnaissance and other subjects related to military matters. The director of this corps, marquis d’Aguesseau, prepared in 1787 a memorandum where he advised the government of placing staff officers (officers de l’État-major) on the permanent footing, especially taking under consideration the recent involvement of France in the American War of Independence. It should, continued d’Aguesseau, serve the country both in the peace and wartime, and became a training school for line officers and high nobles desired to pursue a military career.[12] The corps included nearly a dozen officers who served with Rochambeau in America, including Colonel de Tarlé and Lieutenant-colonel Langlouis du Bouchet.[13] It, however, was left for the Révolution to create real change, which saw the beginning of a true system in the staff organization.

I have never seen any reference to Berthier as part of a 'legend.' If you have a reference to that I would surely like to see it.

Some notes and opinions I used a while ago in the identical discussion on another forum

Berthier was part of the legend - along with Napoleon - they formed a successful team. He was however no modern chief of staff, there Napoleon did not like any initiative and usually did not listen at any councels. In my view Berthier could have been much more than a secretary - under a different general in chief than Napoleon.

And also Berthier had shortcomings - as well as any other, he was no superman either. Also others than Jomini did see Berthier cirtically.

Ce prince était telllement usé et fatigué, que lorsqu'on allait lui demander des ordres, on le trouvait souvent renversé dans son fauteuil, les pieds appuyés sur sa table et sifflant, (...) On peut affirmer que le prince Berthier a été la cause directe d'une bonne moitié des malheurs de l'armée francaise, à partir de la bataille d'Eylau (...) Cette fatigue d'une tête usée produisait souvent, dans les marches, des encombrements de troupes sur les mêmes routes, dans les mêmes villages, et causait des désordres affreux, aui nous aliénaient de plus les habitants du pays."

Stendhal, Vie de Napoleon

Ségur : Berthier s'affaiblissait. Depuis 1805, toute guerre lui était odieuse. Son talent était surtout dans son activité et dans sa mémoire. Il savait recevoir et transmettre, à tous les heures eu jour et la nuit, les nouvelles et les ordres multipliés. Mais dans cette occasions, il se crut en droit d'ordnonner lui.même. Ces ordres déplurent à Davout. Leur première entrevue fut une violente altercation.

Dennie : " Telle était l'opinion du prince de Neuchâtel, qui hassarda de sages reprèsentations à l'Empereur. Il les recut fort mal : Allez-vous-en, lui dit-il, je n'ai pas besoin de vous ; vous n'êtes qu'une ..., Rentrez en France ; je ne retiens personne de force.

Only Napoleon kept his plans and secrets for himself and demanded strictest blind obedience on no initiative, not even from his chief of staff :

Tenez-vous-en strictement aux ordres que je vous donne ; exécutez ponctuellement vos instructions ; que tout le monde se tienne sur ses gardes et reste à son poste; mois seule sais ce que je dois faire." Correspondance militaires de Napoléon, Paris 1893, tome IV, Nr. 739

Creveld is an Israeli historian specialising in the 20th century. He knows nothing about this period.

Blond wrote a mixture of history and fiction, while indulging in some far right political sympathies. The book this is taken from has no footnotes.

It is just bad technique to quote people, whose opinions are worthless. Still, saves doing some proper reasearch - most of the key material is on the Net these days, so why not use it?

This is just the invention of secondary authors with agendas, notably Spencer Wilkinson, writing on the eve of WW1 and his work contains no footnotes. Basically, he made it up and Elting lacked the critical ability to do anything other than copy it. It has led to the regular repetition of such unfounded claims through confirmation bias without the original material being checked. Wilkinson is also making up Gribeauval‘s career - see Duffy: Instrument of War. For the staff and Bourcet, see Leon Hennet: L’etat-Major (1911) which is on Gallica and goes through the whole Choiseul reform process. In fact, he asked for proposals and two others recommended a permanent staff on the Austrian model. Bourcet merely proposed training a few officers in mountain topography. Indeed, go to La guerre dans les montages and you will see he wrote it for the benefit of those, who could not attend his course, not least as it was written after the course stopped. Why not read the contemporary material rather than what Wilkinson made up?

As General Pierre Bourcet was brought up by another poster, perhaps the following will be helpful:

General Pierre Bourcet was the premier staff officer and chief of staff of his day, and he had been chief of staff, among others, to Marshal de Broglie in the Seven Years' War who was the most successful French general of that war, and much of that credit goes to Bourcet. Bourcet was directed by Minister Choiseul to establish a staff college in 1764. De Broglie is also noteworthy as being the instigator of introducing the division into the French army.

‘Bourcet was France’s most expert staff officer and also an authority on mountain warfare. He seems to have been the first to use what is now termed an ‘estimate of the situation’ as an aid in his planning, methodically comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the various possible courses of action.’-The Superstrategists by John Elting, 145.

One of the essential books of the period to have and read, and one that undoubtedly influenced Napoleon in his operations, is Pierre Bourcet's Principes de la Guerre de Montagnes which Bourcet wrote for the use of his students at the staff college at Grenoble. It was a manuscript and not published until later. It can be found on Google Books: https://books.google.com/books?id=A2kDA ... es&f=false

The Duc de Choiseul was instrumental in the French Army's substantial reform movement after the disastrous performance in the Seven Years' War and it was Choiseul who assigned expert officers to conduct the needed reforms, such as Bourcet with the staff officers and Gribeauval with the artillery. And it should also be noted that Gribeauval was one of the officers chosen to be seconded to the Austrian Army during the Seven Years War as the Austrians were short of senior experienced artillery officers.

From The French Army Before Napoleon by Spenser Wilkinson, 33-35: ‘Perhaps the greatest staff officer of the French army of the eighteenth century was Pierre de Bourcet, who entered the army in 1709 at the age of nine and served with distinction in more than twenty campaigns. While yet a young man he acted as assistant quartermaster-general, and thenceforth was in many campaigns both in Italy and Germany the confidential adviser of one commander-in-chief after another.’ ‘On every occasion when an important decision had to be made Bourcet would write a memorandum in which he analused the situation and set forth in detail, with full explanations and reasons, the course which seemed to him the best. In very many cases his suggestions were adopted and were usually justified by success, and when they were rejected the results were seldom fortunate…’ ‘In 1764 Bourcet was appointed Director of a Staff College at Grenoble, where he taught the art of war for seven years, during which he wrote for his pupils a treatise entitled Principes de la Guerre de Montagnes. The book was not intended for publication, but a number of copies were made, of which one was sent in 1775 to the Ministry of War, and others appear to have been circulated among the students and other officers who could be trusted. In 1888 the work was printed but not published by the French Ministry of War. It contains the whole art of generalship as it was understood by the best French officers of the eighteenth century, and it is the more interesting because the principles are illustrated by a series of examples of actions in almost every one of which Bourcet himself had planned the operations. They are also further illustrated by an imaginary campaign in the Maritime Alps, of which Bourcet knew every inch and which were to be the scene of Napoleon’s first essays in planning campaigns.’

From Swords Around A Throne by John Elting, Chapter V: ‘The Napoleonic staff-indeed much of modern staff organization-came from Pierre-Joseph Bourcet’s (1700-1780) work on staff organization and functioning…Bourcet wanted a permanent staff corps of select, specifically trained officers. His proposal was not exactly welcomed by the Royal Army’s generals, but in 1783 Minister of War de Segur finally formed a Corps d’Etat Major. Officers chosen for it were to be trained in topography, history, geography, preparation of unit histories, reconnaissance, and the science of the art of war.’-81 ‘Pierre Bourcet achieved international distinction for his works on staff organization and functioning and on mountain warfare.’-7 ‘Bourcet’s insistence that candidates for the staff corps must pass examinations and undergo a probationary period was most unacceptable to the haute noblesse: Gilded-born youth has always considered prestigious staff positions its natural prerogative.’-8 One of Col Elting’s sources for Bourcet is Memoires Historiques sur la Guerre que les Francais Ont Soutenue en Allemagne 1757 Jusqu’en 1762 written by Bourcet.

I would contend that Napoleon's style of command made it difficult for Berthier to be chief of staff in the modern sense of the words, although I think to dismiss him as a mere chief clerk is a little ungenerous. Perhaps the best illustration of that is how badly Soult handled it in 1815. In that respect the work of Sephen M Beckett in publishing the Operations of the Armeé Du Nord material is fascinating.

I agree with Dave Hollins, Berthier was a chief clark - a chief of staff with limited function - he was not allowed to dab in the operational art of war, which remained the domain of Boney himself.

Berthier did plan anything - the thinking and planning was done by Boney. The muddled organisations of reports directly written to Boney and or to Berthier as well cause more than often confusion.

As Dave pointed out, another pet subject of KK which was beaten to death on other fora - I recommend reading books of Béraud and Vachée on those topics.

Not even in the French Army Boney did invent the corps system, it was already in use under Moreau in 1796 - but Boney did hone the corps system to that effect that it suited his operational art of war.

I especially recommend to read Béraud -volume 1 - Les manoeuvres, p. 200 - 234 - where the author describes in a clear fashion Boney's system of staff work - which included Berthier.

I do agree, but don't stop at the chief of staff and look at the whole staff system. The staff officers at army corps and division level were also very important. They made certain that the divided marching army acted as one. Berthier was certainly one of the best chiefs of staff of his time. But in my opinion he was overclassed by Scharnhorst, Grolman and Radetzky. Both Prussian staff officers brought the Prussian general staff at the end of the Napoleonic Wars to a higher level then the French staff.

On Berthier I suggest reading Franck Favier, Berthier. L'ombre de Napoléon (2015).