Wellington: Romantic Hero?

What I take from all of this conflicting (and in some cases partizan) evidence, is that you don't generally achieve that sort of rank in any army by "being a nice bloke".

The evidence I have seen regarding Wellington's friendship with both John and Pulteney Malcolm suggests he was quite capable of 'gratitude, courtesy and good fellowship'. One example: after the Convention of Cintra, when Pulteney Malcolm was to return to London to testify at the Enquiry, Wellesley (as he then was) wrote to Malcolm: "When you come to town, I can give you a bed here, and you will be as heartily welcome as I have often been on your ships." (12 Nov 1808, Gurwood, vol 3, p.133)

E.W. Peppard (A Short History of the British Army, 1926), in his character sketch of Wellington, not only asserts that "gratitude, courtesy, good fellowship were all foreign to his repellent nature," but offers first and foremost that "His amours were promiscuous and sordid." Nothing in the least romantic there, then. However, he also manages to focus again on the business in hand (Wellington's campaigns, and his role in ending the reign of "the greatest soldier and statesman who ever bore rule in France") and concedes- "But we are not here concerned with the Duke as a man, but rather as a General, and in this respect, it seems to us, no one not wilfully and of set purpose blind can deny his pre-eminent greatness. It remains to be seen in what exactly that greatness consisted." Grudging as that remark might seem, it appears from the concluding paragraph of the chapter: "In his lucid common sense, his grasp of realities, his wide statesmanlike outlook, his power of seeing and seizing the fleeting opportunity, his timely caution and his equally timely daring—above all in what the French call his ‘‘ phlegm ”, which means in essence the power of rising superior to, rather than being controlled by, fortune, whether smiling or adverse—^he remains without superior and with but few equals among the great commanded of history. Above all the lesser men who surrounded him his genius towers, cold and awe-inspiring indeed, but shining and magnificent, like an Alpine peak in the clear light of morning."- - that Major Peppard, Royal Tank Corps (retired), had formed an opinion of the Duke that tended perhaps a little towards the Romantic.

"Personally he was courageous in the extreme and in innumerable instances risked his life like any common soldier. He will always stand out in history, however, as a man divorced from the softer and better influences of humanity — a cold and calculating commander amid a statesman who had in him the makings of a despot, for it was merely the determined attitude of the British people towards his measures of repression which saved him from being that. It would be unjust, as well as ungenerous, to deny that he saved Britain and Europe from what might have been a dangerous supremacy, and if he was not destined to be equally fortunate in peace as in war he was indeed a great general, a great aristocrat and a great man."

A Dictionary of Napoleon & his Times

Hubert Richardson p. 461

Always useful to get the fuller picture, although the author's understanding of the British political system appears a little superficial.

“But surely by intimation he still appears to shift the blame upon the 1st Division [for the failure at Burgos], referring to it as inexperienced and insinuating that it was not up to the job… and regarding the inadequate means, which he denies earlier in his dispatch [to Lord Liverpool], he contradicts himself in the same by saying that the stormer should have the outer line…’had we means sufficient to take the place,’ and goes on to blame the field officer, Major Laurie [who died in the attack], for the failure.” p.237

For king and country: The letters and diaries of John Mills, Coldstream Guards, 1811-14

Ian Fletcher (ed.)

“He could not tolerate that anyone should receive a meed of praise in connexion with any of his campaigns, excepting himself… He will always stand out in history, however, as a man divorced from the softer and better influences of humanity- a cold and calculating commander and a statesman who had in him the makings of a despot, for it was merely the determined attitude of the British people towards his measures of repression which saved him from being that.” P. 461

A Dictionary of Napoleon & his Times

Hubert Richardson

John Aitchison in 1809 observed that "the great miseries which our troops have suffered are in no small degree to be attributed to a presumption of infallibility, which Lord Wellington appears to have entertained for his own plans." P. 62

An Ensign in the Peninsular War

John Aitchison

"Few men with such an undeniable claim to greatness can have united in themselves so many unpleasant personal characteristics. gratitude, courtesy, good fellowship were all foreign to his repellent nature; and his behavior towards certain individuals who were unfortunate enough to fall out of his good graces gives one to believe that his own verdict on Napoleon that he was 'no gentleman' might with even greater appositeness have been self-applied." p. 167

A Short History of the British Army

E.W. Sheppard

Alexander Gordon wrote in 1811, Wellington "has no idea of gratitude, favour, or affection, and cares not for anyone however much he may owe to him." P. 304

The Man Who Broke Napoleon's Codes

Mark Urban

A sad irony that on the night of Waterloo, Wellington wept by the fire having given up his bed to young Alexander Gordon, who said his commander had 'no heart' and 'no idea of affection,' lay dying upstairs. Perhaps Gordon's opinions had changed in the subsequent years.

From my German point of view, Wellington was a romantic hero indeed, fox hounds during a campaign - horse races and what not else, and again he was a man of his age and social upbringing.

Wellington was at least partially responsible for the establishment of the Royal Sappers and Miners in 1813. The British army suffered from a lack of engineer units, as witness the sieges conducted at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz (3), and Burgos.

His correspondence with Lord Liverpool on the subject supports this.

See:

The Royal Sappers and Miners | napoleonicwars (thenapoleonicwars.net)

Forgot to add: in terms of "disdain for the other ranks" was he not also responsible for establishing the rank of colour sergeant in order to expand opportunities for good quality NCOs?

Should we not also factor in the party political animosity that fellow officers might feel towards the Duke (whether personally, or vicariously due to his brother)? As regards "vindictiveness" both the Duke and his brother vigorously supported Catholic Emancipation - few things in British politics more likely to gain you enemies than speaking up for the Left-Footers! Also rarely noted that he recanted his reactionary views on reform, admitting that they were the biggest political mistake he had ever made.

"King Arthur"

"Joan Hyde's (nee Hudleston) 'Scrap Book' - created by David Hyde" (delahyde.com)

The Bevan one is often cited, but this section from Rory Muir's Wellington: Path to Victory (pp. 426-427) shows that there is far more to it than meets the eye, and little of it lies at Wellington's door:

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Bevan of the 4th Foot felt that the whole wight of the blame rested on his shoulders, and, in the hope of clearing his name, he asked for an inquiry. When this was refused he blew his braind out on 8 July at Portalegre. His death caused a stir in the army, and some officers were inclined to blame Wellington. Major Thomas Downmann of the artillery wrote in his diary: 'The feelings of our commander will be as little troubled on this occasion, I imagine, as on most other. He has none. Ambition is his passion and carries him away, leaving those of very different sentiments to their own reflections.' Although obviously hostile and certainly not typical of opinion int he army as a whole this represents a persistent minority view, expressed on a number of occcasions In some respects it was plaining wrong. Wellington had not singled Bevan out for personal criticism, and there was every reason for not reopning the affair by agreeing to an inquiry that would inevitably set one officer agianst another, adding to existing ill feeling. Bevan's complaint and sense of injustice had much less basis that Cochrane's, and pursuing the matter would simply reinforce the perception that he and his regiment had been the principal players in the escape of the French. But Bevan was evidently in no state of mind to keep the affair in perspective. He had long suffered from serious bouts of depression, which should probably have disqualified him from holding a position of such responsibility. Whether he committed suicide because he believed that he had been disgraced, or whether life simply proved too much for him to bear, is unclear; his last letter to his wife, written just a few days before his death, was warm, loving and positive, and makes no mention of Brennier, Almeida, or Wellington's deaptch. The link, which was so glibly made by officers in the army, may have been founded, but it remains unproven.'

So little evidence of vindictiveness - Bevan wasn't singled out by Wellington, and had a history of mental health issues. A connection between the two remains unproven.

Ramsey is a little fairer, but again, there is a Chinese whispers effect here too. Muir again, p. 532:

Wellington, exasperated to see orders he had personally given disobeyed, placed Captain Norman Ramsay of the Horse Artillery under arres. Ramsay had a good excuse and Wellington released him three weeks late without charge, following representations from Graham, Frederick Ponsonby and other. The affair was of no great importance, but it added to the existing resentment in the artillery towards Wellington, and became greatly magnified by some later writers who claimed that it left Ramsay broken-hearted.

So neither case is really an example of vindictiveness - the proper procedures were followed in Ramsay's case. He would have been tried and given the opportunity to defend himself, but when the facts of the situation had been presented to Wellington, he was released, though that process too far too long. A vindictive individual would have pushed for his trial, dismissal or resignation.

Colonel Bevan or Capt. Ramsey?

"a 'gentleman' only by the contemporary standards of his peers. "

An intriguingly vacuous statement, almost drowned out by the sound of a barrel being scraped. But my favourite- "After Waterloo, ....." pff. I mean what is there to say?

From the Biographical Sketches in A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars by Vincent J Esposito and John R Elting:

Wellesley, Arthur (1769-1852).

'First Duke of Wellington. Born in Ireland; family wealthy and aristocratic. Entered army as ensign in 1787. Thanks to the system of 'purchase' then customary, became a lieutenant colonel in 1793. Little regimental service during this period, since he was also aide-de-camp to the lord-lieutenant of Ireland. Took part in the unsuccessful expedition to Holland, 1794-1795. In India, 1796-1805; won several major successes over the Mahrattas; mastered art of military logistics. With abortive Hanover expedition in 1805; Copenhagen expedition in 1807. In 1808, began his famous peninsular campaign that ended in 1814 with the invasion of southern France. British ambassador to France, 1814. After Waterloo, commanded the Allied army of occupation in France, 1815-1818. Thereafter active in British politics and diplomacy, usually with little success.'

'Operating (1808-1815) with a relatively small army, the loss of which probably would be fatal to the allied cause, Wellington wrung maximum results through patience, thorough preparation, plain common sense, and calm courage. Superior judge of terrain, expert tactician, past master of logistics, good understanding of strategy. Could be ruthless, as in his scorched-earth policy in Portugal in 1810. A thorough Anglo-Irish aristocrat, aloofly contemptuous of the rest of the world and its works; a 'gentleman' only by the contemporary standards of his peers. Simple tastes, no liking for ostentation. No conscious effort to win his soldiers' affection, but gained respect through his efficiency. Kept his army under tight personal control, allowing even his best subordinates slight freedom of action. Ungrateful, vindictive, something of a toady and more of a snob, he was still a great captain who did more than his assigned duty.'

Interesting, many thanks for sharing Tom (as ever, I know we are indeabted to you for sharing so consistently the resources that you come across).

Alan's reputation precedes him, and I'd generally agree with what he says with two very small caveats.

He's 100% right, Wellington was almost impossible to cast as a romantic leader, and he certainly had disdain for the lower ranks. The relationship between Wellington and the rank and file was a complex one though. As Alan says, the latter trusted him implicitly, but there was no love there. I wouldn't personally suggest that a relationship based on fear was cultivated between them though. Wellington never sought interpersonal connections with his men. They had affectionate nicknames for him (most notably 'Nosey'), but I only know of one instance (Sourauren) where he embraced the adulation of his men. He could be fierce, certainly issued some furious general orders, but acted within the law when it came to punishment. He could also be lenient when it considered it to be productive (can supply general order instances if people are really interested).

The other thing I would say is that amongst well informed circles, its true that Wellington's reputation has not been denigrated. In popular circles though, the picture is more mixed. I've lost count of the number of times I have tried to offer a more balanced assessment to people who claim that 'Wellington ran away all the time' 'Wellington was a defensive general' 'Wellington was lucky' 'Wellington was second rate because he didn't face Napoleon in Spain' 'Wellington was saved at Waterloo by Blucher'. These individuals usually seem to work on the basis that Wellington cannot be praised, because acknowledging his skill appears, in their mind, to take something away from Napoleon's. Its a very perplexing idea, not least because, if you argue that Wellington was a poor commander, you implicitly suggest that all those he defeated in battle were even less capable (and nobody could argue that Ney, Soult, Massena, Victor, Marmont and even Bonaparte were poor commanders). Its all a case of how well informed people are. If you know your battles, you know Wellington was good, and up there with the best of his age. If you don't, whether you want to acknowledge his skill depends largely on whether you favour the coalition or Napoleon.